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Abstract 
Previous studies of civil war have considered how the dynamics of multi-party conflicts 
differ from those involving a single rebel group. But few studies have examined the 
interdependent relationships that exist between the rebel groups themselves. Some groups 
form alliances, while others engage in inter-group conflict. This thesis contributes to the 
empirical literature on civil conflict by exploring the understudied area of rebel group 
interactions. Chapter I reviews the literature, highlights the gaps in previous research and 
outlines the hypotheses to be tested. Chapter II examines the driving forces for rebel group 
interactions by testing two competing theories using empirical data. Results suggest that 
power considerations are the primary driving force behind group interactions, but identity 
considerations are also found to play an important role. Chapter III explores the conditions 
that facilitate cooperative versus conflictual interactions. A set of theoretical arguments, 
based on credible commitments, are proposed and these are tested using empirical data. 
Results suggest that rebels with high levels of alliance credibility are more likely to cooperate 
with their peers, whereas groups who lack alliance credibility are more likely to engage in 
inter-rebel violence. Chapter IV examines the effect of interaction strategies on the survival 
and termination-type of rebel groups. Results of empirical data analysis show that interaction 
strategies have no effect on group longevity. Groups who engage in inter-rebel violence are 
more likely to terminate by peace agreement, whereas groups who form alliances are less 
likely to terminate by peace agreement. Allied groups are also less likely to suffer defeat. 
Chapter V investigates how computer based simulation techniques may be used to model 
rebel group interactions. A model of two-sided conflict is developed and extended so that 
multi-party conflict simulations can be performed. Suggestions regarding the modelling of 
interaction strategies are proposed and conclusions are drawn, which emphasise the relative 
advantages of differential equation modelling and agent-based simulation. 
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Introduction 
Multi-party civil conflicts pose a complex challenge for states. They last longer than two-
sided wars and they are less likely to reach a resolution at the negotiating table via peace 
settlements (Cunningham 2006; Nilsson 2010). This complexity arises, in part, because of the 
interdependent relationships that exist between the groups involved. Some rebel groups form 
alliances and join forces in their quest to defeat the state, while other groups engage in inter-
rebel violence, choosing instead to engage in armed combat with their peers.  
An increasing number of studies have begun to explore how the dynamics of multi-party war 
differ from two-sided war, but few studies have examined the interdependencies that exist 
between the rebel groups themselves, even though interactions between non-state actors in 
multi-party civil wars are common. The dynamics of the Afghan civil war for example, which 
started over three decades ago and is still active today, has been altered considerably by the 
interactions that took place between the fourteen rebel groups involved. Some groups 
operated independently, some formed cooperative alliances, while others engaged in combat 
with their peers. In this case, fighting occurred between rival groups, such as the Taliban and 
UIFSA, but also between groups that had previously been allies, such as Jamiat i-Islami and 
another Mujahedeen Alliance member, Hezb i-Islami.  
What factors determine the interaction decisions made by rebel groups? Why do some rebel 
groups form cooperative alliances, while others, under apparently similar circumstances, 
engage in combat with their peers? Do rebel groups who interact improve their chances of 
survival? Do they have a higher likelihood of achieving a decisive victory? How can the 
underlying mechanisms of multi-party conflicts be explored? The chapters presented in this 
thesis contribute to the civil conflict literature by addressing these unanswered questions. 
Answering these questions is important because they are central to understanding the 
dynamics of multi-party civil war; an aspect that is crucial, if multi-party conflicts are to be 
successfully managed at both the national and international levels.  
The first part of this thesis (Chapter I) reviews the theoretical and empirical contributions to 
the literature on rebel group interactions. Since this field of study is relatively new, most of 
the theories discussed do not directly address interactions between rebel groups in civil war. 
Instead, they consider interactions that take place between sovereign states or between 
political parties within a nation state. It is proposed however, that useful analogies can be 
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drawn from these theories if it is assumed that non-state actors in civil wars behave like 
nation states in the international system. The two dominant theories explored in Chapter I 
provide competing explanations for the motivations (or driving forces) responsible for rebel 
group interactions and these are tested empirically in Chapter II. The first theory is based on 
the notion that power considerations are dominant in shaping the interaction decisions made 
by warring groups. According to this theory, interactions are viewed as being purely tactical 
and rebel groups are expected to interact in a way that maximises their military capabilities 
(i.e. size). In contrast, the second theory is based on the notion that identity considerations, 
such as ideology, ethnicity or religion are dominant in shaping the interaction decisions made 
by rebel groups. According to this theory, rebel groups are expected to interact with others on 
the basis of their shared identity. The prevailing opinion among civil war scholars is that 
power considerations are the primary driving force behind interactions. As such, few studies 
have empirically tested the role of social ties in encouraging rebel group interactions and the 
role of ideology has been almost entirely overlooked. This aspect is explored in Chapter II.  
As mentioned above, few empirical studies have explicitly examined rebel group interactions 
in multi-party wars. The studies that have examined rebel group interactions, have either 
considered alliance formation, or inter-rebel violence, but few studies have examined both 
types of interaction strategy at the same time. Thus, by examining each strategy separately, 
previous research has overlooked the possibility that the root causes of each outcome might 
be identical. Indeed, the literature review presented in Chapter I, suggests that there is good 
theoretical reason to anticipate that shared identity will encourage alliance formation in some 
cases, whilst facilitating inter-rebel violence in others. The question of why some rebel 
groups form alliances with their peers, while others, driven by the same identity-based 
motives, engage in combat with their peers is addressed in Chapter III. 
The theoretical explanations for rebel group interactions discussed in Chapters I-III are based 
on the assumption that groups adopt strategies to maximise their returns, such as bargaining 
power, chance of victory, survival or profits. But empirical studies in the rebel group 
dynamics literature have not yet established whether groups who adopt interaction strategies 
do indeed have improved prospects in civil war, such as an increased chance of survival or an 
increased chance of attaining a favourable outcome against the state. This aspect is important 
because from the viewpoint of conflict resolution, gaining knowledge on the determinants of 
interactions is only of value to policy-makers if it is known how these interactions affect a 
rebel group’s chance of success. If groups who engage in inter-rebel violence get eliminated 
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quickly or achieve less favourable outcomes such as government defeat, policy-makers may 
be less concerned about the onset of conflict between rebel groups. But, if violence between 
non-state actors increases the chance of survival for some groups (which have survived at the 
expense of others), and if this longevity results in favourable outcomes for the surviving 
group, such as rebel victory, then policy-makers might take the opposite view. These aspects 
are explored in Chapter IV. 
The empirical contributions reviewed in Chapter I, and the analyses presented in Chapters II-
IV, use statistical modelling methods to empirically test theories relating to rebel group 
interactions. The main issue with these approaches is that they do not provide any 
information regarding the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon under study. Statistical 
models allow us to draw conclusions regarding the macro-level effect of rebel group 
interactions on civil war dynamics, but since they are observational methods, they can only 
provide indirect information regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for these 
effects. The final chapter of this thesis (Chapter V) attempts to overcome this issue by 
investigating the potential uses of differential equation modelling and agent-based simulation 
for the modelling of rebel group interactions. These simulations are used to illustrate a variety 
of hypothetical conflicts and to demonstrate how computer based simulation techniques could 
be used to test the micro-level mechanisms underpinning rebel group interactions. 
The focus of this thesis is rebel group interactions. As such, a great deal of consideration is 
given to characteristics at the rebel group-level. This aspect is advantageous as it addresses 
the limitations of previous conflict research, which has tended to focus solely on state 
attributes. It is important to point out however, that rebel group interactions (and other rebel 
group dynamics such as splintering and defection) should not be considered as being 
independent from the state. Indeed, the state is likely to influence the nature of the 
interactions that take place between rebel groups (an aspect which is considered in Chapters 
III and V). The state is also likely to influence the number of rebel groups that are willing to 
participate in conflict in the first place (an aspect that is considered briefly in Chapter II). 
Other studies have also demonstrated the influence of the state in terms of encouraging rebel 
defection (Kalyvas 2008). Thus, whilst the primary focus of this thesis is to consider the 
effect of rebel group-level attributes (such as identity and group size) on group interactions, 
future research should ensure that both state and rebel group-level attributes are considered.     
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Chapter I 
 
Context and theory 
 
1.1  Relevant literature 
The national-level correlates of civil war are well understood. Civil wars are more likely to 
occur in countries with poverty and economic instability, in countries with weak institutions, 
in sparsely populated peripheral regions and in countries with mountainous terrain (Collier 
and Hoeffler 2000, 2004, 2007; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Hegre and Sambanis 2006). The 
mechanisms underpinning these relationships however, are not well understood. One reason 
for this is that traditional studies of civil conflict have tended to focus exclusively on the role 
of state attributes. While many of these studies have emphasised the importance of rebel 
group characteristics, most have failed to specify group-level attributes in empirical models.  
A number of recent studies have attempted to overcome this issue by focusing on dyadic 
interactions. These are interactions that take place between the state and a rebel group 
(Cederman, Girardin and Gleditsch 2009; Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan 2009). 
Dyadic studies represent a positive shift away from the state-centric approaches favoured 
previously. However, their main shortcoming is that they conceptualise war as a two-party 
phenomenon between the state and a single rebel group. This approximation is limited since 
over one-half of all civil conflicts occurring after 1945 involved more than one rebel group 
(Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008). In response to this empirical observation, an 
increasing number of studies have started considering how conflict dynamics (namely 
duration and termination) might be affected by the presence of multiple rebel groups. 
Research in this field has shown that civil wars involving multiple groups last longer because 
they are substantially more resistant to resolution (Cunningham 2006) and that the inclusion 
of all rebel groups in negotiations does not necessarily ensure peace (Nilsson 2008). 
Most recently, research on multi-party conflicts has moved beyond the study of conflict 
dynamics to the study of rebel group dynamics. This relatively new branch of literature has 
sought to understand the causes and effects of a range of within-group and between-group 
behaviours. Studies which have looked at within-group dynamics have considered group 
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fragmentation (or splintering), where a rebel group splits into two separate groups as a result 
of internal dispute (Cunningham, Bakke and Seymour 2012; Warren and Troy 2014) and 
group defection, where segments of a rebel group break away to join the state or an opposing 
rebel group (Kreutz 2012; Staniland 2012). Studies which have looked at between-group 
dynamics have considered alliance formation, where rebel groups cooperate with each other 
and join forces against the state (Akcinaroglu 2012) and inter-rebel violence, where rebel 
groups fight with each other simultaneously to fighting the state (Christia 2008; Lilja and 
Hultman 2011; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). The primary focus of this thesis is between-group 
dynamics. These will be referred to hence forth as rebel group interactions.  
Research on rebel group interactions has sought to explain the motives (or driving forces) for 
cooperation, or fighting, between rebel groups. Some theorists suggest that power-based 
considerations are the primary driving force behind rebel group interactions, whilst other 
theorists suggest that identity-based considerations are dominant. Power scholars argue that 
group interactions are purely tactical and that rebels are motivated solely by a desire to win 
the war and maximise returns. Identity scholars argue that these rationalist explanations are 
too simplistic. They argue that identity-based factors (such as shared ideology, ethnicity or 
religion) are also important in determining the interaction decisions made by rebel groups.  
The aim of the first part of this chapter is to review the theoretical and empirical literature 
relating to rebel group interactions. This review will begin by discussing power-based 
theories. These theories will be explained and the empirical contributions to the conflict 
literature will be reviewed. An explanation of identity-based theories will then be provided 
and the empirical contributions will be reviewed. A discussion of alternative competing 
theories of rebel group interactions (which consider institutional and geographic factors) will 
be included. This review will finish by discussing the merits, shortcomings and compatibility 
of power-based and identity-based theories.  
1.1.1 Power-based theories of rebel group interactions 
Several prominent theories in the political science literature argue that power considerations 
are the primary driving force behind group interactions (Waltz 1979; Walt 1987; Schweller 
1994). These theories suggest that cooperation between groups, or indeed conflict between 
groups, arise as a result of tactical decisions motivated purely by a desire for victory or for 
maximising returns (Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Christia 2008; Fjelde 
and Nilsson 2012). As such, power-based theories tend to disregard the notion that identity-
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based factors, such as ideology or ethnicity, play a role in motivating the behaviour of 
warring groups. Some theorists have gone as far as to say that identity-based factors are 
irrelevant, they suggest that identity is used merely to justify tactical decisions made on the 
basis of power-balancing (Riker 1962; Christia 2012).  
Broadly speaking, power-based explanations can be categorised into three main branches of 
political science and international relations theory. These are; power balancing and 
bandwagoning theory; economic viability theory and; minimum winning coalition theory. 
Most of these theories do not directly address interactions between rebel groups in civil war. 
Instead, they consider interactions that take place between sovereign states or between 
political parties within a nation state. Useful analogies however can be drawn from these 
theories if it is assumed that non-state actors in civil wars behave like nation states in the 
international system (Posen 1993; Fearon 1995, 1998). These theories, their civil conflict 
analogies and the related empirical research are reviewed below.  
Balancing and bandwagoning theories 
Balancing theory suggests that international security is achieved only when the military 
capabilities of nation states are distributed in such a way that no one state is strong enough to 
dominate all others (Waltz 1979). The theory predicts that if one state gains a 
disproportionate amount of power, it is likely to attack its weaker neighbours thereby 
providing an incentive for them to unite in a defensive coalition. As such, balancing theory 
implies that the driving force behind alliance formation is power-balancing, whereby actors 
choose to balance against their most powerful rivals.  
One criticism of this theory is the assumption that the dominant state would automatically be 
perceived by the weaker states as posing a threat. Walt (1987) proposes a modification which 
overcomes this issue, arguing that power-balancing occurs only when the dominant state is 
perceived as being threatening. Walt (1987) defines threat as a function of a nation state’s 
offensive power, military capabilities, geographic proximity and perceived aggressive 
intentions. Balancing theory does not account for the possibility that power-balancing may 
not be the optimum solution for weak states, as highlighted by the empirical reality of 
bandwagoning, where a weak state aligns with a stronger power at the expense of balancing 
with its weaker peers. Schweller (1994) argues that bandwagoning may be a preferable 
alliance strategy if the objective of the weak actor is profit and not security. Walt (1987) 
argues that bandwagoning is optimal when a state is particularly weak or if it is proximate to 
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a strong power, whilst Mearsheimer (2001) likens bandwagoning to capitulation, suggesting 
that bandwagoning occurs when a weak state recognises imminent defeat against the stronger 
power in an on-going war. 
One implication of balancing theory in the context of civil war is that rebel groups might 
align to balance power against a stronger state. Akcinaroglu (2012) argues that alliances 
might enable rebel groups to increase their military capabilities to a point where the power-
balance shifts away from the state. She concludes that this shift in power-balance might 
explain why some weak groups survive against extremely low odds or why some strong 
states may be defeated by seemingly less capable enemies.  
In her empirical study, Akcinaroglu (2012) analyses Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) 
data on civil war outcomes between 1946 and 2008. She tests the effect of alliance formation 
and cumulative alliance capabilities on war outcomes using competing risks regression. Her 
results show that rebel groups who form alliances are less likely to suffer defeat, while groups 
who have access to high levels of alliance capabilities (i.e. groups who form alliances with 
larger military capabilities) are more likely to be the victors of war. As such, this study 
provides some evidence that alliances might be motivated by power-based motives. In her 
discussions, Akcinaroglu (2012) also hints at the suggestion that identity-based factors are 
unlikely to play a role. Specifically, she points out that alliances are often forged despite 
differences in ideological and territorial aspirations between groups. But since power-
balancing mechanisms are not directly tested (i.e. the effect of relative rebel group size on the 
likelihood of alliance formation is not tested), the main contribution of Akcinaroglu’s study is 
that it yields useful insights into the effect of rebel group alliances on civil war outcomes. 
If power-based theories of alliance formation are correct, there should be a higher likelihood 
of cooperation between groups that are small relative to their peers. Smaller groups have high 
incentives to form alliances because they are more vulnerable to elimination, meaning they 
will be more willing to share the spoils of war with their alliance partner, compared to larger 
groups who may be unwilling to share their returns as a result of their high degree of power.  
Hypothesis: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
cooperate. Groups who are militarily small relative to others will form alliances to 
balance their power against the state or other rebel groups. 
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Another implication of balancing theory in the context of civil war is that strong rebel groups 
might have an incentive to attack weaker rebel groups, thereby providing an incentive for 
weaker groups to unite and balance power against them. In their empirical study on inter-
rebel violence, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) find evidence which supports this case. They argue 
that strong rebels have increased abilities and incentives to eliminate their weaker peers. 
These increased incentives arise because smaller groups have potential to act as veto-players 
by blocking settlements (Cunningham 2006) and because small groups often stand to gain a 
disproportionate share of the spoils of war (Nilsson 2010). The latter occurs because in multi-
party conflicts, the state seeks to reduce the number of battles they fight. As such, 
governments will often offer concessions to small groups as a means of winning away pieces 
(Zartman 1995).  
Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) analyse UCDP data on non-state actor conflict using logistic 
regression models and find that militarily small and militarily large rebel groups are most 
likely to engage inter-rebel violence. This finding provides some evidence that strong rebel 
groups may attack their weaker peers, although there is ambiguity regarding this conclusion 
because the data analysed does not distinguish between the targets and initiators of non-state 
violence. Another limitation of this study is that it does not consider group alliances or the 
effect of social ties on inter-rebel violence, however the authors do point out that identity-
based factors are likely to play an important role in motivating the interaction behaviour of 
warring groups. In summary, if power-based theories of inter-rebel violence are correct, we 
would expect a higher likelihood of fighting for small and large groups. Larger groups have 
the capacity to engage in inter-rebel violence, whereas smaller groups are obvious targets.  
Hypothesis: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
engage in inter-rebel violence. Groups who are militarily large relative to others will 
target groups who are militarily small relative to others.  
Economic viability theories 
Economic viability theories are based on the notion that opportunity and economic viability 
are the dominant explanations for civil war. Theorists in this school of thought argue that the 
risk of civil conflict is increased when there is an opportunity for rebels to make a financial 
gain or when there is an opportunity for rebels to generate profits through the control or 
extortion of natural resources such as drugs, diamonds, timber or oil (Collier and Hoeffler 
2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003). In the context of rebel group interactions, economic viability 
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theories are practically in agreement with the international relations theories of power-
balancing discussed above. They suggest that rebel groups will interact with each other in a 
way that maximises profit without regard to identity considerations.   
One implication of this is that rebel groups operating in conflict zones with natural resources 
may seek to form alliances to generate profits. In his empirical study on natural resources, 
Ross (2004) uses a case-study approach to examine the influence of natural resources on civil 
war. In this study, seven hypotheses regarding the influence of natural resources on civil war 
are described and the observable implications of each hypothesis are specified. Ross (2004) 
then reports which mechanisms are observed in a sample consisting of thirteen cases. Ross 
(2004) finds that some civil conflicts experience lower casualty rates as a result of 
cooperation between non-state actors. In eight of the thirteen case-studies considered, Ross 
(2004) finds that rebel groups laid down their arms to cooperatively exploit the same 
resources. This occurred in Sierra Leone, where rebels cooperatively extorted diamonds, and 
in Sudan, where profitable alliances were struck between the groups who guarded the 
countries oilfields and pipelines that they had opposed.  
Conversely, Ross (2004) finds in other cases, that the presence of natural resources increases 
conflict intensity as a result of conflict between non-state actors. This type of fighting 
occurred in Peru, where the hard-line Maoist group Sendero Luminoso clashed with rival 
groups over control of the coca trade, and in Myanmar, where rebel groups in the Shan region 
fought to control the heroin trade. The main strength of Ross’s study is that it considers 
alliance formation and inter-rebel violence simultaneously, unlike the majority of previous 
research which has considered these two types of interactions separately. The main criticism 
of this study is that the sample size is small, meaning that the results may not be reflective of 
civil wars more generally. Another criticism is that Ross (2004) does not address the question 
of why some groups cooperatively exploit natural resources, whilst other groups engage in 
conflict over resources. As such, further research is needed to address this aspect. 
Another empirical study which finds evidence supporting economic viability arguments is the 
study by Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) discussed earlier. The results of their logistic regression 
analyses show that drug cultivation in conflict zones increases the likelihood of inter-rebel 
violence and that gemstone production decreases the likelihood. With regards to the latter, 
Fjelde and Nilsson conclude that groups who seek to generate profits through natural 
resources may have to divide their time between fighting the state and extracting resources. 
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In turn, they agree with Addison, Le Billon and Murshed (2003) who argue that this 
substitution between activities may, in some circumstances, lead to increased incentives for 
groups to align with their peers and cooperatively generate profits. Collier (2000) also 
supports the suggestion that group interactions are motivated by the desire of groups to 
maximise returns. He provides anecdotal evidence which suggests that armed conflicts 
between non-state actors are a direct consequence of rebel groups’ efforts to create a 
monopoly over natural resources in areas where the economic returns are high.  
The main criticism of these studies, and of power-based theories more broadly, is that they 
disregard the role of identity-based factors entirely. This is limited because some theorists 
argue that shared identity reduces the costs of alliance formation (Fearon and Laitin 1996; 
Weinstein 2007). Others argue that shared identity increases the payoff for groups who 
eliminate their ideologically or ethnically similar peers (Christia 2008; Lilja and Hultman 
2011; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). If it is true that identity-based factors result in cost savings 
which maximise returns for rebel groups, then the economic viability approaches which 
overlook identity considerations are arguably incomplete. 
Minimum winning coalition theories 
Another set of power-based theories that are analogous to rebel group interactions in civil war 
come from the comparative politics literature on political parties and voting. The literature on 
comparative politics is extensive, with most theories seeking to predict which political parties 
will align. In multi-party contexts, coalition theory emphasises the idea of a minimum 
winning coalition, in which there is a mix of parties that are willing to align who have the 
minimum number of representatives required to form a majority. As with the theoretical 
viewpoints discussed so far, this theory suggests that political parties make alliance decisions 
irrespective of their ideological agenda (Riker 1962). It is worth noting that some approaches 
to comparative politics do take ideology into account. These emphasise policy-viable 
coalitions, in which it is argued that political parties care more for their policies than for 
being in power (De Swaan 1973). These theories are discussed in a later section of this 
review.  
Applied to a civil war context, minimum winning coalition theory suggests that rebel groups 
will seek to achieve a victory against the state with the minimum number of allies (i.e. a 
group will seek to form alliances with the smallest possible number of other rebel groups). 
The rationale behind this is based on the assumption that rebel groups seek to maximise their 
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returns. If a rebel group is able to align with a few partners, they may increase their chance of 
victory at the same time as maximising their share of returns on the spoils of war. 
Additionally, a weak rebel group may not wish to align with a more powerful player because 
the stronger player cannot credibly commit (or guarantee) that it will not turn on the weaker 
rebel group once victory is secured (Fearon 1995, 1998; Lake and Rothchild 1996; Walter 
1997; Powell 2006).  
In her empirical study of rebel group alliances, Christia (2012) proposes that rebel groups 
align on the basis of minimum winning coalitions. She argues that identity-based factors do 
not play a role in alliance formation, citing case-study examples of Afghanistan and Bosnia, 
where alliances were forged despite ethnic and ideological disparities between rebel groups. 
By analysing novel interview data collected from the leaders and generals of several Afghan 
rebel groups, Christia (2012) shows that changes in relative power-balances between rebel 
groups over the course of the Afghan war, resulted in alliance fractionalisation and 
subsequent fighting between rebel groups. She concludes that alliances are less prone to 
fractionalisation (and subsequently less likely to result in inter-rebel violence) when the rebel 
groups face a strong state or when the allied groups experience a series of battlefield wins. 
The study by Christia (2012) is arguably the most comprehensive empirical study of rebel 
group interactions in civil war. It makes a significant contribution to the field by presenting 
novel qualitative data collected via interviews of rebel group commanders in the Afghan war. 
In addition, the study considers a number of rebel group behaviours simultaneously and 
produces findings which support many long-standing theories based on power considerations. 
Despite these strengths, there are a few criticisms of her study.  
Firstly, Christia (2012) entirely dismisses the role of identity on the basis that ideological and 
ethnic ties were contradicted when alliance configurations in the Afghan war changed. But, 
she overlooks the fact that many alliances were originally formed on the basis of shared goals 
(the Mujahedeen alliance was formed by groups who opposed Soviet occupation for 
example). As such, her findings do not support her overall conclusion that identity-based 
factors are irrelevant in alliance formation. Instead, her findings suggest that alliance 
preferences are likely to evolve over the duration of war. Another issue is that the study 
suffers from selection bias. Christia (2012) uses case-studies on the Afghan and Bosnian 
conflicts to produce evidence which supports her claims. But, the selection of these two cases 
means that other possible interaction strategies are overlooked (for example, many rebel 
26 
 
groups do not interact with their peers at all, they choose instead to operate independently for 
the entire duration of the conflict).  
Christia (2012) also considers inter-rebel violence only as a function of alliance 
fractionalisation. This is empirically limited, as is evident in the studies by Fjelde and Nilsson 
(2012) and Lilja and Hultman (2011), which show that many groups engage in inter-rebel 
fighting for reasons beyond acrimonious splits. Finally, as with all power-based theories of 
interactions, Christia assumes that rebel groups make alliance choices purely on the basis of 
tactical decisions regarding the military capabilities of other groups. But, as Fearon (1995) 
points out, actors in civil war have a strategic incentive to misrepresent their capabilities. If 
groups have incomplete information, it could be argued that they are more likely to make 
interaction decisions on the basis of other preferences (such as identity) instead of relying on 
uncertain estimations regarding the military capabilities of other groups. 
1.1.2 Identity-based theories of rebel group interactions 
Contrary to the power-based theories discussed above, a number of political scientists argue 
that identity considerations are the dominant explanation for within-conflict dynamics such as 
rebel group interactions. Identity scholars argue that the rationalist explanations for civil war 
(summarised earlier) are overplayed (Rokkan 1999; Kaufmann 2001; Buhaug, Cederman, and 
Rød 2006; Cederman and Girardin 2007; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). They argue 
that the decisions and behaviours of non-state actors are determined, either in whole or in 
part, by factors such as ideology, political stance, ethnicity, caste, tribe, religion, social-class 
or language (Bates 1983; Horowitz 1985; Platteau 1994; Fearon and Laitin 1996; Miguel and 
Gugerty 2005; Habyarimana, Humphreys, Posner, and Weinstein 2007).  
Some theorists argue that rebel groups with a distinct identity may gain organisational 
advantages which govern their behaviour (Selznick 1952; Pye 1956; Huntington 1968; Bates 
1983; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010a), whilst others argue that identity-based interactions satisfy 
individuals’ evolutionary need to belong to a group (Horowitz 1985; Van Den Berghe 1981; 
Van Evera 1994, 2001; Petersen 2001, 2002). Most identity-based theories do not directly 
address between-group interactions in civil war. Instead, they consider how identity-based 
factors shape within-group dynamics (such as recruitment, cohesion, fragmentation and 
defection). But as before, useful analogies can be drawn if these theories are extended by 
assuming that within-group dynamics are akin to between-group dynamics. These identity-
based theories, their implications for rebel group interactions and the related empirical studies 
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are reviewed below. A third identity-based theory on policy-viable coalitions which was 
mentioned in the previous section is also discussed. 
Organisational efficiency explanations 
Many theories argue that identity plays a crucial role in civil conflict because it enables rebel 
groups to gain organisational advantages which govern their behaviour. These organisational 
advantages include increased mobilisation capabilities, improved cohesion and a decreased 
likelihood of defection. Rebel groups with a distinct identity may gain recruitment 
advantages because they are able to motivate or coerce individuals to fight on the basis of 
ethnic or religious justifications or loyalty (Gates 2002; Zartman 2005; Weinstein, 2007; Eck 
2009). Groups may also derive cohesive benefits, because identity provides a readily 
available shared code for communication (such as language, social norms, custom or 
religious practice), which provides an opportunity for repeated exchanges and information 
sharing between group members. These repeated exchanges lead to an understanding of 
reciprocity that, along with reputation costs, facilitates in-group policing and sanctioning. In 
turn, these features decrease the likelihood of internal group dispute, splintering or defection 
(Selznick 1952; Pye 1956; Huntington 1968; Bates 1983; Kalyvas and Balcells 2010a).  
One implication of these theories for rebel group interactions is that shared identity might 
facilitate alliance formation by reducing the costs of coordinating operations (Fearon and 
Laitin 1996). Shared identity is likely to improve communication between groups, enabling 
them to initiate alliances. It might also strengthen alliance bonds by reducing the incentive for 
each group to renege on their alliance deal. There are very few empirical studies that test the 
effect of social ties on alliance formation. The main reasons for this are a lack of conceptual 
clarity regarding identity variables (such as ideology) and paucity in appropriate data. One of 
the first studies of to explore the effect of social ties on alliance formation in civil war is the 
study by Bapat and Bond (2012).  
In their study, Bapat and Bond (2012) identify certain conditions under which rebel groups 
may be able to overcome commitment problems and form alliances. They present two game-
theoretic models, which differentiate between two types of alliance. The first model captures 
bilateral alliances, which involve cooperation between domestic rebel groups. The second 
model captures asymmetric alliances, which involve cooperation between domestic groups 
and external groups or sponsors. Bapat and Bond (2012) present the theoretical predictions 
obtained from their game-theoretic models and test them empirically using UCDP data. Their 
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results show that bilateral alliances are more likely when a state’s repressive capabilities are 
poor, whereas asymmetric alliances are more likely when a state’s repressive capabilities are 
strong. Bapat and Bond (2012) argue that social ties between rebel groups are a function of 
the repressive capabilities of a state. Thus, rebel groups facing weak governments are able to 
form strong bilateral alliances with high degrees of social connectedness, whereas rebel 
groups facing strong governments are only able to form asymmetric alliances, which are 
weaker with lower degrees of social connectedness. The main criticism of this study is that 
social ties between groups are not quantified; the authors simply assume that bilateral 
alliances do indeed have higher degrees of social connectedness compared to asymmetric 
alliances. As a result, the study arguably provides evidence in support of an alternative 
hypothesis, that involvement of an external sponsor decreases the likelihood of alliance 
formation between domestic rebel groups. 
If shared identity reduces the costs of cooperating and increases the likelihood of alliances 
between rebel groups, it might be expected that rebel groups with different identities are more 
likely to fight. Interestingly, a number of empirical studies find evidence which supports the 
opposite argument that shared identity increases the likelihood of inter-rebel violence 
(Christia 2008; Lilja and Hultman 2011; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) 
argue that there are good theoretical reasons for this. They suggest that multi-party conflicts 
are more likely to take on a zero-sum character because each rebel group is in competition 
with its peers for recruits and civilian support. If the recruitment pool is sufficiently small, or 
if the number of rebel groups operating in the conflict is sufficiently large, a rebel group may 
have to resort to fighting other groups as a means of eliminating its competition 
(Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan, 2009).  
In their empirical study on violence between co-ethnic groups, Lilja and Hultman (2011) find 
that the Sri Lankan rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), targeted their co-
ethnic peer groups so that they could establish dominance over their ethnic constituency.   
Christia (2008) also finds that Muslim groups in Bosnia engaged in fighting over resources 
despite their shared religious beliefs. She concludes that identity-based factors are not 
important in motivating rebel group behaviour.  
Based on these discussions, it is evident that empirical research has produced divergent 
results regarding the effect of social ties on rebel group interactions. Some studies suggest 
that shared identity facilitates cooperation between rebel groups, whilst others argue that 
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shared identity creates dispute between groups. In reality, it seems that shared identity 
facilitates alliance formation in some instances, whilst encouraging inter-rebel violence in 
others. Ultimately, this question is an empirical one. As such, further research is needed to 
establish the conditions that lead to cooperative versus conflictual interactions.   
Hypothesis: Shared identity increases the likelihood of interactions (cooperation and 
fighting) between groups. Rebel groups are more likely to interact when they share 
social ties (such as ideology) with other groups. 
Hypothesis: In the presence of a conditional variable, Z, rebel groups who share social 
ties with other groups will form alliances, but in the absence of Z, rebel groups who 
share social ties with other groups will engage in inter-rebel violence. 
Explanations of individual-belonging 
The primordialist school of thought also supports the suggestion that identity-based factors 
govern the behaviour of rebel groups in civil war. Academics in this field argue that ethnic 
groups and other identity-based groups satisfy individuals’ evolutionary need to belong to an 
in-group. Van Den Berghe (1981) argues that this need-to-belong results in the formation of 
kinship groups who use nepotism to propagate their line. Van Evera (2001) suggests that 
group identities, once constructed, are near impossible to reconstruct, whilst Salter (2001) 
and Van Den Berge (2002) argue that the desire of individuals’ to protect their genetic 
relatives is so strong, that individuals are willing to sacrifice themselves, in battle for 
example, if it ensures survival of their ethnic kin.  
These theories have a number of implications for civil war. Firstly, they suggest that 
heterogeneous societies are inevitable and that identity-based groups are unavoidable facets 
of social life. This could explain why multi-party conflicts arise in the first place. If 
individuals have a strong sense of belonging to a pre-existing identity-based group, then it 
follows that these groups may be un-willing to merge and form a single group if they enter 
into conflict against the state. The question of why some civil wars contain more than one 
rebel group is an interesting one that previous research has not addressed. Secondly, if 
individuals have a strong sense of belonging to a group, then it holds that rebel groups might 
be willing to fight other rebel groups, if those groups threaten the survival of their own group. 
This suggestion is supported by empirical research which shows that pre-existing identity 
cleavages encourage fighting between groups, even when those cleavages are based on non-
genetic factors such as ideology (Balcells 2010, 2011).  
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In contrast to the above discussion, some scholars argue that the evolutionary need of 
individuals’ to belong to a group could well be the basis for alliance formation (Tajfel, Bilig, 
Bundy and Flament 1971; Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby 1992; Kaufmann 1996a, 1996b; 
Petersen 2001, 2002). If individuals have a strong desire to protect their kin, then rebel 
groups with the same identity have increased incentives to accommodate each other in an 
alliance (and make sacrifices for each other) if the long-term survival of their common kin is 
ensured. This suggestion is supported by previous empirical research which has shown that 
kinship alliances are a common feature of many civil wars (Cederman, Girardin, and 
Gleditsch 2009; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). The growing literature on security 
communities also supports this theory. Security communities are formed when separate 
entities join forces and align in response to the same emerging threat. Scholars in this field 
propose that in normal circumstances these entities would not usually interact. But, when 
faced with the same emerging threat, these entities unite on the basis of a shared desire to 
survive (Starr 1992; Adler and Barnett 1998; Acharya 2001).  
These discussions enhance the point made earlier, that identity-based theories can be used to 
explain opposing interaction behaviours. The majority of civil war research does not address 
this aspect. Most empirical studies avoid problematic discussions relating to theoretical 
contradictions by analysing cooperation and fighting in separate statistical models.  
Policy-viable coalition theory 
As mentioned earlier, a significant number of theories in the coalition politics literature argue 
that identity concerns, as opposed to power concerns, are the key predictor of alliance 
behaviour. These theories are based on policy-viable coalitions, which assume that political 
parties care more for their policies than for being in power. They predict that political parties 
who are most similar on the political spectrum are more likely to align (De Swaan 1973). 
Some scholars have shown that policy-viable coalition theories capture the empirical reality 
of cabinet coalitions more accurately than theories which disregard political agendas 
(Przeworski et al. 2000). Other scholars in the comparative politics literature argue that both 
power considerations and identity considerations are important in alliance formation. They 
propose the notion of a minimal connected winning coalition, in which political parties seek 
to form minimum winning coalitions, but being constrained by identity, they look first for 
alliance partners among their ideologically similar peers (Axelrod 1970; Grofman 1982).  
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1.1.3 Alternative theories of rebel group interactions 
A number of studies advocate alternative explanations for rebel group dynamics in civil war. 
These studies suggest that factors unrelated to power-based or identity-based considerations 
are dominant in shaping the interaction decisions made by rebel groups. Some empirical 
research emphasises the importance of institutional factors, whilst other empirical research 
suggests that geography and technology are likely to play a role.  
Institutional factors 
Some civil war studies emphasise the role of institutional factors in shaping the decisions 
made by rebel groups. Empirical research has shown that state characteristics (such as 
administrative capabilities and legitimacy) and state responses to rebels (such as repression) 
have a direct impact on the interaction choices made by rebel groups. In their empirical study 
of inter-rebel violence, Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) define state strength in terms of the 
administrative capabilities and legitimacy of the government (e.g. polity). They examine 
UCDP non-state actor conflict data using logistic regression models and find that rebel 
groups engaged in conflict with a strong state are less likely to fight other groups, whereas 
rebel groups engaged in conflict with a weak state are more likely to fight other groups. 
Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) conclude that in cases where rebel groups face administratively 
weak states, the axis of conflict is likely to shift away from the government towards conflict 
between rebel groups. The rationale behind this is that each rebel group will be concerned 
about gaining political power in anticipation of the incumbent government being overthrown.  
Other studies which emphasise the role of institutional factors consider how state repression 
might affect the choices made by rebel groups. Some scholars have argued that state 
repression increases group unity and spurs recruitment through a variety of mechanisms 
including revenge (which is grievance-based) and the desire to protect oneself (which is 
based on rational choice) (Goodwin 2001; Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas and Kocher 2007). Other 
scholars have argued that sate repression may cause splintering and fighting between groups 
because it creates internal dispute over strategy and leads to a worsening of pre-existing 
tensions (Lawrence 2007; Lyall 2009). This last point has led to a more refined suggestion 
that state repression is likely to amplify pre-existing sentiments; internally unified groups will 
become more cohesive, whilst internally divided groups will become more likely to fragment 
(McLauchlin and Pearlman 2009). If it is assumed that within-group dynamics are akin to 
between-group dynamics, then it holds that state repression might facilitate rebel group 
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alliances in some circumstances, whilst encouraging fighting between groups in others. This 
has been tested for the case of alliances in the study mentioned earlier by Bapat and Bond 
(2012) who find that state repression increases the likelihood of rebel group alliances. 
Geographic factors 
Previous research has shown that geography can either be a cause of civil war, or a context in 
which war can be analysed (Diehl 1991). Studies concerned with the geographic causes of 
war have found that civil war is more likely to occur in sparsely populated regions (Buhaug 
and Rød 2006) and in countries with mountainous terrain and resource wealth (Collier 2000; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Angrist and Kugler 2008; Bellows and Miguel 2008). Studies 
concerned with the geographic contexts of war have shown that violent events cluster in 
space along geographic borders (Kirby and Ward 1987; Anselin and O’Loughlin 1990, 1992; 
O’Loughlin and Anselin 1991, 1992) and that the initiation, diffusion and spread of conflict 
can be explained by geographic factors (Braithwaite 2005, 2006; Gleditsch 2002; Ward and 
Gleditsch 2002). Recently, research in this field has started to consider how geographic 
factors might affect the behaviour of rebel groups.  
Buhaug, Gates and Lujala (2009) use precisely dated duration data in event history 
models combined with geographic data on conflict location to show that the relative 
location of government and rebel forces can enhance as well as reduce the relative 
capabilities of each side. They argue that rebel groups without proximity to government 
forces are disadvantaged because they must use vital resources travelling to target the 
government stronghold. One obvious counter-argument to this is that rebel groups who 
have proximity to government forces might be more vulnerable to government attacks. 
The relationship between rebel group interactions and geographic proximity has not 
been empirically tested, although some theoretical work in the economics literature, 
which focuses on governance costs and principle-agent relations, argues that 
geographic proximity is an important feature of within-group dynamics. Johnston 
(2008) investigates the organisational characteristics of rebel groups and the 
downstream effects that certain group-level characteristics have on civil war. Using 
evidence from field research conducted in Liberia and Sierra Leone, combined with 
comparative case-studies of armed groups fighting in those countries from 1989 to 
2003, Johnston (2008) demonstrates that geographical and technological factors 
influence certain within-group dynamics. He shows that in cases where geographical 
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distances are great and where technology is primitive, monitoring costs make rebel 
defection, opportunism and splintering more likely. This research does not directly 
consider interactions between rebel groups, but it does provide some indication that 
geographic proximity is likely to play a role.  
One theory which is commonly referred to in the geography literature is the principle of 
least-effort, which suggests that “given various possibilities for an action… [an 
entity]…. will select the action requiring the least expenditure of effort” (Zipf 1965). 
The implication of this for rebel group interactions is that groups will interact with each 
other on the basis of geographic proximity simply because it is the option that involves 
the least effort. Gates (2002) points out that geographic proximity might also be 
important in its association with identity-based factors. He argues that the proximity of 
rebel groups might determine the attitudes that are felt within groups and between 
them. Gates (2002) suggests that proximate rebel groups will be more able to assess 
identity-based similarities which might facilitate alliance formation or encourage inter-
rebel violence. Conversely, if two rebel groups are not proximate they have less 
information on which to base their interaction decisions. This lack of information, 
combined with the increased costs associated with coordinating operations over greater 
distances, may reduce the likelihood that groups will interact. 
1.1.4 Power-based versus identity-based theories  
The prevailing opinion among civil war scholars is that power considerations are the primary 
driving force behind rebel group interactions. Some of the most prominent and long-standing 
theories in the fields of political science and international relations have laid the foundations 
for power-based arguments and many empirical studies have produced evidence which shows 
that some rebel groups appear to be motivated solely by power considerations. Despite the 
substantial support for power-based arguments, there is mounting evidence which suggests 
that the role of identity-based factors should not be ignored.  
The majority of previous research has reasoned in support of one theory over the other, but it 
could be argued that both theories are correct, they need not be mutually exclusive. As 
mentioned earlier, it might be the case that power concerns are constrained by identity 
concerns (Axelrod 1970; Grofman 1982). Alternatively, it might be the case that some rebel 
groups are driven predominantly by power concerns, whilst others are driven predominantly 
by identity concerns. The extent to which each rebel group favours one concern over the 
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other could be a function of internal group characteristics or other external factors such as 
geography, technology or other conflict or state characteristics.  
Rebel group preferences regarding identity and power considerations are likely to differ 
between groups and also, as Christia (2012) and Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) point out, they are 
likely to change over time. Some rebel groups might initially choose to interact on the basis 
of identity considerations for example, but as the conflict evolves and as circumstances 
change, group preferences may change such that power relations become paramount. Finally, 
it might be the case that power concerns are the dominant driving force behind some types of 
group interactions (such as fighting between rebel groups), whereas identity concerns are the 
dominant driving force behind other types of interactions (such as alliance formation).  
In summary, both the power-based and identity-based theories go some way towards 
explaining the interaction decisions of rebel groups in civil war, although individually they 
are unable to encompass all aspects in their own right. Power-based arguments do not 
account for the fact that some rebel groups choose to operate independently in multi-party 
wars, whereas identity-based arguments do not account for cases where alliances are forged 
between groups with conflicting identities. As such, these theories should not be viewed as 
being mutually exclusive. Instead, research should seek to identify the extent to which each 
of these theories apply and the conditions in which they have the highest degree of influence. 
1.2 Hypotheses to be tested 
The review of empirical literature has shown evidence suggesting that power and identity-
based factors are both likely to play a role in motivating the interaction behaviour of warring 
rebel groups. Specific hypotheses regarding the effect of power and identity-based factors on 
group interactions were highlighted in the first part of this chapter. These hypotheses, which 
are tested in the next chapter of this thesis (Chapter II), are listed below.  
1.2.1 Hypotheses for rebel group cooperation  
Hypothesis 1: Shared identity increases the likelihood of cooperation between groups. 
Rebel groups are more likely to form alliances when they share social ties (such as 
ideology) with other groups. 
Hypothesis 2: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
cooperate. Groups who are militarily small (relative to others) will form alliances to 
balance their power against the state or other groups. 
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1.2.2 Hypotheses for rebel group fighting  
Hypothesis 3: Shared identity increases the likelihood of fighting between groups. 
Rebel groups are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence when they share social 
ties (such as ideology) with other groups. 
Hypothesis 4: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
fight. Groups who are militarily large (relative to others) will target groups who are 
militarily small.  
1.2.3 Hypotheses for conditional relationships 
If the hypotheses regarding identity-based theories of rebel group interactions are correct, it is 
possible that a third, conditional variable might explain why one rebel group chooses to 
cooperate with its peers, while another rebel group, under apparently similar circumstances, 
chooses to fight. This suggests additional hypotheses to test. 
Hypothesis 5: In the presence of a conditional variable, Z, rebel groups who share 
social ties with other groups are more likely to form alliances. 
Hypothesis 6: In the absence of a conditional variable, Z, rebel groups who share 
social ties with other groups are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. 
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Chapter II 
 
The determinants of rebel group 
interactions 
 
Abstract 
Numerous theories have sought to explain the motives for cooperation or fighting 
between rebel groups in civil conflicts. Some theorists argue that power considerations 
are the primary motivation, while others argue that identity considerations are 
dominant. The aim of this chapter is to test these theories empirically. The 
determinants of rebel group interactions are analysed statistically using recently 
published data on rebel group alliances and inter-rebel violence. A novel methodology 
based on a social network approach is developed so that identity-based arguments can 
be tested. Results show that rebel groups are more likely to form alliances when they 
are ideologically similar to their peers. Groups are also more likely to align when they 
are militarily weak relative to their peers or when they control territory. Results on 
inter-rebel violence show that rebel groups are more likely to fight other groups when 
they are militarily strong relative to their peers or when they receive foreign support 
from external actors. Overall, these findings suggest that inter-rebel violence is 
motivated predominantly by power considerations, although identity-based factors 
play some role. Cooperative interactions are also driven by power considerations, but 
in this case identity-based factors are found to play an important role. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Previous empirical studies of civil conflict have considered how the dynamics of multi-group 
conflicts differ from those involving a single rebel group. But few studies have examined the 
interdependent relationships that exist between the rebel groups themselves, even though 
such interactions between groups in multi-party civil wars are common. Inter-rebel fighting 
has been well documented in Myanmar, Liberia and Sudan for example, so have cooperative 
alliances between rebel groups in Congo, Ethiopia and Guatemala.  
Many theories have sought to explain the motives, or driving forces, for cooperation or 
fighting, between rebel groups. Some argue that interactions are driven by power 
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considerations. These theorists argue that interactions between rebel groups are purely 
tactical and motivated solely by a desire to win the war and maximise returns. According to 
this school of thought, the expectation is that rebel groups will interact on the basis of their 
size, or the potential for profit, irrespective of identity-based considerations. Identity scholars 
argue that these rationalist explanations are too simplistic. They argue that interactions 
between rebel groups in multi-party civil wars are driven, either in whole or in part, by 
identity-based factors such as shared ideology, ethnicity, caste, tribe, class or religion. 
The aim of this chapter is to test these two competing theories empirically. The determinants 
of rebel group interactions are analysed statistically using data on alliance formation and 
inter-rebel violence that has recently become available. In the present work, it is argued that 
both power-based and identity-based factors are likely to play a role in motivating the 
interaction behaviour of rebel groups. A novel methodology based on a social network 
approach is utilised and a quantitative index that measures the degree of ideological similarity 
between groups is developed. This index is examined using a large-N framework so that 
identity-based theories can be tested. A variable relating to relative rebel group size is also 
utilised so that power-based theories can be tested.   
This chapter begins by revisiting the hypotheses outlined earlier in Chapter I. A detailed 
description of the mechanisms responsible for motivating rebel group interactions is provided 
using case-study examples. This is followed by a section describing the research design. 
Results of the statistical analyses are then presented and discussed. The chapter finishes by 
outlining the limitations of the present research and highlighting avenues for further research. 
Finally, conclusions are drawn and additional lines of enquiry intended for the subsequent 
chapters of this thesis are discussed.  
2.2 Hypotheses and case-study examples 
Specific hypotheses regarding the effect of power and identity-based factors on rebel group 
interaction strategies were outlined in Chapter I. A more detailed description of the 
mechanisms responsible for these relationships is provided below using case-study examples. 
2.2.1 The determinants of rebel group cooperation 
The first hypothesis outlined in Chapter I is based on the expectation that groups who are 
ideologically similar are more likely to form cooperative alliances. According to this 
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perspective, if rebel groups have the same ideology they are more likely to have similar 
goals. Shared goals increase the appeal of an alliance because each group stands to gain an 
advantage against the state without having to accommodate the alternative goals of a 
dissimilar group. Shared goals also strengthen alliance bonds by reducing the chances of 
internal disputes and by increasing trust between groups. Groups who share ideological ties 
may also feel a stronger sense of loyalty or duty towards the alliance, thus reducing the 
incentive for each rebel group to renege on their deal. In these ways, social ties reduce the 
costs of coordinating operations. 
Hypothesis 1: Shared identity increases the likelihood of cooperation between groups. 
Rebel groups are more likely to form alliances when they share social ties (such as 
ideology) with other groups. 
This type of alliance occurred in the Guatemalan civil war. After an unsuccessful coup in 
1960, the state of Guatemala fought a left-wing insurgency for over 30 years. As the conflict 
progressed, a number of leftist groups emerged. All groups followed a communist doctrine - 
they fought for the interests of the poor, workers’ rights and for agrarian reform. In 1982, 
after encountering fierce resistance from the state, the four major guerrilla organisations 
(EGP, ORPA, PGT and FAR) united to form the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unit 
(URNG). The Guatemalan state initially responded with high levels of repression. However, 
when that strategy failed, the state entered into negotiations with the alliance and made 
concessions by increasing aid to peasants and indigenous communities (the main supporters 
of URNG). These concessions eventually led to a cease-fire and a peace settlement was 
signed in 1996. In this conflict the leftist groups were able to unite on ideological grounds. 
Their shared goals facilitated alliance formation, which in turn, enabled them to increase their 
bargaining power and successfully press their demands on the Guatemalan state.   
The second hypothesis outlined in Chapter I is based on the expectation that groups are likely 
to form alliances on the basis of their relative size, irrespective of identity considerations. 
Groups who are militarily small relative to their peers will seek to balance their power by 
aligning against the state and other rebel groups. Smaller groups have higher incentives to 
form alliances because they are more vulnerable to elimination. This means they will be more 
willing to share the spoils of war with their alliance partner, compared to larger groups who 
have a lesser incentive to align and share their returns as a result of their capacity.   
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Hypothesis 2: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
cooperate. Groups who are militarily small (relative to others) will form alliances to 
balance their power against the state or other groups. 
This type of alliance occurred in the Afghan civil war. In 1978, insurgency broke out as a 
result of fierce opposition to the Soviet backed communist government. In 1979 the Soviet 
army responded by invading Afghanistan, and a number of insurgent groups who had 
organised in Pakistan, joined forces to balance their power against the Soviet regime. The 
alliance, known as the Mujahedeen, was formed between ten smaller groups who had 
different ethnic identities, including Pashtun, Hazara, Uzbeck and Tajik. The Mujahedeen 
alliance was unable to totally defeat the Soviet army, but they were able to make it 
increasingly costly for the Soviets to remain in Afghanistan and after ten years the Soviet 
army withdrew. By uniting and balancing their power against a stronger force, the members 
of the Mujahedeen were able to sustain conflict against the Soviet army and on the basis of 
their increased capacity they achieved their goal despite their conflicting ethnic identities. 
2.2.2 The determinants of rebel group fighting 
The discussions presented in Chapter I suggest there is good theoretical reason to expect that 
groups who share the same identity may be more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. This 
type of fighting occurred between Muslim groups in the Bosnia-Herzegovina civil war during 
the 1990’s. The Bosnian conflict involved three warring groups, the Bosnian Muslims who 
made up about 40% of the population, the Bosnian Serbs and the Bosnian Croats who each 
made up about 30% respectively. Tensions escalated in the country when Fikret Abdić, a 
Muslim member of the presidency set up an economic empire, which he declared as an 
independent economic region called the Autonomous Province of Western Bosnia (APWB). 
The newly declared independent region was opposed by the Serbs and Croats, but also by 
many Muslims and soon after the declaration of the APWB, intense fighting erupted between 
the Muslims, Serbs and Croats, but also between the Muslim groups. In this case, the Muslim 
population were divided by economic grievances irrespective of their shared ideological and 
religious beliefs. This led to inter-group fighting between Muslims despite high incentives for 
the Muslim groups to unite against the Serbs and Croats. 
Hypothesis 3: Shared identity increases the likelihood of fighting between groups. 
Rebel groups are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence when they share social 
ties (such as ideology) with other groups. 
40 
 
The next hypothesis proposed in Chapter I, relates to the influence of how the relative size of 
a group affects the likelihood of inter-rebel violence. Groups who are militarily large relative 
to their peers will target groups who are militarily small. Large groups have the capabilities to 
attack their weaker peers and they also have increased incentives. These incentives arise 
because strong groups may seek to increase their capacity by eliminating weaker groups 
(which are easy targets) and absorbing their resources. They also arise because strong groups 
are disadvantaged by the presence of smaller groups in negotiated deals (Nilsson 2010). This 
means that large groups have an incentive to eliminate small groups to regain an upper hand 
in the bargaining over the future allocation of political power. This type of fighting occurred 
in Burundi when the militarily strong group, Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People-
Forces for National Liberation (Palipehutu-FNL) was angered by the decision of the smaller, 
marginalised group, the National Council for the Defence of Democracy (CNDD) to initiate 
peace talks with the state.  
Hypothesis 4: The relative size of a rebel group affects the likelihood that they will 
fight. Groups who are militarily large relative to others will target groups who are 
militarily small relative to others. 
2.3 Research design 
This section describes the dataset, variables and methods of estimation used to test the above 
hypotheses (1 – 4).   
2.3.1 Dataset 
The above hypotheses are tested in a large-N framework using a data taken from the UCDP 
Dyadic Dataset (Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008). This dataset contains dyadic 
information on all rebel groups involved in armed conflict with a recognised government 
between 1945 and 2008. 
Two types of conflict are excluded from the analyses. Conflicts involving fighting between a 
state and a rebel group that operates outside its own territory are excluded because these 
types of conflict often involve aspects that are not generally representative of the rebel group 
interactions appropriate to the present study. That is, groups operating within the boundaries 
of a country are likely to interact in a different manner to rebel groups operating extra-
territorially. These differences between intra-territorial and extra-territorial interactions have 
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not been investigated in conflict research. This is an important area for future enquiry, but is 
not within the scope of the present work.  
The second type of conflict excluded from the present study, concerns those involving inter-
state armed conflict (i.e. between two more nation states). These types of conflict do not fit 
the scope of the present research, which examines rebel group interactions in civil war.  
The frequency distribution of the number of armed civil conflicts (1945-2008) as a function 
of the number of rebel groups involved in each conflict is shown in Figure 2.1. Most civil 
conflicts involve a single rebel group, although a substantial proportion of civil wars are 
multi-party (~ 50%).  
Figure 2.1 Frequency of armed civil conflicts (1945-2008) as a function of the number of 
rebel groups involved in the conflict 
 
Some nation states experience multiple insurgencies which overlap in time but occur in 
different geographic regions. This is often the case when a state faces separatist groups who 
seek to gain independence or increase their autonomy over some geographic region. For 
example, the Indian government fought eleven insurgencies between the 1990 and 2000. 
Most of these conflicts occurred in different geographic regions (in Nagaland, Mizoram, 
Manipur, Assam and Kashmir for example) and involved disassociated rebel groups (i.e. 
Sikhs, Assamese, Kashmiri’s) who fought for independence during the same period of time. 
As is evident from these discussions, rebel groups may be assumed to overlap if they operate 
in the same country and/or in same conflict/geographic region and/or if they operate in the 
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same year. In this analysis, rebel groups are assumed to overlap only if they operate in the 
same conflict-year. Therefore, rebel groups operating in the same country but in a different 
conflict were assumed not to overlap.  One potential issue with this conflict-year overlap 
criterion relates to the UCDP definition, namely that civil war is “a contested incompatibility 
... that results in at least 25 battle-related deaths a year” (Harbom et al. 2008). This cut-off 
threshold means that any group failing to reach the threshold of 25 deaths in the same year as 
any other group is excluded from the analysis, even if the group existed in the same conflict, 
around the same time as other groups and had the potential to interact.  
The main disadvantage of the overlap criterion used in the present analysis is that it results in 
a smaller sample size as a result of the exclusion of non-overlapping rebel groups. But this 
disadvantage is viewed as being less problematic than the alternative option, of adding 
additional conflict-years (say plus or minus five years) and generating pseudo observations 
for each rebel group that would otherwise have been excluded. Figure 2.2 shows the 
frequency of multi-party conflicts (1945-2008) and the maximum number of overlapping 
groups involved in each conflict (assuming the overlap criterion of conflict-year). The 
majority of conflicts involved two overlapping rebel groups in any single conflict-year. The 
maximum number of overlapping groups in any single conflict-year was eight, in the Afghan 
civil war for the conflict-years 1980 and 1984.  
Figure 2.2 Frequency distribution of multi-party civil conflicts (1945-2008) as a function 
of the number overlapping rebel groups in each conflict 
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2.3.2 Dependent variables 
Two interaction outcomes are considered; cooperative alliances and inter-rebel violence.  
Definition of alliance formation (rebel group cooperation) 
Rebel groups are assumed to be allied if they have a “cooperative relationship in their quest 
to defeat the government” (Akcinaroglu 2012). This relationship may be formal or informal 
and it must involve commitment and the exchange of benefits between two or more rebel 
groups. These benefits may be tangible (for example, groups may support others by providing 
training, engaging in tactical support, providing material or military support and coordinating 
their military operations), or they may be intangible (for example, groups may share 
information or intelligence). It is important to note that alliances differ from mergers. 
Mergers between rebel groups are formal, such that two groups become one. This is publicly 
acknowledged and the merged group is under a single command. Alliances however, may be 
informal and they do not result in joint command. Only a small fraction (~ 20%) of 
cooperative interactions between rebel groups result in formal mergers, and since it is 
possible for cooperative interactions take place in the absence of a formal deal, the definition 
of alliance was selected as being more appropriate for testing hypotheses on rebel group 
cooperation.  
Definition of inter-rebel violence (rebel group fighting) 
Inter-rebel violence is defined as “the use of armed force between two organised armed 
groups, neither of which is the government of a state, that results in at least 25 battle related 
deaths in a year” (Sundberg et al. 2012). According to this definition, a formally organised 
armed group is a non-governmental group (or non-state actor) that has announced a name for 
its group and is using armed force against another formally organised group. Examples of 
non-state groups include political parties, rebel groups, clans, ethnic groups and civilian 
supporters of any of these groups. In many circumstances, these types of groups are not 
involved in armed conflict with the state. Since the aim of the present research is to examine 
rebel group interactions in civil war, only violence occurring between rebel groups or splinter 
groups that have fought against state forces are included in the analyses. 
Coding of dependent variables 
Cooperation: a binary variable taking the value 1 if the rebel group formed an alliance with 
one (or more) rebel group(s) in that conflict-year and 0 otherwise 
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Fighting: a binary variable taking the value 1 if the rebel group engaged in armed conflict 
with one (or more) rebel group(s) in that conflict-year and 0 otherwise 
2.3.3 Independent variables 
Previous research has not considered how social ties between rebel groups affect the 
likelihood of interactions in civil war. One objective of this chapter is to develop a novel 
quantitative index which can be used to measure the degree of ideological similarity between 
groups. The following section describes how the identity-based independent variable, 
ideological ties, was constructed. 
Construction of the independent variable for ideological ties 
Before describing how the independent variable, ideological ties, was constructed it is first 
necessary to clarify the use of the term ‘identity’ and discuss how effectively ‘ideological 
ties’ represents this concept. The term ‘identity’ (discussed in detail in Chapter I), is a broad 
term encompassing many aspects including ideology, ethnicity and religion. For this reason, 
‘ideology’ may be regarded as a subset of identity. Sanín and Wood (2014) describe ideology 
as “a set of more or less systematic ideas that identify a constituency, the objectives pursued 
on behalf of that group, and a program of action”. But, on the basis of this description, it 
could be argued that ethnicity and religion are similar to ideology. For example, an individual 
who follows an organised religion is declaring their belief in a set of ideas shared by a 
religious community in which there is a program of action (such as prayer or visiting a place 
of worship). Similarly, an individual who identifies themselves as belonging to a particular 
ethnic group may share similar ideas and take similar actions on the basis of shared cultural 
norms. Thus, in the present research the term ‘ideological ties’ is used as proxy intended to 
represent the broader term of ‘identity’.  
To construct the independent variable, ideological ties, it was first necessary to define the 
term ‘ideology’. Ugarizza and Craig (2012) propose that a rebel group’s ideology is made up 
of three components: (i) discourse (the group’s stated aims and objections), (ii) emotional 
response (the group’s response to external events) and (iii) attitude (the group’s underlying 
psychological orientation). This definition was utilised in the present analysis. The discourse 
component was assumed to be the main goals and stated opponents of the group (e.g. 
overthrow the government, oppose the Soviet occupation). The emotional response 
component was assumed to be the methods adopted by the group to achieve their goals (e.g. 
use brutal means by targeting civilians). The attitude component was assumed to be the 
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political or religious stance of the group (e.g. Communist, Islamist) and the membership of 
the group (e.g. tribesmen, students, exiles, military officers). 
Qualitative data were collected on each of these components for each rebel group in the 
sample. A novel qualitative data list was compiled from the case studies detailed in 
Cunningham et al. (2013), Google online book excerpts, journal articles and books on civil 
war. The data collection process was conducted as follows.  
First, a rebel group was selected from the dataset, for example the Taliban in Afghanistan. 
Next, the relevant case study from Cunningham et al. (2013) was examined. All information 
relating to each component of the ideology definition was recorded in bullet point format. For 
example, in the case study of Afghanistan, Cunningham et al. (2013) state that: 
“...... The Taliban controlled 10 of Afghanistan’s 30 provinces. Within these provinces 
the group sought to overthrow warlords, remove existing political parties and 
implement Islamic law.......” 
This statement clearly provides information on the goals of the Taliban. The three statements 
(i) overthrow warlords, (ii) remove existing political parties, (iii) implement Islamic law were 
recorded in the goals component of the ideology definition for the Taliban. Crucially, all 
statements that could be perceived as being a goal of the group were recorded. By recording 
all statements, subjective decision making was reduced (e.g. if the aim was to record the main 
goal of the group, instead of all goals of the group, then higher degrees of subjective decision 
making would have been introduced).  
Having recorded all information from the case studies provided by Cunningham et al. (2013), 
the reliability of the data was checked by examining Google online book excerpts, journal 
articles and books on civil war. If new information emerged, new statements were added to 
the dataset. If conflicting information emerged, new statements were added to the dataset and 
the original statement was not removed or altered. This minimised subjective bias because 
decisions did not have to be made about the validity of the various sources.  
Table 2.1 presents an example of the qualitative ideology data collected for two rebel groups 
in the Afghan civil war. 
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Table 2.1 Example of data collected on ideology for two of the thirteen Afghan groups 
 Taliban 
 
Jamiat-i-Islami 
Ideology 
 
  
Stated 
goals and 
opposition 
Group sought 
to... 
• Control Kabul 
• Gain territory 
• Overthrow warlords 
• Abolish political parties 
• Implement Islamic law 
• Control Kabul 
• Create independent state 
 
Group opposed 
to... 
• US coalition government  
• Jamiat-i-Islami 
• Communist government 
• Soviet occupation 
• Taliban 
Method Brutal approach • Yes • No 
Attitude Political/religious 
stance 
• Islamic  
• Jihadist 
• Islamic 
Membership • Tribesmen  
• Students 
• Students 
By virtue, every group included in the UCDP dataset is an armed group that adopts violent 
means (instead of/as well as political means) to achieve its goals. Therefore, the method 
component was recorded as a binary response, signifying whether or not the rebel group 
adopted particularly brutal tactics (e.g. did the group target civilians, engage in other terrorist 
activity or commit rape, torture and/or kidnapping?). The membership component included 
group members, fighters and founders of the group. 
The qualitative data were next transformed into a quantitative index that measures the extent 
of ideological similarity between groups. This was achieved using a network approach. Such 
approaches have not been commonly used in conflict studies, although the existence of 
interdependent relationships between actors in civil war, have been noted (Cederman et al. 
2009; Cunningham et al. 2009). The empirical method used previously in civil war research 
has been to consider multi-party conflicts as a set of parallel dyadic conflicts between each 
rebel group and the state (by using a dyadic data set-up in regression models). This imposes a 
fundamental limitation, since the interdependencies that exist between the rebel groups 
cannot be accounted for. In other areas of political science research, network approaches have 
been used to study interdependent relationships between different actors, but these have been 
limited to the study of the relationships that exist between nation states rather than rebel 
groups within a state (Maoz et al. 2006; Maoz 2009, 2010; Cranmer et al. 2011, 2012). 
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Network theory is concerned with the use of networks as a representation of the relationships 
that exist between discrete objects. It has played a central role in social science disciplines 
and has formed the basis of Social Network Analysis, which examines the structure of 
relationships between social entities (Wasserman 1994). These entities are often individuals, 
but may also be groups, organisations or nation states. Network analysis has a wide range of 
applications - it has been used to understand the diffusion of innovations (Valente 1995), 
news and rumours (Nekovee et al. 2007) as well as the spread of diseases and other health 
related behaviours (Newman 2002). In economics, it has been applied to the study of markets 
to examine the role of trust in exchange relationships and the social mechanisms responsible 
for price setting (Thompson 1991), and in the field of political science, it has been used to 
study recruitment and participation in political movements (Wasserman 1994). 
Network analysis involves the use of various measures of centrality, which determine the 
relative importance of each node (or vertex) within a network (Newman 2010). The simplest 
measure is degree centrality, defined as the number of ties stemming from each node. 
Another measure is eigenvector centrality, which measures the degree of influence that an 
individual node has on the dynamics of an entire network (Newman 2010). Other relevant 
concepts in network analysis include the notion of reciprocity, when the connections (or ties) 
between nodes are mutual such that the relationship between entities is two-way (Garlaschelli 
et al. 2004) and finally, network density, which measures the degree of connectedness of the 
network as a whole (Hanneman and Riddle 2005). In the present work, a network technique 
was applied by producing graphical network representations of all conflicts in the sample. 
These networks are made up of nodes, which represent rebel groups involved in a single 
conflict. The nodes are connected by lines (or ties), which represent ideology attributes. If 
two rebel groups shared the same attribute (e.g. Islamist) the groups were connected by a 
single line. Ties between groups were added only when there was reciprocity (i.e. when the 
ideology attribute was present in both groups). The advantage of this method is that obscure 
or irrelevant information recorded in the qualitative ideology data is, in effect, removed and 
the most important aspects of ideology naturally emerge in the form of network connections.       
An example of this graphical network method is shown in Figure 2.3 for the case of NI groups 
with NJ possible shared attributes (these attributes are the qualitative statements collected for 
each group, such as tribesman, Islamist etc). The example is chosen for six groups (NI = 6) 
and five possible attributes (NJ = 5), with a specific assumed distribution of shared attributes 
used as an illustration. In this example, the number of ideological ties that each group has 
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with its peers (the degree centrality of each node) can be obtained by counting the number of 
lines that stem from each node. In Figure 2.3 the degree centrality Zi = 5, 7, 9, 11, 9, 7 for 
groups i = 1 to 6 respectively (the max. hypothetical degree centrality for each node = 25).  
Figure 2.3 Graphical network representation of a hypothetical distribution of five 
attributes shared between six rebel groups, distributed as shown 
 
 
An alternative way of calculating the degree centrality of each node is illustrated by the 
matrix shown in Table 2.2. The various attributes are represented as NJ columns labelled j = 
1 to NJ and NI groups as rows labelled i = 1 to NI. Groups are coded with 1 if they have a 
particular attribute, and 0 if not. The distribution of shared attributes shown in Table 2.2 
corresponds to the graphical representation shown in Figure 2.3.   
Table 2.2 Matrix of hypothetical attributes (j = 1 to NJ) for rebel groups (i = 1 to NI), 
where NJ = 5 and NI = 6 
 j = 1 j = 2 j = 3 j = 4 j = 5 
i = 1   0   1   0   0   0 
i = 2   0   1   0   1   0 
i = 3   1   1   1   0   0 
i = 4   1   1   1   1   1 
i = 5   0   1   1   1   0 
i = 6   1   1   0   0   0 
1
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
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A connection factor ηj can then be defined for each attribute j. For example, column 2 
(corresponding to attribute j = 2) is coded entirely with 1’s meaning that all groups in the 
network have attribute j = 2. Thus, each individual group shares attribute j = 2 with five other 
groups in its column, so that η2 = 5. For another example, this time for groups having 
attribute j = 1, each of these share this attribute with just two other groups in its column and 
therefore η1 = 2. Thus, the connection associated with the j
th
 attribute can be written in the 
form: 
  1
1
−=∑
=
IN
i
ijj αη         (2.1) 
where αij takes the value 0 or 1 as shown in Table 2.2. The values of ηj are thus 2, 5, 2, 2, 0 
for attributes j = 1 to 5 respectively. Having calculated the connection associated with the j
th
 
attribute, the degree centrality can then be calculated. Take for example the group i = 2. This 
group is connected to all other groups according to the relationship: Z2 = ( 0 x η1) + (1 x η2) 
+ (0 x η3) + (1 x η4) + (0 x η5) = 7. Thus, the degree centrality of each node in the network 
can be written in the form: 
∑
=
=
JN
j
jijiZ
1
ηα          (2.2) 
This matrix method reproduces the results obtained from the network node counting method, 
but is more convenient for large values of NI and NJ. 
To construct the independent variable, ideological ties, the degree centrality Zi for each rebel 
group in the dataset was calculated from a matrix corresponding to each conflict-year. This 
index produces high values of Zi for groups that are heavily tied ideologically to their peers 
and low values of Zi for rebel groups that are ideologically dissimilar to their peers.  
The above method represents a novel and simple approach for quantifying rebel group 
ideology ties, but a limitation is that Zi is assumed to depend solely on how many groups 
share a given attribute. Thus, Zi does not account for the fact that different attributes may 
carry different weightings in terms of encouraging group interactions, or for the fact that 
rebel group sizes are generally not equal. With respect to the latter, the attributes can be 
weighted for the numbers in each group with relative ease (so long as the group numbers are 
known). A more difficult task would be to provide a weighting to the importance of the 
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attributes themselves. In view of this, an attribute weighting was not attempted because the 
influence of group size is incorporated as an independent variable in the analyses. 
Before moving on to discuss the coding of the independent variable, rebel size, there are a 
few more important points to make regarding the conceptualisation, coding and data 
collection of the ideological ties variable. Firstly, as discussed above, only the attribute 
‘ideology’ has been included as a proxy for ‘identity’ in statistical models. But the network 
methodology proposed can be used to code ethnic or religious ties (or any other type of 
identity ties) between groups. In the present research, a novel dataset on the ethnicity of rebel 
groups was also compiled using the same data collection method described above and an 
ethnic ties index was calculated for each rebel group in the dataset. An index for religious ties 
was also calculated using the network method using data from Lindberg (2008). An 
interesting finding that emerged from this analysis was that the indices for ideology, ethnicity 
and religion were highly correlated and so, they could not be used together in statistical 
models. This finding adds further weight to the suggestion put forward earlier in this chapter, 
that, ideological ties, is a sufficient proxy for identity when used alone. 
A second important point concerns the nature of the network method and how it compares to 
alternative definitions and operationalisations of the term ‘ideology’. In the comparative 
politics literature, the traditional approach to modelling political ideology has been to model 
left-right political scales and consider the difference in ideological stance that exists between 
different political parties (Castles and Mair 1984; Kitschett and Hellemans 1990; Gabel and 
Huber 2000; Anderson and Matthew 2008). The advantage of these left-right spectrum 
approaches is that the polarity between ideological stances is captured, unlike the network 
method proposed in the present research, which captures the degree of ideological similarity 
between groups, but not opposing (or polar) views. Although not attempted in the present 
research, this limitation could be overcome by incorporating negative ties (that act as 
repulsion attributes) into the network index calculation.   
Construction of the independent variable for relative rebel size 
Rebel size: a continuous variable representing the military capabilities of each rebel group 
relative to others. The size of each group is expressed as a percentage of the total size of all 
groups warring in the same conflict-year. A percentage value is used (instead of the absolute 
value of group size) to capture the relative difference in size between the rebel groups. Using 
the percentage in this case also has the added advantage of producing values that are 
comparable across countries. Troop size data are used from Cunningham et al. (2009).     
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2.3.4 Control variables 
Ethnic conflict: a binary variable taking the value 1 if the rebel group operated in an ethnic 
conflict and 0 otherwise. Data are taken from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al. 
2008). This is included as a control variable because ethnic conflicts are more likely to 
include identity-based groups.    
Foreign support: a binary variable taking the value 1 if the group received foreign support 
(either from foreign governments or external non-state actors) and 0 otherwise. Data are 
taken from Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). This is included as a control 
because the provision of foreign support is likely to affect the interaction decisions made by 
rebel groups. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) have shown that groups who receive foreign support 
are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. Rebels who receive support also have lower 
incentives to align with other groups (Bapat and Bond 2012).    
Territorial control: a binary variable taking the value 1 if the rebel group controlled territory 
and 0 otherwise. Data are taken from Cunningham, Gleditsch and Salehyan (2009). This is 
included because rebel groups who control territory may be more likely to interact. Collier 
(2000), Lilja and Hultman (2011) and Cunningham et al. (2013) all provide anecdotal 
evidence that rebel groups engage in inter-rebel violence with the aim of gaining and 
increasing their control of territory.   
Number of groups: a continuous variable signifying the number of overlapping groups that 
are listed in the dataset for each conflict-year. This is included as a control because group 
interactions might be more likely to occur simply as a result of increased opportunity when 
there are large numbers of groups operating in the same conflict. This variable also controls 
for the fact that the ideological ties variable is sensitive the number of overlapping groups.  
GDP (expressed as the natural logarithm, ln[GDP]): a variable equal to the gross domestic 
product of a state. Higher GDP indicates larger state capacity. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) have 
shown that the likelihood of inter-rebel violence is increased when rebel groups fight weak 
sates. Rebel groups fighting strong states also have higher incentives to align (Akcinaroglu 
2012). Data are taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003). 
Population (expressed as the natural logarithm, ln[Pop]): a variable corresponding to the 
population of a country. This is included as a control because countries with large 
populations have higher recruitment opportunities for rebels. Groups are more likely to 
engage in inter-rebel violence if they are in competition over limited resources such as 
recruits (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Groups who have access to large recruitment pools may 
also be less willing form alliances. Data are taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003).  
Ethnic fractionalisation: a widely used variable in empirical studies of civil conflict, which 
represents the degree of ethnic heterogeneity in a society. The ethnic fractionalisation index, 
defined as the probability that two individuals selected at random from a country will be from 
different ethnic groups, ranges between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates that the society is entirely 
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homogenous and 1 indicates that the society is entirely ethnically heterogeneous (see Fearon 
(2003) for a detailed description of the ethnic fractionalisation index). This is included as a 
control because conflicts occurring in ethnically heterogeneous societies are more likely to 
involve identity-based rebel groups. The data are taken from Fearon and Laitin (2003).    
Intensity: a widely used variable in empirical studies of civil conflict, which corresponds to 
the intensity of conflict. A value 1 signifies low intensity (25 - 999 battle related deaths per 
conflict year) whereas a value 2 signifies high intensity (≥ 1000 battle related deaths per 
year). Data are taken from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset (Harbom et al. 2008). This is used as a 
control because rebel groups who encounter heavy losses have high incentives to form 
alliances and might be more vulnerable to attack from other rebel groups.
 
  
2.3.5 Methods of estimation 
The determinants of rebel group cooperation and of rebel group fighting are examined using 
logistic regression models. In the first instance, a sample containing only multi-party conflicts 
is analysed. This sample was selected because rebel group interactions can only occur if there 
is more than one rebel group engaged in a conflict.  
To examine the sensitivity of the model to two issues that might lead to errors of statistical 
inference, two additional forms of model are used and the results are compared to the logistic 
regression models. First, multi-level mixed-effects logistic regression models (described in 
more detail below) are used to control for the lack of independence between rebel groups 
operating in the same conflict, and the lack of independence between conflicts occurring in 
the same country.  
Second, to control for potential sample-selection bias that may arise from the analysis of a 
sample containing multi-party conflicts only, a larger sample containing all conflicts (i.e. 
two-sided and multi-party conflicts) is analysed using two-step Heckman selection models 
(which are also described in more detail below).  
Finally, to control for the lack of independence between the annual observations for each 
rebel group, additional variables which control for time-dependence are included in the 
statistical models. These are: 
Previous coop: a variable signifying the number of years elapsed since the rebel group 
cooperated with one or more other rebel group(s). 
Previous fight: a variable signifying the number of years elapsed since the rebel group 
engaged in inter-rebel violence with one or more other rebel group(s).  
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The squared and cubed terms for both variables are also included, instead of time dummies or 
splines, as proposed by Carter and Signorino (2010). 
Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics 
Level Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables Cooperation 1126 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Fighting 
 
1126 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Independent variables Ideological ties 1126 6.47 4.77 0 24 
Rebel size 
 
1126 0.41 0.26 0.006 0.976 
Control variables Ethnic conflict 1126 0.37 0.48 0 1 
 Foreign support 1126 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Terr. control 1126 0.44 0.50 0 1 
 N groups 1126 3.82 1.61 2 8 
 ln [GDP] 1126 4.77 4.90 0.15 24.54 
ln [Pop] 
Ethnic frac. 
1126 
1126 
16.76 
0.55 
1.36 
0.27 
14.46 
0.04 
20.89 
0.90 
Intensity 1126 1.22 0.41 1 2 
2.4 Results and discussions 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are presented in Table 2.3. The 
final sample consisted of 1128 conflict-years, 209 rebel groups, 49 conflicts and 39 countries. 
The minimum number of rebel groups involved in a single conflict was two, the maximum 
number was eight and the mean was close to four (3.8). 67% of the rebel groups formed an 
alliance, whereas only 10% of rebel groups engaged in inter-rebel violence.  
To check for multicolinearity (e.g. if one variable is linearly dependent on the other), it is 
necessary to check the correlations between all the pairs of the independent variables. Severe 
multicolinearity between independent variables is problematic when fitting regression models 
because it can increase the variance of the coefficient estimates and make the estimates very 
sensitive to minor changes in the model. The result is that the coefficient estimates are 
unstable (for example they can switch signs) meaning that they become difficult to interpret. 
As such, multicolinearity makes it more difficult to specify the correct model. 
The degree of association between all pairs of the independent variables is shown in Table 
2.4 using the Spearman rank correlation. Unlike other tests for correlation, such as Pearson 
correlation, which assumes a linear relationship between two variables and is based on the 
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assumption of normal distributions, Spearman rank correlations are not based on any 
distributional assumptions. As such, Spearman rank correlations test for monotonic 
relationships between two variables (as opposed to linear relationships) and therefore allow 
greater flexibility in establishing association between variables. All variables except two are 
shown to be independent of one another. These exceptions are ideological ties and N groups 
(0.57) and ethnic fractionalisation and GDP (-0.55), which are underlined in Table 2.4.
*
 
2.4.1 Modelling the determinants of rebel group cooperation 
Table 2.5 shows logistic regression estimates for the determinants of rebel group cooperation. 
In line with the expectations of hypothesis 1, ideological ties is statistically significant (at the 
<0.01 level) with an odds ratio (OR = 1.15). The OR represents the odds that an outcome will 
occur given a particular exposure, compared to the odds of the outcome occurring in the 
absence of that exposure. Thus if OR = 1 the independent variable has no effect on the 
outcome, if OR > 1 the independent variable has a positive effect on the outcome and if the 
OR < 1 the variable has a negative effect on the outcome. The OR for ideological ties = 1.15. 
This indicates that there is a 15% increase in the odds of cooperation per unit increase of 
ideological ties (assuming all other variables are at fixed values).  
The 95% confidence intervals (CIs) show that if the experiment was repeated a hundred 
times, the estimated parameter would fall 95% of the time, within the lower and upper 
bounds defined by the CI. If the CIs are small (i.e. close to the estimated parameter value), 
then there is a high degree of confidence that the estimate is close to its real value. For 
ideological ties, this is the case since the lower and upper intervals are (1.09, 1.21). 
The result for rebel size is also significant (at the <0.01 level) and the effect is negative, as 
signified by an OR = 0.36. This indicates that there is a 64% decrease in the odds of 
cooperation per unit increase of rebel size (assuming all other variables are at fixed values). 
This result provides evidence in support of hypothesis 2, as it indicates that rebel groups who 
are militarily small relative to their peers are more likely to form alliances. In this case the 
CIs are larger, so there is slightly less confidence regarding the estimate. However, the upper 
bound is well below 1, which confirms that the effect of rebel size on cooperation is negative 
and statistically significant.  
                                                           
*
 These correlations do not create an issue with the fitting of the regression models, which are run in the 
software package STATA that automatically drops variables when multicolinearity exists. 
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Table 2.5 Logistic regression results for the determinants of cooperation 
Variable Odds ratio 95% CI Standard error 
Ideological ties 1.15** 1.09, 1.21 0.030 
Rebel size 0.36** 0.19, 0.68 0.117 
Ethnic conflict 0.77** 0.52, 1.13 0.152 
Foreign support 0.80** 0.48, 1.37 0.217 
Territorial control 2.03** 1.41, 2.93 0.380 
Number of groups 0.93** 0.81, 1.07 0.068 
ln [GDP] 0.99** 0.95, 1.04 0.023 
ln [Pop] 1.32** 1.15, 1.51 0.092 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.70** 0.32, 1.51 0.275 
Intensity 1.53** 0.97, 2.42 0.357 
Previous coop 0.18** 0.14, 0.24 0.026 
Previous coop
2 
1.23** 1.17, 1.29 0.031 
Previous coop
3 
0.99** 0.99, 1.00 0.001 
Constant 0.03** 0.01, 0.41 0.043 
Number of obs.                 1126 
LR χ
2
 (13)                        508.70 
Log likelihood                -460.736 
Pseudo R
2
                           0.36 
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05  
The above results show that groups operating in countries with large populations are more 
likely to form alliances OR = 1.32 (significant at the <0.01 level), as are groups who control 
territory OR = 2.03 (significant at the <0.01 level). One explanation for the latter effect 
might be that groups who control territory are, by virtue, well-established. Such groups may 
gain efficiency through increased abilities to organise their operations, which may increase 
their ability to form alliances. Groups who control territory are also more able to make their 
presence known to potential allies and are more able to offer benefits related to territorial 
control, such as base-camps, training facilities and access to trade routes. These features may 
increase a group’s ability to form alliances.  
The results shown in Table 2.5 are illustrated as a Forest Plot in Figure 2.4. The square points 
on the plot show the odds radio for each statistically significant result and the horizontal bars 
around each point show the 95% confidence intervals. Predicted probabilities for cooperation 
as a function of ideological ties and rebel size are shown in Figures 2.5 and 2.6. These were 
created using the margins command in STATA, which generates predicted probabilities for 
each value of the independent variable, while holding all other independent variables constant 
at their mean value. The predicted probabilities at each margin (i.e. value of the independent 
variable) can then be plotted in STATA using the marginsplot command.  
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Figure 2.4 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from logistic regression estimates 
 
Figure 2.5 Predicted probabilities for group cooperation as a function of ideological ties 
(range = 0:24) generated from logistic regression 
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Figure 2.6 Predicted probabilities for group cooperation as a function of relative rebel 
group size (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression 
 
Inspection of Figure 2.5 shows a positive effect of ideological ties on alliance formation and 
the predicted values have relatively small CIs, indicating a high degree of confidence in these 
predicted values. The slope is initially steeper, particularly between lower values of 
ideological ties. Figure 2.6 shows a negative effect of rebel size on alliance formation, and 
once again the CIs are relatively small. The predicted probability curve in Figure 2.6 is flatter 
than in Figure 2.5 and not so curved at higher values of rebel size. 
2.4.2 Robustness checks for results on rebel group cooperation 
Clustering effects 
One of the assumptions made in regression analysis is that the observations in the sample 
analysed are independent of each another. The sample used in the above analysis violates this 
assumption in the sense that the conflict-years for a single rebel group are related and also 
that the rebel groups operating in the same conflict are related. Similarly, the civil conflicts 
occurring in the same country are not independent of one another in the sense that they have 
the same national-level attributes. A graphical depiction of these nested (or clustered) levels 
is shown in Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7 Nested levels for eight rebel groups, four conflicts and three countries 
 
This aspect is important to bear in mind when considering statistical results, because in cases 
when observations are clustered, there could be effects that vary across clusters that are not 
explained by the covariates in the model. This is known as unobserved heterogeneity 
(Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). For instance, in civil wars, different countries are likely 
to have different unobserved features that could influence rebel group interactions, such as 
societal, economic and political aspects. This means that two observations belonging to the 
same country could be more highly correlated than two observations belonging to different 
countries (Skrondal and Rabe-Hesketh 2004). These dependencies can be controlled for by 
using multi-level models (also known as hierarchical linear models or mixed-effects models). 
The main difference between multi-level models and ordinary linear regression models (and 
also logistic models), is that the intercepts, slopes, or both intercepts and slopes, can be 
allowed to vary across contexts (i.e. country, conflict or group). In the present analysis, 
random intercept modelling is deemed most appropriate, since it is regarded that the slopes of 
the regression lines are more likely than intercepts to be constant across different contexts.  
Results of a multi-level logistic regression analysis are shown in Table 2.6. The levels of 
analysis used were as follows: country (level 1) and rebel group (level 2). Note that two 
levels were used instead of the three in the illustration given in Figure 2.7. This is because 
few countries in the sample encountered more than one civil war. The random-effects 
parameters are shown in the first part of Table 2.6. The estimated standard deviations in the 
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intercepts are 5.68 for level 1 (country) and 2.15 for level 2 (rebel group). Both estimates are 
>0, indicating that there is variation between both countries and between groups. The 
standard deviation between countries is higher than between rebel groups, indicating a higher 
degree of variability between countries than there is between groups (although the standard 
errors for the country-level are also larger, indicting a lower degree of precision in the 
estimate). The main implication of this is that multi-level models are more appropriate than 
logistic regression for modelling rebel group cooperation. This is further confirmed by the 
likelihood ratio test (LR test) versus logistic regression result (χ
2
 = 122.24, significant at the 
< 0.01 level).  
The second part of Table 2.6 shows the fixed-effects estimates (i.e. the logistic regression 
coefficients transformed into odds ratios). Results for ideological ties, rebel size, territorial 
control and population are all robust at the <0.01 level, with the exception of rebel size 
which decreases in significance to the <0.05 level. The coefficient for intensity gains 
significance compared to the earlier logistic regression analysis at the <0.01 level.  
Table 2.6 Multi-level logistic regression estimates for the determinants of cooperation 
Level  N          Intercept Est. SD Standard error 
Level 1 (country) 380 5.675  1.820  
Level 2 (rebel group) 200 2.147  0.509  
 
Variable Odds ratio 95% CI Standard error 
Ideological ties 1.34** 1.19, 1.51 0.080 
Rebel size 0.18** 0.04, 0.71 0.126 
Ethnic conflict 3.01** 0.58, 15.76 2.543 
Foreign support 0.32** 0.08, 1.24 0.222 
Territorial control 8.46** 2.28, 31.50 5.674 
Number of groups 0.57** 0.16, 2.02 0.368 
ln [GDP] 1.09** 0.89, 1.33 0.112 
ln [Pop] 29.80** 3.61, 245.78 32.082 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.01** 5.36e
-09
, 2.44 0.001 
Intensity 2.93** 1.36, 6.29 1.143 
Previous coop 0.24** 0.16, 0.34 0.045 
Previous coop
2 
1.20** 1.11, 1.28 0.040 
Previous coop
3 
0.99** 0.99, 1.00 0.001 
Constant 2.14e
-22
**** 1.61e
-35
, 2.85e
-09 
3.30e
-21 
Number of obs.                 1126 
Wald χ
2
 (13)                       143.26 
Log pseudo likelihood               -399.615 
LR vs. log.reg. χ
2
  (2)                           122.24** 
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
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These results are plotted as a Forest Plot in Figure 2.8. The odds ratio for ideological ties OR 
= 1.34. This is increased compared to the logistic estimates, where the ideological ties OR = 
1.15. The odds for rebel size in the multi-level model OR = 0.18. Once again, the effect of 
rebel size on cooperation is larger than in the logistic regression model, where the OR = 0.36.  
Figure 2.8 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from mixed-effects logistic regression 
 
Selection effects 
The analyses presented so far were conducted on a sample of multi-party civil conflicts, 
simply because group interactions can occur only if there are two or more groups operating in 
the same conflict. This potentially leads to the issue of sample selection bias because all 
conflicts containing a single rebel group are excluded. One way to check and control for this 
bias is to use the Heckman selection model (Heckman 1979).  
Heckman selection modelling involves two stages. First, a model is formulated which 
predicts the probability of some outcome using observations from the entire population. 
Estimation of the first model yields results that can be used to generate predicted probabilities 
for each observation. In the second stage, selection bias is corrected by incorporating a 
transformation of these predicted probabilities as an independent variable in a second model. 
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This second model predicts the probability of a different outcome, but this time using 
observations from a selected sample of the population (Heckman 1979; Puhani 2000).  
In the present work a two-stage Heckman selection was performed to check the robustness of 
results obtained in the previous analyses. As before, the unit of analysis was the conflict-year. 
The dependent variable for the first stage of the model is:  
Multiple groups: a binary variable where 0 signifies that the rebel group operated in a two-
sided conflict (i.e. a conflict involving a single rebel group) and 1 signifies that the rebel 
group operated in a multi-party conflict (i.e. a conflict involving two or more rebel groups).  
Selecting appropriate independent variables for the first stage (to predict the outcome 
multiple groups) is tricky because previous research has not addressed the specific question 
of why multi-party wars arise in the first place, or indeed, why some conflicts involve larger 
numbers of rebel groups. As such, the stage 1 independent variables used in the present 
analysis are selected on the basis of their association with the likelihood of civil war. If an 
independent variable is highly associated with an increased likelihood of civil war, it is 
possible that the same independent variable will also be associated with larger numbers of 
groups. This argument is based on the notion that if some factor increases the opportunity for 
civil war, it may also increase the opportunity for the numbers of rebel groups. On this basis, 
three independent variables were selected and used in the first stage to predict multiple 
groups. The coding and description for why these variables were used, is provided below.  
Military quality (expressed as the natural logarithm, ln[military quality]): a proxy for state 
strength that is widely used and recommended by Bennett and Stam (1996). Military quality 
is calculated by taking the military expenditure of a country divided by the number of 
military personnel, transformed by taking the natural log. Data are taken from Lacina (2006). 
This variable is included because state strength is associated with conflict opportunity. 
Previous research has shown that poorer states are more likely to experience civil war 
(Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 2007, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, if state 
weakness provides more opportunity for civil conflict, it could be argued that weak states 
would be more likely to have larger numbers of rebel groups.    
Democracy: a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 10, where 10 signifies that the 
country is entirely democratic and 0 signifies that the country is entirely undemocratic. Data 
are taken from Lacina (2006). This variable is included because democracy is also associated 
with conflict opportunity. Hegre et al. (2001) have shown that mixed regimes, which are 
neither fully democratic, nor extremely repressive, are most likely to experience internal 
conflict. This argument is based on the notion that highly authoritarian states are less likely to 
experience civil war because potential rebels are less likely to mobilise when they perceive 
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the cost of group formation to be high. Highly democratic states are also less likely to 
experience civil conflict because they have institutionalised channels through which 
opposition groups can be accommodated (Tilly, 1978). In the middle of the range however, 
where regimes are not repressive enough to prevent mobilisation but also not accommodative 
enough to channel opposition through institutional mechanisms, conflict is most likely 
(Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, if intermediate 
levels of democracy are associated with increased opportunity for conflict, it could be argued 
that these states will be prone to conflicts with higher numbers of rebel groups.   
Ethnic fractionalisation: coded as before. The association between ethnic heterogeneity 
(either polarisation or fractionalisation) and the likelihood of civil war has been an area of hot 
debate. Polarisation occurs when a society is divided into a small number of large groups, 
whereas fractionalisation occurs when a society is divided into a large number of small 
groups. Some research has shown that the likelihood of civil war is increased when states are 
highly ethnically fractionalised, but not when they are ethnically polarised (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Other research has shown that the relationship between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the likelihood of civil war is weak, but that civil war is most likely when 
societies are highly ethnically polarised (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2004; Østby 
2008). The rationale behind these arguments is that heterogeneous societies, which are 
divided along ethnic lines, are more prone to grievances arising between groups. In turn, 
these grievances increase the likelihood of war. If ethnic heterogeneity increases the 
likelihood of war, it could also be argued that it increases the numbers of rebel groups that are 
motivated to participate in war.   
In the present analysis, the second stage of the Heckman selection model is the same as the 
logistic regression model presented earlier except that a term containing the transformed 
predicted probabilities from the first stage is included. Descriptive statistics for all variables 
used in the analysis are presented in Table 2.7.  
The sample used in the Heckman selection model consisted of 1434 conflict-years (+308), 
276 rebel groups (+67), 116 conflicts (+67) and 86 countries (+47), where the parentheses 
relate to the addition of data for two-sided wars.  
Table 2.8 displays the Spearman rank correlations between the variables. The variables are 
broadly independent of one another, with the exception of three pairs of variables, which are 
underlined in Table 2.8. These pairs are ideological ties and rebel size (-0.59), ideological 
ties and number of groups (0.77) and rebel size and number of groups (-0.64). The presence 
of multicolinearity in these pairs is not a confounding issue however. Only multi-party 
conflicts are analysed in the second stage of the model, and the independent variables used in 
the second stage do not co-vary (as demonstrated in Table 2.4).  
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Table 2.7 Descriptive statistics of variables used for the Heckman selection model 
 Variable type Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Stage 
1 
 
 
Dependent variable 
 
Multiple groups 1434 0.79 0.41 0 1 
Independent 
variables 
ln[Mil. quality] 1183 7.74 1.17 0.92 11.12 
Democracy 982 3.36 3.85 0 10 
Ethnic frac. 1431 0.52 0.28 0.01 .90 
Stage 
2 
Dependent variable Cooperation 1434 0.53 0.50 0 1 
       
Independent 
variables 
 
Ideological ties 1434 5.08 4.99 0 24 
Rebel size 
 
1434 0.41 0.26 0.06 1 
Control variables Ethnic conflict 1434 0.42 0.49 0 1 
 Foreign support 1433 0.88 0.33 0 1 
Terr. control 1433 0.43 0.50 0 1 
 N groups 1434 3.21 1.83 1 8 
 ln [GDP] 1434 4.99 5.16 0.15 40.70 
ln [Pop] 1434 16.74 1.37 12.85 20.89 
Ethnic frac. 1431 0.52 0.28 0.01 0.90 
  Intensity 1434 1.22 0.41 1 2 
Results of an analysis using a two-stage Heckman selection model are shown in Table 2.9. In 
stage 1, all three independent variables have a statistically significant effect on the ’multiple 
groups’ outcome. Military quality has a negative effect OR = 0.77 (at the <0.01 level), 
indicating that there is an inverse relationship between state strength and the number of 
groups in a conflict. The causality of this effect is not easy to envisage however. It could be 
argued that the presence of a weak state encourages more rebel groups to engage in conflict 
in the first place. Alternatively, it could be argued that the presence of multiple groups could 
weaken a state more than if it was fighting a single rebel group.  
Democracy has a positive effect OR = 1.04 (at the <0.01 level), indicating that democratic 
states are more likely to have multi-party conflicts. Ethnic fractionalisation also has a 
positive effect OR = 3.83 (at the <0.01 level), indicating that multi-party conflicts are more 
likely to occur in ethnically heterogeneous countries. These results are illustrated in a Forest 
Plot in Figure 2.9. Predicted probabilities are plotted for military quality and ethnic 
fractionalisation in Figures 2.10 and 2.11. Overall, these results suggest that societal factors, 
as opposed to state factors, are the dominant explanation for why multi-party conflicts might 
arise in the first place. 
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Table 2.9 Heckman selection model estimates for the determinants of cooperation 
Stage Variable         Coefficient Standard error 
1 Military quality ln -0.266**  0.046  
  Democracy  0.041**  0.016  
 Ethnic fractionalisation 1.342**  0.187  
 Constant 2.069**    0.286  
2  Ideological ties 0.023**  0.004  
 Rebel size -0.171**   0.057  
 Ethnic conflict -0.075**  0.037  
 Foreign support -0.042**  0.051  
 Territorial control 0.179**  0.034  
 Number of groups -0.043**  0.014  
 ln [GDP]  0.005**  0.007  
 ln [Pop] 0.024**  0.014  
 Ethnic fractionalisation 0.121**  0.105  
 Intensity 0.037**  0.035  
 Previous coop -0.331**  0.023  
 Previous coop
2 
0.040**  0.004  
 Previous coop
3 
-0.001**  0.001  
 Constant 0.199**  0.292  
 Mills (lambda)        0.179  0.155  
 Number of obs.                  798  
 Censored / uncensored obs. 174 / 624  
 Wald χ
2
 (13)                        535.60  
 Rho, Sigma              0.496, 0.362  
Note: ** denotes significant at p≤ 0.01, * denotes significant at p≤ 0.05 
One limitation of the stage 1 model is that the outcome variable, multiple groups, is coded as 
a binary variable instead of a continuous variable. This is a requirement of the Heckman 
selection model, which uses observations coded with ‘1’ (i.e. multi-party conflicts) in the 
second stage. As a result of this, information regarding the possible effect of the independent 
variables on the number of groups in a conflict may be lost. A further discussion of this issue 
with some additional statistical modelling that considers the number of rebel groups as a 
continuous variable is given in Appendix I. The possibility of a curvilinear relationship 
between democracy and number of groups is also discussed in Appendix I.  
A second limitation of the stage 1 model is the potential for endogeneity (that is, where an 
uncontrolled endogenous variable is correlated with the error term). In this case, endogeneity 
may arise because there is potentially an unspecified confounding variable that has an effect 
on the number of groups (the dependent variable), and the independent variables in stage 1, 
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and/or the variables in stage 2. As such, future research that seeks to investigate the causes of 
multi-party conflict should take this aspect into account.  
For stage 2, the results for ideological ties, rebel size and territorial control are robust, 
although the size of the effect for all variables has decreased. The negative coefficients for 
ethnic conflict and number of groups both gain significance (at the <0.05 and <0.01 levels 
respectively). These results are plotted as Forest Plot in Figure 2.12.  
Figure 2.9 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from Heckman selection model stage 1 
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Figure 2.10 Predicted probabilities of multi-party conflict as a function of military 
quality (range = 0:12) generated from Heckman selection estimates 
 
Figure 2.11 Predicted probabilities of multi-party conflict as a function of ethnic 
fractionalisation (range = 0:1) generated from Heckman selection estimates 
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Figure 2.12 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from stage 2 of the Heckman model 
 
Overall, the above analysis confirms that there is no effect of selection bias in the sample 
analysed. The estimated selection coefficient, lambda = 0.179, p >0.05 is not statistically 
significant, which means that rebel groups operating in multi-party conflicts have the same 
characteristics (with regards to cooperation) as observed in a sample drawn randomly from 
the entire population. The implication of this is that the results obtained in previous models 
are not influenced by sample selection bias. 
2.4.3 Modelling the determinants of rebel group fighting 
The analyses presented so far have considered rebel group alliances. The following consider 
inter-rebel violence. Table 2.10 shows logistic regression estimates for the determinants of 
rebel group fighting. Descriptive statistics and correlations relating to the independent 
variables are the same as in the previous logistic regression analysis. 
The odds ratio for ideological ties is not statistically significant, so that no evidence is found 
in support of hypothesis 3. The result for, rebel size, is significant (at the <0.01 level) and the 
odds ratio OR = 3.96. This means that there is about 300% increase in the likelihood of inter-
rebel violence for every unit increase in rebel size.  
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Table 2.10 Logistic regression results for the determinants of fighting 
Variable Odds ratio 95% CI Standard error 
Ideological ties 1.03** 0.98, 1.10 0.031 
Rebel size 3.96** 1.76, 8.91 1.639 
Ethnic conflict 1.06** 0.64, 1.76 0.275 
Foreign support 2.16** 0.98, 4.73 0.865 
Territorial control 1.16** 0.73, 1.81 0.265 
Number of groups 1.14** 0.97, 1.33 0.089 
ln [GDP] 0.99** 0.93, 1.04 0.027 
ln [Pop] 1.07** 0.88, 1.31 0.107 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.32** 0.13, 0.80 0.150 
Intensity 1.24** 0.73, 2.11 0.337 
Previous fight 0.51** 0.42, 0.63 0.054 
Previous fight
2 
1.04** 1.02, 1.06 0.011 
Previous fight
3 
0.99** 0.99, 1.00 0.001 
Constant 0.02** 0.01, 0.55 0.030 
Number of obs.                 1126 
LR χ
2
 (13)                        123.10 
Log likelihood                -292.030 
Pseudo R
2
                           0.17 
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
With regards to the control variables, the result for foreign support is positive (OR = 2.16) 
and significant (at the <0.05 level), indicating that rebel groups who receive support from 
external actors are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. There is over 100% increase 
in the likelihood of inter-rebel violence for every unit increase in foreign support. This 
analysis supports the findings of Fjelde and Nilsson (2012).  
The coefficient for ethnic fractionalisation is also significant (at the <0.05 level) with an OR 
= 0.32, indicating that rebel groups operating in countries with ethnically heterogeneous 
societies are less likely to fight with other groups.  
The results shown in Table 2.10 are plotted as a Forest Plot in Figure 2.13. Predicted 
probabilities for a range of assumed values of rebel size are shown in Figure 2.14.  
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Figure 2.13 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from logistic estimates for fighting 
 
Figure 2.14 Predicted probabilities of inter-rebel violence for a range of assumed values 
of relative rebel group size (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
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To test hypothesis 4, namely that both larger groups and smaller groups have an increased 
likelihood of engaging in inter-rebel violence, the independent variable, rebel size, was coded 
into two separate independent variables as follows:  
Strong rebels: a binary variable where 1 signifies that the group size was ≥ 75% of the sum of 
all group sizes in the conflict, and 0 signifies that the group size was < 75% of the sum of all 
group sizes.  
Weak rebels: a binary variable where 1 signifies that the group size was < 25% of the sum of 
all group sizes in the conflict, and 0 signifies that the group size was ≥ 25% of the sum of all 
group sizes.  
Descriptive statistics of these two variables are shown in Table 2.11, which shows that 14% 
of rebel groups were strong relative to their peers, whereas 36% of the groups were weak 
relative to their peers.  
Table 2.11 Descriptive statistics for the variables strong rebels and weak rebels 
Level Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Rebel group-level 
independent variables 
Strong rebels 1126 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Weak rebels 1126 0.36 0.48 0 1 
The results of a logistic regression analysis performed with these two independent variables 
are shown in Table 2.12. The odds ratios for strong rebels and weak rebels are both greater 
than 1 and significant at the <0.01 and <0.05 levels respectively. This indicates that there is 
an increased probability of inter-rebel violence for both large and small rebel groups, thus 
providing evidence in support of hypothesis 4. The standard errors on these two variables are 
lower than the standard errors observed on the rebel size variable in the previous model 
which is indicative of a better fit.  
The overall model fit has also improved (as is evident in the pseudo R
2
 parameter which has 
increased from 0.17 in the previous model to 0.21). The result for foreign support is robust 
but the coefficient on ethnic fractionalisation loses statistical significance. Odds ratios for the 
significant relationships are plotted as a Forest Plot in Figure 2.15. The predicted 
probabilities for strong rebels and weak rebels are plotted in Figures 2.16 and 2.17 
respectively. Both figures show increases in the probabilities of fighting for groups that are 
relatively strong and relatively weak compared to their peers. The slope of the curve in Figure 
2.16 is steeper than that in Figure 2.17, indicating that the probability of inter-rebel violence 
increases more markedly for strong rebels than for weak rebels.  
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Table 2.12 Logistic regression estimates for the determinants of fighting with inclusion 
of the independent variables strong rebels and weak rebels 
Variable Odds ratio 95% CI Standard error 
Ideological ties 1.03** 0.97, 1.09 0.032 
Strong rebels 6.21** 3.33, 11.56 1.971 
Weak rebels 1.79** 0.99, 3.21 0.535 
Ethnic conflict 0.89** 0.52, 1.52 0.242 
Foreign support 2.27** 1.02, 5.06 0.928 
Territorial control 0.95** 0.59, 1.52 0.227 
Number of groups 1.09** 0.93, 1.28 0.090 
ln [GDP] 0.99** 0.93, 1.04 0.027 
ln [Pop] 1.11** 0.90, 1.36 0.116 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.50** 0.19, 1.29 0.242 
Intensity 1.11** 0.65, 1.93 0.311 
Previous fight 0.55** 0.45, 0.68 0.059 
Previous fight
2 
1.03** 1.01, 1.05 0.011 
Previous fight
3 
1.00** 1.00, 1.00 0.001 
Constant 0.01** 0.00, 0.41 0.020 
Number of obs.                 1126 
LR χ
2
 (14)                        147.01 
Log likelihood                -280.08 
Pseudo R
2
                           0.21 
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
Figure 2.15 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from logistic estimates for fighting 
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Figure 2.16 Predicted probabilities of inter-rebel violence for a range of assumed values 
of the variable strong rebels (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
 
Figure 2.17 Predicted probabilities of inter-rebel as a function of the variable weak 
rebels (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
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An alternative way to test for a U-shape effect is to include the squared term of rebel size. 
The model was re-run (as shown in Table 2.10) but with the inclusion of the term, rebel size
2
. 
The result for rebel size
2
 was significant at the <0.05 level with an odds ratio = 53.50. But the 
confidence intervals were very large (2.16, 1323.80) indicating a low degree of confidence 
over the estimate. The inclusion of the term, rebel size
2
 improved the pseudo R
2
 parameter 
from 0.17 to 0.18 (compared to the original model shown in Table 2.10) but worsened the fit 
from the previous model (shown in Table 2.12), which had a pseudo R
2
 = 0.21. 
2.4.4 Robustness checks for results on rebel group fighting 
Clustering effects 
Results of a multi-level logistic regression are shown in Table 2.13. The significant effects 
for the variables, weak rebels, foreign support and ethnic fractionalisation, are lost from the 
previous logistic regression analyses. Only the variable, strong rebels, which has an odds 
ratio OR = 10.18 (significant at the <0.01 level) is robust when clustering effects are 
controlled for.  
This has implications for hypothesis 4, since it suggests that groups who are militarily large 
relative to their peers have an increased likelihood of inter-rebel violence, but that groups 
who are militarily weak relative to their peers do not. One possible explanation for this effect 
could be that large rebel groups target other large groups because there is a higher degree of 
competition between larger groups. As Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) point out, groups must 
compete for the spoils of war, for recruits and for power, so although large groups potentially 
have more to lose by engaging in combat with their larger peers, they also have more to gain 
if they emerge victorious.  
The standard deviations of the intercept estimates are 3.18 for level 1 (country) and 1.03 for 
level 2 (rebel group). Once again, both estimates are >0, indicating that there is variability 
between countries and between groups.  
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Table 2.13 Multi-level logistic regression estimates for the determinants of fighting 
Level  N          Intercept Est. SD Standard error 
Level 1 (country) 380 3.182  0.970  
Level 2 (rebel group) 200 1.025  0.399  
 
Variable Odds ratio 95% CI Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.96** 0.88, 1.06 0.046 
Strong rebels 10.18** 3.61, 28.68 5.380 
Weak rebels 2.12** 0.87, 5.09  0.948 
Ethnic conflict 0.57** 0.14, 2.38 0.417 
Foreign support 2.22** 0.64, 7.75 1.416 
Territorial control 0.60** 0.24, 1.53 0.287 
Number of groups 1.30** 0.57, 2.95 0.544 
ln [GDP] 1.05** 0.90, 1.24 0.086 
ln [Pop] 2.73** 0.86, 8.52 1.602 
Ethnic fractionalisation 0.04** 0.01, 9.46 0.108 
Intensity 0.70** 0.31, 1.54 0.283 
Previous fight 0.71** 0.54, 0.93 0.096 
Previous fight
2 1.01** 0.98, 1.04 0.013 
Previous fight
3 0.99** 0.99, 1.00 0.001 
Constant 2.49e
-09
*** 2.30e
17
, 0.27 2.35e
081 
Number of obs.                 1126 
Wald χ
2
 (14)                       43.72 
Log pseudo likelihood               -248.615 
LR vs. log.reg. χ
2
  (2)                           64.08** 
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
Results of a two-stage Heckman selection model for inter-rebel violence are shown in Table 
2.14. The results obtained in stage 1 are identical to those obtained in stage 1 for the 
cooperation model. Unlike the Heckman selection model for cooperation however, the 
estimated selection coefficient lambda
†
 is statistically significant (lambda = 0.259, 
significant at the <0.05 level). This means that rebel groups operating in multi-party conflicts 
have different characteristics (with regards to fighting) than observed in a sample drawn 
randomly from the entire population. As such, sample selection bias is a confounding factor 
in the models presented earlier and hence the Heckman selection model provides superior 
estimates for predictions of rebel group fighting. Notice also that the standard errors on the 
coefficients have decreased; an outcome which is also indicative of an improved model.  
                                                           
†
 Lambda is calculated by multiplying the model parameters rho and sigma, where rho is the correlation 
coefficient between the unobserved variables that determine selection into stage 2 and the unobserved variables 
that determine rebel group fighting  (= 0.825) and sigma is the adjusted standard error for stage 2 (= 0.266). 
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Results for strong rebels and weak rebels are robust with respective odds ratio OR = 1.09 and 
1.07 (both significant at the <0.01 level). The previous result obtained on foreign support is 
also robust with an odds ratio OR = 1.08 (significant at the <0.05 level).  
The result for territorial control gains significance (at the <0.05 level) with an odds ratio OR 
= 0.95, indicating that groups who control territory are less likely to fight. The result for 
intensity also gains significance (at the <0.05 level), with an odds ratio OR = 1.05 indicating 
for each unit increase in intensity there is a 5% increase in the likelihood of inter-rebel 
violence. Thus, groups operating in high intensity conflicts are more likely to fight. The 
causality on this effect is unclear, although it is likely that inter-rebel violence leads to 
increased casualties, which results in higher intensity conflict overall (Ross 2004).  
The result for GDP also gains significance (at the <0.01 level) with an odds ratio OR = 0.99, 
indicating that rebel groups fighting against strong states are less likely to fight among 
themselves. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) obtained a similar result using Polity scores as a 
measure of state strength. They propose that if the state is weak, rebel groups are more likely 
to be concerned about their position relative to the other rebel groups who will all be vying 
for political influence. An obvious way for a group to improve their position and increase 
their political influence is to eliminate other rebel groups.  
The results obtained from the Heckman selection model for rebel group fighting are plotted 
as a Forest Plot in Figure 2.18.  
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Table 2.14 Heckman selection model estimates for the determinants of fighting 
Stage Variable         Coefficient Standard error 
1 ln [Military quality] -0.266**   0.046  
  Democracy  0.041**  0.016  
 Ethnic fractionalisation 1.342**  0.187  
 Constant              2.069       0.286  
2  Ideological ties -0.002**  0.003  
 Strong rebels 0.088**   0.034  
 Weak rebels 0.070**   0.022  
 Ethnic conflict 0.040**  0.025  
 Foreign support 0.078**  0.033  
 Territorial control -0.053**  0.023  
 Number of groups 0.008**  0.009  
 ln [GDP]  -0.012**  0.004  
 ln [Pop] -0.001**  0.009  
 Ethnic fractionalisation 0.048**  0.076  
 Intensity 0.052**  0.024  
 Previous fight -0.038**  0.008  
 Previous fight
2 
0.003**  0.001  
 Previous fight
3 
-0.001**  0.001  
 Constant -0.112**  0.199  
 Mills (lambda)            0.259**  0.113  
 Number of obs.                  798  
 Censored / uncensored obs. 174 / 624  
 Wald χ
2
 (14)                        72.00  
 Rho, Sigma              0.924, 0.280  
Note: ** denotes significant at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significant at p ≤ 0.05 
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Figure 2.18 Forest plot of odds ratios calculated from stage 2 of the Heckman selection 
model estimates for rebel group fighting 
 
2.4.5 Modelling alternative interaction strategies 
The analyses presented so far have examined the effects of identity and power-based factors 
on two separate interaction outcomes: cooperation and fighting. But in reality, a group can 
adopt a wider range of strategies. A group can operate independently throughout the duration 
of a conflict, or they can adopt a strategy of alliance formation, or inter-rebel violence. A 
group may also cooperate with one or more other groups whilst simultaneously fighting with 
others. Alternatively a group might form an alliance at one point in a conflict then engage in 
fighting with their alliance partner at a later point in the conflict if the alliance breaks down 
(i.e. alliance fractionalisation). In this respect, the binary outcome models utilised so far in 
this chapter are limited. To overcome this approximation, a multinomial logistic regression 
model was employed using the dependent variable; interaction strategy type. The distribution 
of interaction strategy types is shown in Table 2.15. 
The majority of groups tabulated in the dataset adopted a strategy of cooperate only (~ 60%), 
whereas a much smaller fraction of groups adopted a strategy of fight only (~ 5%). 11% of 
groups operated independently for the entire duration of war. 13% of the groups experienced 
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alliance fractionalisation, which resulted in fighting with a previous ally. 11% of the groups 
formed an alliance with one group, whilst simultaneously fighting with another group.  
Table 2.15 Distribution of rebel group interaction strategy types 
Outcome N % 
Operate independently 22 10.53 
Cooperate only 126 60.29 
Fight only 10 4.78 
Cooperate with one group, fight with another 24 11.48 
Fight with a previous ally 27 12.92 
Total 209 100 
These interaction outcomes were coded using the cooperation and fighting data described in 
earlier in this chapter. Each interaction strategy type was coded as follows: 
Operate independently: if the rebel group did not form an alliance or engage in inter-rebel 
violence with any other group at any point in their lifetime, they were assumed to operate 
independently and were coded with 0.  
Cooperate only: if the rebel group cooperated with one or more group(s) at some point in 
their lifetime but did not engage in inter-rebel violence, they were assumed to cooperate only 
and were coded using 1 for each conflict-year.  
Fight only: if the rebel group fought with one or more group(s) at some point in their lifetime 
but did not form an alliance with any other group(s), they were assumed to fight only and 
were coded using 2 for each conflict-year.      
Cooperate with one group, fight with another: if the rebel group was involved in an alliance 
in the same conflict-year as they engaged in inter-rebel violence, they were assumed to be 
cooperating with one group, whilst simultaneously fighting another and were coded using 3 
for each conflict year. 
Fight with a previous ally: if the rebel group was involved in an alliance at one point in the 
conflict and engaged in inter-rebel violence at later point in the conflict, they were assumed 
to be fighting with a previous ally and were coded using 4 for each conflict year.   
A multinomial logistic regression model was employed using the same independent and 
control variables as before. The time-dependent controls and the squared terms were also 
included. Robust standard error estimates are reported, which take into account the nesting of 
observations within conflicts. This technique was used instead of multilevel models (which 
cannot be used to fit categorical outcome models) and is based on the Lin and Wei (1989) 
81 
 
generalization of the Sandwich estimator, which is used commonly to control for the lack of 
independence within nested observations.  
Results for each interaction strategy type are shown below in Tables 2.16 – 2.19. Results for 
the first outcome, cooperate only, are shown in Table 2.16. The previous results obtained on 
ideological ties, territorial control and population are all robust. The significant result on 
rebel size is lost however. In Table 2.17, the coefficients for strong rebels and weak rebels 
also lose significance for the second outcome, fight only. Instead, the coefficient for 
ideological ties gains significance (at the <0.05 level) and is positive, indicating that groups 
who are ideologically similar to their peers are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence 
(in-line with the expectations of hypothesis 3). The significant result for foreign support is 
lost, but the negative effects of GDP and ethnic fractionalisation on inter-rebel violence are 
robust (both at the <0.01 level).  
In Table 2.18, the coefficient for ideological ties is also positive and significant (at the <0.05 
level), indicating that groups who ideologically similar to their peers are more likely 
cooperate with one or more group(s) whilst simultaneously fighting with other groups. This 
result provides further evidence that shared identity encourages cooperation and fighting 
between groups. The coefficients for foreign support and territorial control are both positive 
and significant (at the <0.05 and <0.01 levels respectively), indicating that groups who 
receive external support or who control territory are more likely to cooperate with some 
groups, whilst simultaneously fighting with others. These results might be explained by the 
fact that this strategy requires organisational efficiency (derived from territorial control) and 
military capability (derived from foreign support). The coefficients for GDP and ethnic 
fractionalisation are both negative (and both significant at the <0.05 level). 
Results for the final outcome, fight with previous ally, are shown in Table 2.19. The 
coefficient for weak rebels is negative and significant (at the <0.01 level), indicating that 
weak rebels are less likely to engage in fighting with a previous ally. One possible 
explanation for this could be that weak rebels are less likely to splinter from their alliance 
partner in the first place as a result of vulnerability arising from their small size. The 
coefficient for foreign support is positive and significant (at the <0.01 level), indicating that 
groups who receive support are more likely to fight with a previous ally. One explanation for 
this could be that foreign support provides a source of dispute between groups, which leads to  
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Tables 2.16 – 2.19 Multinomial logistic regression estimates 
Table 2.16 Cooperate only 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.216**  0.082  
Strong rebels -0.786**   0.705  
Weak rebels -0.796**   0.487  
Ethnic conflict -0.286**  0.650  
Foreign support 0.226**  0.599  
Territorial control 2.057**  0.856  
Number of groups 0.221**  0.278  
ln [GDP]  -0.080**  0.060  
ln [Pop] 0.405**  0.202  
Ethnic frac. -0.377**  1.258  
Intensity 0.478**  0.708  
Constant -6.957**  3.513  
Number of obs.                 1126  
Wald χ
2
 (60)                       425.57  
Log pseudo likelihood               -661.900  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.51  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
 
Table 2.17 Fight only 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.309**  0.158  
Strong rebels 1.017**   0.962  
Weak rebels 0.180**   0.883  
Ethnic conflict -0.869**  0.955  
Foreign support 3.218**  1.758  
Territorial control 1.503**  1.136  
Number of groups -0.869**  0.473  
ln [GDP] -0.356**  0.125  
ln [Pop] 0.252**  0.309  
Ethnic frac. -4.429**  1.372  
Intensity 1.308**  0.980  
Constant -5.216**  5.704  
Number of obs.                 1126  
Wald χ
2
 (60)                       425.57  
Log pseudo likelihood               -661.900  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.51  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
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Table 2.18 Cooperate with one group, fight with another 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.269**  0.138  
Strong rebels 0.655**   0.875  
Weak rebels 0.862**   0.836  
Ethnic conflict -1.163**  1.084  
Foreign support 1.952**  1.158  
Territorial control 3.947**  1.220  
Number of groups -0.111**  0.495  
ln [GDP] -0.159**  0.117  
ln [Pop] 0.997**  0.299  
Ethnic frac. -4.449**  2.186  
Intensity -0.406**  0.996  
Constant -17.567**  5.477  
Number of obs.                 1126  
Wald χ
2
 (60)                       425.57  
Log pseudo likelihood               -661.900  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.51  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
 
Table 2.19 Fight with previous ally 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.119**  0.114  
Strong rebels -0.298**   0.955  
Weak rebels -2.209**   0.805  
Ethnic conflict -0.758**  2.092  
Foreign support 3.112**  1.110  
Territorial control 2.009**  1.293  
Number of groups 1.902**  2.566  
ln [GDP] -0.294**  0.120  
ln [Pop] 0.702**  0.575  
Ethnic frac. 6.593**  5.806  
Intensity 1.707**  1.131  
Constant -30.037**  13.289  
Number of obs.                 1126  
Wald χ
2
 (60)                       425.57  
Log pseudo likelihood               -661.900  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.51  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
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alliance fractionalisation and subsequent fighting. The coefficient for GDP is negative and 
significant (at the <0.01 level), indicating that groups fighting strong states are less likely to 
fight with a previous ally. This might occur because the presence of a strong state improves 
cohesion, making alliance fractionalisation less likely. The coefficients for N groups, 
population and ethnic fractionalisation are positive and significant (at the <0.01, <0.05, 
<0.05 levels respectively).    
2.5 Limitations and avenues for further research 
Several limitations have been revealed by the present approach, which suggest obvious 
avenues for further research. Firstly, the dependent variable, cooperation, is limited by the 
unavailability of specific data. The dataset does not specify which groups formed an alliance, 
only that the group formed an alliance with one or more rebel group(s) in that conflict-year. 
The dependent variable, fighting, is also limited because the dataset does not distinguish 
between initiators and targets. As a result, the positive relationship between foreign support 
and the likelihood of inter-rebel violence is ambiguous. The group receiving foreign support 
could become a target for attack because of its increased resources, or the group receiving 
foreign support could initiate fighting with another group as a result of its increased capacity. 
Should such data become available, it would be desirable to use a dyadic design so that the 
mechanisms responsible for rebel group interactions can be tested more directly.  
Alternatively, future research may benefit from moving away from dyadic designs, shifting 
instead towards the use of network approaches since these provide an opportunity for 
multiple interdependencies to be explored. The network methodology proposed in this 
chapter has shown one possible way forward, although further research is needed to verify 
the ideology data and to validate the network methodology.  
The primary purpose of this chapter has been to test theories relating to identity and power-
based factors. Other factors, such as the previous interaction behaviour of groups and the role 
of geography or technology have not been considered. Since these features may also be 
important in determining rebel group interactions, the study of these aspects is an obvious 
extension to the present work. Another useful line of enquiry for future research is to 
investigate why some conflicts contain multiple rebel groups. This question was briefly 
addressed in this chapter but further research is needed and the theoretical explanations of 
why multi-party conflicts arise need developing. 
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2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has addressed an understudied aspect of the conflict literature by examining the 
determinants of two types of rebel group interaction strategy, namely alliance formation and 
inter-rebel violence. Two theories relating to group interactions were tested; one being 
identity-based and the other power-based. A novel methodology based on social network 
analysis was utilised so that a quantitative index, which measures the degree of ideological 
similarity between groups, could be developed. The potential use of network approaches for 
examining social ties between groups has been highlighted. The effects of ideological ties and 
relative rebel group size on alliance formation and inter-rebel violence were tested using 
logistic regression models. The robustness of the results was checked using mixed-effects 
models, two-step Heckman selection models and multinomial logistic regression models.  
Findings suggest that power-based factors have greater utility in explaining rebel group 
interactions. Identity-based factors are found to play a role in motivating cooperative 
alliances but there is less convincing evidence found regarding their role in motivating inter-
rebel violence. The results for each interaction strategy are detailed below. 
2.6.1 Results for rebel group cooperation 
It is shown that groups are more likely to cooperate with others when they are heavily 
ideologically connected to their peers, when they are militarily weak relative to their peers or 
when they control territory. These results were robust in all models. The implication is that 
power considerations are dominant in encouraging cooperative interactions between groups, 
but identity-based factors also play an important role.  
2.6.2 Results for rebel group fighting 
It is shown that groups are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence with others when 
they are either militarily strong or militarily weak relative to their peers or when they receive 
foreign support from external actors. These findings were not robust in all models however. 
Results obtained from the multi-level models suggest that only strong groups have an 
increased likelihood of inter-rebel violence (the results obtained on weak rebels and foreign 
support were not robust). Some additional important and significant results were gained after 
controlling for sample selection bias. These results show that groups are less likely to fight 
others when they control territory and when they are engaged in conflict against a strong 
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state. Some evidence was also found that supports the suggestion that identity-based factors 
also play a role in encouraging inter-rebel violence, although this evidence was found only in 
the multinomial logistic regression model. In summary, these results show that power 
considerations are dominant in encouraging violent interactions between groups. Identity-
based factors may also play a role, but the evidence found to support this claim is weak. 
2.6.3 Additional lines of enquiry 
The analyses presented in this chapter provide insight on the determinants of rebel group 
interactions, although the reasons why a group might choose to cooperate with other groups 
instead of fight (or vice versa) remains unresolved. The theoretical discussions presented in 
Chapter I suggest that both types of interaction strategy, although directly opposite in nature, 
develop from the same root causes. The results presented in this chapter also shows some 
evidence that supports the argument that groups who share the same identity are more likely 
to interact. The salient question therefore is why does one rebel group choose to cooperate 
with its peers, while another group, driven by apparently similar identity-based motives, 
choose to fight with its peers? This aspect is addressed in more detail in Chapter III.
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Chapter III 
 
Friend or foe? Rebel group interactions 
and the role of credible commitments 
 
Abstract 
Why do some rebel groups form alliances with their peers while other groups, driven 
by apparently similar identity-based motives, engage in inter-rebel violence? In this 
chapter it is argued that groups who are ideologically similar to their peers are more 
likely to form alliances if they are perceived by other groups as being able to credibly 
commit to an alliance. If a group lacks alliance credibility in the eyes of their peers, it 
is argued that the group is more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. The alliance 
credibility of rebel groups is measured against two criteria (i) the level of external 
threat faced by the rebel groups and (ii) the organisational characteristics of the groups 
themselves. Conditional hypotheses are tested using two contrasting but 
complimentary methodologies, namely logistic regression analysis and classification 
and regression tree analysis (CART). Results of the regression analysis suggest that 
groups who are ideologically similar to their peers are less likely to form alliances if 
they are also a new entrant to the conflict. Results of the CART analysis suggest that 
ideological ties are the most powerful predictor of rebel group interactions and that 
groups who are ideologically similar to their peers are most likely to base their 
interaction decisions on the organisational characteristics of other groups. These 
results provide some evidence in support of the theoretical proposition that rebel 
groups make interaction decisions on the basis of perceived alliance credibility.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
The findings presented in the previous chapter support the theoretical arguments put forward 
in the literature review (in Chapter I) in that they suggest the root causes of alliance formation 
and inter-rebel violence might be the same. Namely, that rebel groups who are heavily 
ideologically tied to their peers are more likely to form either alliances or to engage in inter-
rebel violence than groups who are less ideologically tied. On first inspection these results 
may seem contradictory. They suggest shared identity increases the likelihood of two 
88 
 
opposing outcomes. Thus, while the results described in the previous chapter provide general 
information regarding the determinants of rebel group interactions, they do not answer the 
specific question of why a group may choose one interaction strategy over the other. In other 
words, why does one rebel group, who is ideologically similar to their peers, choose to 
cooperate, while another group, driven by similar identity-based motives, chooses to fight? 
The aim of this chapter is to address this question.  
3.2 Background 
Previous civil war research has tended to model conflict as an all-or-nothing phenomenon, in 
which outcomes, such as war or no war, are predicted by a list of independent and control 
variables whose predictive power is assessed individually across all observations. Most 
studies have avoided discussions of how the effect of one variable may be conditional on the 
presence of another (i.e. one variable may have a moderating effect on the other). This has 
meant that researchers have identified independent variables which appear to predict 
outcomes under all conditions. 
Most studies on rebel group interactions have avoided constructing statistical models with 
moderating effects to explain the different interaction strategies adopted by groups. Some 
research has examined the mechanisms responsible for alliance formation by applying one set 
of theories, while other research has used the same set of theories to focus on the mechanisms 
responsible for inter-rebel violence. Studies that have sought to test these theories have often 
used regression models to predict rebel group interaction outcomes, for example by 
comparing cases where the outcome did or did not occur (e.g. Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). The 
main issue with this approach is that regression modelling favours the analysis of one-to-one 
correlations between sets of variables and therefore it is not ideal for the complex situations 
that occur in rebel group interactions. Multi-dimensional statistical methods which measure 
the moderating effect of one variable on another are available, but they have not yet been 
utilised to their full potential in studies of rebel group interactions. 
Few empirical studies have examined cases where rebel groups might cooperate or fight 
under seemingly similar conditions. An exception is the study by Ross (2004) who finds that 
in some civil wars, natural resource endowments lead to cooperation between non-state 
actors, but in other civil wars natural resource endowments lead to fighting. Another 
exception is the study by Christia (2012) who argues that changes in relative power-balances 
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between rebel groups over the course of a conflict results in alliance fractionalisation and 
subsequent fighting between groups. She concludes that alliances are less prone to 
fractionalisation (and subsequently less likely to result in inter-rebel violence) when the rebel 
groups face a strong state or when the allied groups experience a series of battlefield wins. 
One of the main criticisms of this study is that Christia (2012) considers inter-rebel violence 
only as a function of alliance fractionalisation. This assertion is limited, given the results of 
several other studies (including the findings presented in Chapter II of this thesis), which 
suggest that many groups engage in inter-rebel fighting for reasons beyond acrimonious splits 
(Lilja and Hultman 2011; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). Whilst these studies represent valuable 
contributions to the rebel group dynamics literature by providing insight into the causes of 
group interactions, they do not answer the specific and important question of why a rebel 
group chooses one type of interaction strategy over the other. 
The aim of this chapter is to address this question. The main contribution made in the chapter 
is to propose a novel theoretical framework relating to rebel group interactions in multi-party 
civil wars, which is based on Walter’s (1997) theory of credible commitments. Walter (1997) 
addresses the question of why peace settlements in civil wars occur infrequently compared to 
negotiated settlements made between nation states in inter-state wars. She argues that unlike 
in inter-state wars, the actors in civil wars lack the credibility to commit to peace deals. In 
this chapter, credible commitment theory is extended and applied to the case of rebel group 
interactions. On the basis of this extension it is proposed that alliance credibility is the 
conditional variable determining whether a group chooses to cooperate or fight with its peers. 
The chapter begins by outlining some theoretical arguments relating to why a rebel group 
might choose to cooperate instead of fight (and vice versa). A set of conditional hypotheses 
are derived and these are tested using both statistical modelling methods and machine 
learning techniques, namely classification and regression trees (CARTs), the application of 
which is novel in civil war research. A description of the research design is provided and 
results are presented and discussed. A comparison of the two methods used is provided and 
the limitations of each method are highlighted. Conclusions are drawn and the lines of 
enquiry intended for the subsequent chapter in this thesis are discussed. 
3.3 Theory and hypotheses 
In her seminal paper on critical barriers to civil war settlement, Walter (1997) argues that 
commitment problems are the main factor inhibiting negotiated settlements between states 
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and rebel groups. Between 1940 and 1990, 55% of inter-state wars were resolved at the 
bargaining table, whereas only 20% of civil wars reached solutions in this way (Walter 1997). 
Walter argues that this occurs because parties are unlikely to enter into cooperative 
agreements if there is little expectation that such agreements will be fulfilled. Expressed 
differently, alliance formation relies on perceived credibility between the actors involved 
(Fearon 1995; Leeds 1999; Morrow 2000; Bapat and Bond 2012).  
In civil wars, Walter (1997) has shown that successful negotiated peace settlements are most 
likely to be achieved when a third, stronger party acts as a mediator and agrees to enforce the 
terms of a peace treaty. The third party presence increases the credibility of both sides, which 
in turn, increases the likelihood of a peaceful resolution. In international affairs, nation states 
also assess potential alliance partners via their credibility. They develop expectations of 
credible commitments by assessing prospects for future interactions and by seeking assurance 
that there will be punishment for broken promises (Axelrod 1984; Fearon 1998; Kydd 2005).  
The above types of credibility assessments are more difficult for rebel groups. Rebel groups 
often do not survive for extended periods and they seldom possess the transparent structures 
required for credibility assessments to take place (Stedman 1997; Walter 2002). A rebel 
group is also unlikely to be able to find a third party, or mediator, who will guarantee the 
terms of an alliance agreement between themselves and another non-state actor. Rebel groups 
must therefore assess the credibility of potential alliance partners in other ways. It is proposed 
in this chapter that credibility is the condition that determines whether a rebel group will 
choose to cooperate with its peers instead of fight. It is argued that rebel groups choose a 
strategy of cooperation instead of fighting, not because there is a third party to enforce an 
agreement, but because rebel groups in multi-party conflicts have a common enemy and 
potentially share the same fate. If the external threat faced by rebels is large (i.e. the state is 
strong) then rebel groups gain alliance credibility in the eyes of their peers because they have 
higher potential losses from not forming an alliance.  
In this chapter, it is proposed that rebel groups also develop expectations of credibility by 
assessing certain organisational characteristics of potential partners. It is argued that cohesive 
groups who have strong and stable leadership are likely to gain credibility in the eyes of their 
peers. Effective leadership and group stability strengthens trust; the assumption being that if a 
leader is able to manage his own affairs, then he will be more able to manage alliance affairs. 
Additionally, cohesive groups are more likely to experience in-group policing, thus 
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minimising the likelihood of dispute within a group. Cohesive groups may then be more 
likely to agree on the terms of an alliance and in turn, may be less likely to renege on their 
original alliance deal. These mechanisms and their effect on the alliance credibility of rebel 
groups are discussed in more detail below. 
3.3.1 External threat faced by rebel groups 
A long standing proposition in the field of political science is that external threat is conducive 
to group solidarity and cooperation (Kaplan 1957; Wolfers 1962; Liska 1962; Boulding 1962; 
Scott 1967; Rothstein 1968; Burgess and Moore 1973; Stein 1976; Sullivan 1976). The 
‘external threat-cohesion’ hypothesis originates from the socio-psychological literature on 
group behaviour (Sherif and Sherif 1953; Simmel 1955; Coser 1956; Sherif 2010). It suggests 
that in the absence of a common enemy, interactions between actors may or may not occur, 
but in the presence of a threat from a common enemy, things change. Groups rally to each 
other’s defence and suppress any tendencies towards conflict between themselves. As the 
presence of any perceived threat diminishes, the actors return to their normal patterns of 
interaction, namely elevated levels of within and between-group dispute than was the case 
during the period under higher levels of external threat.  
The implications of the above theory are far reaching. It has been applied in the field of 
international relations where studies have sought to identify a positive relationship between 
external threat and cohesion in the form of alliance blocs such as NATO (Tucker 1963; Holsti 
et al. 1973). Thompson and Rapkin (1981) point out that the theory can also be applied to 
cohesion within a nation state. For example, a desperate autocrat might choose to focus on 
external threats or enemies to divert attention away from domestic problems, thereby 
prolonging their position as leader. In a civil war context, the implication of this theory is that 
insurgent groups will adopt a strategy of alliance formation in response to a strong external 
adversary. In turn, alliances that were formed during the course of the conflict are more likely 
to disintegrate if the incumbent state is overthrown. If the external threat faced by rebel 
groups is relatively low at the start of the conflict then groups may select a strategy of inter-
rebel violence instead of alliance formation. 
One case in point is the Afghan civil war, which began in the 1970’s. A coalition of guerrilla 
groups, referred to as the Mujahedeen, fought in violent protest against the Soviet-backed 
communist state. After ten years of insurgency the Soviet army withdrew and a power-
sharing government was formed by the leader of Jamiat i-Islami, one of the insurgent groups 
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who had formed the Mujahedeen. Within months of the Soviets leaving Afghanistan, fighting 
over leadership erupted between the various factions of the Mujahedeen. The country was left 
without a functioning government for several years until 1996 when the Taliban seized 
control of Kabul. In the face of this common enemy, members of the Mujahedeen ceased 
fighting and joined forces in an alliance with other Taliban opponents to form the United 
Islamic Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan (UIFSA). In this case the members of the 
Mujahedeen lost their alliance credibility once the external threat, the Soviet-backed 
government, was removed. The exiting of the Soviets meant that the members of the 
Mujahedeen were forced into a prisoner’s dilemma situation, where all groups would benefit 
from cooperating but each individual group would be far worse off if they naively cooperated 
whilst another group exploited their trust and used force to take solitary control of Kabul. 
In the international arena, states have military and economic mechanisms to maintain 
cooperation even under circumstances where incentives develop for individual states to 
renege or cheat. For rebel groups however, there is generally no way of ensuring that an 
alliance partner will stick to an agreement, since there are no real mechanisms in place for 
punishing a partner who reneges on a deal. One possible way that a rebel group might 
develop expectations regarding the alliance credibility of potential allies is by assessing the 
level of external threat posed by the state and using this as a gauge for risk. Rebel groups 
facing high levels of external threat are likely to gain alliance credibility in the eyes of their 
peers because they have higher potential losses from not forming an alliance; they are more at 
risk from being eliminated by the state and they have minimal bargaining power and 
therefore have a smaller chance of being offered concessions by the state (Nilsson 2010). 
High levels of external threat increase the need for a group to form an alliance and they 
reduce the incentive for a group to renege on an alliance deal. Conversely, rebel groups who 
face relatively lower levels of external threat are likely to lack alliance credibility in the eyes 
of their peers; they are less likely to be eliminated by the state and as a result they are more 
likely to be concerned about their position relative to other rebel groups, all of whom will be 
vying for political influence in anticipation of government collapse (Fjelde and Nilsson 
2012). In this situation, the rebel groups lose their credibility as potential allies because they 
are more likely to view their peers as competition (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). 
Hypothesis 5a: Rebel groups who share social ties with other groups are more likely 
to form alliances, conditional on the presence of a strong state. 
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Hypothesis 5b: Rebel groups who share social ties with other groups are more likely 
to engage in inter-rebel violence, conditional on the presence of a weak state. 
3.3.2 Organisational characteristics of rebel groups 
A number of studies in the conflict literature have examined within-group dynamics. A range 
of organisational characteristics have been studied including cohesion (Fearon and Laitin 
1996; Kenny 2010) and leadership (Jones and Olken 2007; Tiernay 2013). Studies on 
cohesion suggest that cohesive rebel groups are more likely to experience in-group policing 
(Fearon and Laitin 1996), a feature that minimises the likelihood of dispute within a group 
and might facilitate cooperative deals between groups (Fearon and Laitin 1996). Other 
studies on within-group cohesion have shown that if a group is not cohesive, then some 
members of the group may act as spoilers by attempting to block peace settlements offered 
by the state (Stedman 1997; Kydd and Walter 2003; Greenhill and Major, 2006; Nilsson 
2008; Pearlman 2009; Pearlman and K. Cunningham 2011). In many cases, these within-
group disagreements erupt into violence and the peace settlement is abandoned simply 
because the rebel group lacks credibility regarding its commitment to the peace deal.  
Studies on leadership have shown that the leaders of the rebel groups are also an important 
variable in civil war dynamics. Jones and Olken (2007) compare successful and unsuccessful 
assassination attempts of rebel group leaders in civil wars and find that the unsuccessful 
assassination of leaders tends to enflame low-intensity conflicts and diminish high-intensity 
conflicts. Tiernay (2013) on the other hand, finds that the unexpected removal of a rebel 
group leader significantly shortens the duration of civil war. Conversely, he finds that civil 
wars are less likely to end when rebel groups are led by their founder for the entire duration 
of war. Collectively, these findings suggest that stable and effective leadership increases a 
rebel group’s credibility and chance of success. 
Another way that a rebel group might develop expectations regarding alliance credibility is to 
assess the organisational characteristics of a potential ally. Cohesive groups who have strong 
and stable leadership are likely to gain alliance credibility in the eyes of their peers because 
these features promote trust. Cohesive groups have, by virtue, achieved within-group 
cooperation regarding attainment of the group’s goals (Kenny 2010). This ability to achieve 
within-group cooperation means that cohesive groups are less likely to disagree on the terms 
of an alliance, and in turn, they may be less likely to renege on an alliance deal made with 
another group. The longevity of rebel groups is also important for the same reason; trust. In 
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order to gain alliance credibility, a group must be able to provide assistance over a period of 
time, or it must be around long enough to be at least of some assistance to its ally. Groups 
who have survived the test of time gain alliance credibility because other groups trust that 
they will be able to provide support over a period of time. Indeed, if there was some 
expectation that a group would disintegrate or get eliminated before it was able to provide 
support, then the rebel group’s credibility regarding their commitment to an alliance would 
clearly be lost. Intuitively, if a group has ineffective leadership and/or internal divisions, it is 
less likely to gain trust or alliance credibility in the eyes of its peers. New groups are also 
likely to lack alliance credibility because they do not have enough previous history for trust 
to have developed. Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) point out that new entrants to a conflict are 
more likely to be viewed as competitors. By virtue, groups that are new entrants to a conflict 
have either opted to form a separate group, or they have splintered from an existing group 
and these features may give other groups the impression that the new group is self-interested 
and untrustworthy. These arguments suggest that efficiently organised rebel groups (i.e. those 
with strong and stable leadership, who are cohesive and who have achieved longevity) will be 
more likely to adopt a strategy of alliance formation, whereas rebel groups who are unable to 
manage their own internal affairs (i.e. those with unstable leadership and internal dispute) or 
new entrants to a conflict will be more likely to adopt a strategy of inter-rebel violence. 
One notable example of the above occurred in the civil war in Algeria in the late 1980’s. Two 
main groups were challenging the Algerian government and both were dedicated to 
implementing Islamic Sharia law. The first group, the Armed Islamic Movement (MIA) 
adopted a violent campaign but was not able to accomplish much militarily against the state. 
The second group, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), chose to pursue a political, rather than 
violent, strategy and competed in elections in 1991. The FIS, who had large support from the 
Algerian population, was set to win, but the government intervened militarily and cancelled 
the elections. Following this cancellation, armed conflict broke out. Initially, FIS stayed out 
of the conflict, but by 1992, FIS decided to endorse the armed struggle and it merged with the 
MIA. At this time, both the FIS and MIA were efficiently organised. This supports the 
arguments presented here, namely that well-organised groups are more likely to cooperate.  
From the period of 1992 to 2001 the Algerian conflict became particularly bloody, resulting 
in approximately 100,000 deaths. During this period of high intensity conflict, FIS was 
weakened by state repression. First, the leaders, and then hundreds of FIS members, were 
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targeted by the Algerian secret services, which left the group without directives and with no 
clear strategies (Lowri 2005). As a result, FIS lost control, both administratively and on the 
ground. This left a vacuum of governance in Algeria and in the absence of any political or 
moral authority, a number of poorly coordinated, uncontrollable, radical Islamic groups 
formed. The motivations of these groups, referred to collectively as the Armed Islamic 
Groups (or GIA), ranged from religious extremism to outright banditry (Lowri 2005). Since 
these newly formed groups lacked organisational integrity, the only way they could gain 
recognition was by demonstrating and exercising a capacity for disruptiveness, especially 
with respect to their rivals. As a result, maximalist strategies of targeting one another and 
outdoing one other through violence became the order of the day (Lowri 2005). All groups 
during this period lacked alliance credibility. They were poorly organised, with unstable and 
ineffective leadership and many of the groups were new entrants to the conflict. In this case, 
the groups were unable to trust one another and fighting inevitably erupted between them. 
Hypothesis 6a: Rebel groups who share social ties with other groups are more likely 
to form alliances, conditional on the presence of those groups having stable 
leadership, cohesion and longevity.  
Hypothesis 6b: Rebel groups who share social ties with other groups are more likely 
to engage in inter-rebel violence, conditional on the presence of those groups having 
unstable leadership, poor cohesion or being a new entrant to the conflict. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Dataset and dependent variables 
The above conditional hypotheses are tested in a large-N framework using the dataset 
described in Chapter II. All multi-party civil wars listed in the dataset are analysed. The unit 
of analysis is the conflict-year. Two binary rebel group interaction outcomes are considered: 
cooperative alliances and inter-rebel violence. Categorical outcomes for the different 
interaction strategy types are also examined (see Chapter II for a detailed description of the 
coding of these). All dependent variables are coded as before (in Chapter II). These are: 
Cooperation: a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the rebel group formed an alliance 
with one (or more) rebel group(s) in that conflict-year and 0 otherwise. 
Fighting: a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the rebel group engaged in armed conflict 
with one (or more) rebel group(s) in that conflict-year and 0 otherwise. 
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Interaction strategy type: a categorical variable taking the value of 0 if the rebel group 
operated independently, 1 if the group formed an alliance only, 2 if the group engaged in 
inter-rebel violence only, 3 if the group cooperated with one group, whilst simultaneously 
fighting with another and 4 if the group fought with a previous ally.  
3.4.2 Independent variables 
A total of eight independent variables, described below, are used to test the hypotheses. Three 
independent variables from Chapter II are used in the present analysis. These are: 
Ideological ties: a continuous variable signifying the degree of ideological similarity between 
groups. This variable has a range of 0 to 24 where 0 indicates that the group is ideologically 
dissimilar to its peers and 24 indicates that the group is heavily ideologically connected to its 
peers (see Chapter II for a detailed description of the derivation of this variable). 
Strong rebels: a binary variable where 1 signifies that the group size was ≥ 75% of the sum of 
all group sizes involved in the conflict and 0 signifies that the group size was < 75% of the 
sum of all group sizes involved in the conflict. Troop size data are used. These are taken from 
Cunningham et al. (2009). 
Weak rebels: a binary variable where 1 signifies that the group size was < 25% of the sum of 
all group sizes in the conflict, and 0 signifies that the group size was ≥ 25% of the sum of all 
group sizes. Troop size data are used. These are taken from Cunningham et al. (2009). 
Two independent variables are used to test the hypotheses relating to the levels of external 
threat faced by rebel groups (hypotheses 5a and 5b). Both independent variables are proxies 
for state strength and are coded as follows: 
State strength: a measure of the military capabilities of the state relative to the military 
capabilities of the rebel group. Troop size data are used. Data for rebel troop sizes are taken 
from Cunningham et al. (2009) and data for government troop sizes are taken from Lacina 
(2006). The relative power between the state and a single rebel group is calculated for each 
conflict-year using the expression, (NG – NR) / (NG + NR), where NG is the number of 
government troops and NR is the number of rebel troops. This expression produces an index 
which ranges between -1 and 1, where a value of 0 signifies that the government forces and 
rebel group are at parity in terms of troop size, a positive value signifies that the government 
side is stronger (i.e. high levels of external threat) and a negative value signifies that the rebel 
side is stronger (i.e. low levels of external threat). 
Polity: a measure of the administrative capabilities of the state. Polity scores are used and 
data are taken from the Polity IV Project, 1800-2009. The polity index ranges between 10 and 
-10, where positive values signify that a state is strong in terms of its administrative 
capabilities (i.e. high levels of external threat) and negative values signify that a state is weak 
in terms of its administrative capabilities (i.e. low levels of external threat). 
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Three independent variables are used to test the hypotheses relating to the organisational 
characteristics of rebel groups (hypotheses 6a and 6b). These are coded as follows: 
Leadership turnover: a variable signifying the total number of leaders that the rebel group 
had since it was founded. High leadership turnovers are assumed to be associated with 
reduced alliance credibility, whereas low leadership turnovers are assumed to be associated 
with high alliance credibility. Data are taken from Tiernay (2013).
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Fractionalisation: a binary variable where a value of 1 signifies that the rebel group 
experienced fractionalisation (i.e. group splintering) and 0 otherwise. Cohesive groups who 
do not experience fractionalisation are assumed to have high alliance credibility, whereas 
groups who do experience fractionalisation are assumed to have low alliance credibility. Data 
are taken from the UCDP Non-state Actor Dataset v.1 (2009).  
New group: a binary variable where a value of 1 signifies that the rebel group is a new entrant 
to the conflict and 0 otherwise. Rebel groups are coded as being new entrants if they first 
crossed the UCDP defined threshold of 25 battle related deaths in a conflict-year that 
occurred after the conflict start date. (This includes splinter groups). New groups are assumed 
to be associated with low levels of alliance credibility, whereas rebel groups with longevity 
(i.e. those who have operated in the conflict since the start date) are assumed to have high 
levels of alliance credibility. Data for the coding of this variable are taken from Cunningham 
et al. (2009). 
3.4.3 Control variables 
To control for the lack of independence between the conflict-years for a single rebel group, 
additional variables are included, which control for time-dependence. These are: 
Previous cooperation: a variable signifying the number of years elapsed since the rebel group 
cooperated with one or more other rebel group(s). 
Previous fighting: a variable signifying the number of years elapsed since the rebel group 
engaged in inter-rebel violence with one or more other rebel group(s). 
Following the proposal of Carter and Signorino (2010), the squared and cubed terms (and raw 
values) of the above variables are included instead of time dummies or splines. 
                                                           
‡
 The independent variable leadership turnover was not normalised by the number of conflict-years the rebel 
group existed. It was not viewed as being necessary because in the dataset analysed, leadership turnover was not 
found to vary as a function of the length of time a group existed. The mean survival of all rebel groups in the 
dataset = 8 conflict-years, the maximum survival = 59 conflict-years. Only one group in the dataset had the 
maximum leadership turnover of 4 leaders (the RCD in Zaire) who were included in the dataset for a total of 4 
conflict-years (1998 – 2001). This is below the mean value of survival. Four rebel groups in the dataset had a 
leadership turnover of 3leaders. These were the PLFP in Israel who were included for a total of 2 conflict-years, 
the PWG in India for 4 conflict-years, the group Hezbollah in Israel for 8 conflict-years and the GIA in Algeria 
for 10 conflict-years. The majority of these cases were equal to, or below the mean value of survival.   
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3.4.4 Methods of estimation 
Two different methodologies are used to test the conditional hypotheses described above; 
logistic regression modelling with the inclusion of moderating variables and classification 
and regression trees (CARTs). These are described below. 
Logistic regression analysis 
Firstly, logistic regression models are employed. The dependent variables, cooperation and 
fighting are examined separately. To investigate the possibility of a conditional relationship 
between social ties and alliance credibility, a set of moderating variables are constructed and 
these are included in the regression models. The independent variable, ideological ties, is 
multiplied by each of the independent variables relating to the alliance credibility of rebel 
groups; state strength; polity; leadership turnover; fractionalised; and; new group.  
Classification and Regression Tree analysis 
An alternative way to test for a moderating effect between independent variables is to use 
classification and regression trees (CART). The seminal work on CARTs was published by 
Breiman, Friedman, Olshen and Stone (1984). Tree models are used to predict continuous 
outcome variables and are called regression trees, whereas models used to predict binary or 
categorical outcomes are called classification trees. Since rebel group interaction outcomes 
may be either binary or categorical, only classification trees are utilised in this chapter.  
To elaborate, CARTs are a type of decision tree derived by using a computer program based 
on a machine-learning methodology. CART analysis can be used as a tool for determining 
and ordering the relative importance or explanatory power of independent variables, 
determining the boundaries within which those independent variables have their strongest 
effect and assessing the possibility of moderating effects between variables. Instead of 
working deductively from starting hypotheses or theories, CARTs represent a machine-
learning generative approach, which can be used to show how different combinations of 
variables can have different effects on an outcome. CARTs can also be used to show the 
ranges within which those particular variables have their strongest effect.  
CARTs are performed using the same data used to fit statistical models (e.g. with the 
dependent and independent variables coded as separate vectors in a dataset). As with other 
statistical modelling methods, such as regression models or general linear models, CARTs 
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seek to predict the dependent variable from a set of independent variables. The unique aspect 
of CARTs is that they use computer algorithms based on recursive partitioning to make 
predictions (instead using algorithms to find the line of best fit, which is the aim of regression 
methods). Recursive partitioning algorithms create a decision tree from the dataset by striving 
to correctly classify observations on the basis of several dichotomous independent variables. 
Put differently, CARTs search the parameter space for the best combination of variables (and 
their values) to classify particular outcomes. As such, CARTs are a more exhaustive 
approach than regression methods, which test only one combination of variables and the 
moderating effects (or variable interactions) where specified. 
In classification tree models, leaves represent class labels and branches represent 
conjunctions of features that lead to those class labels. Classification trees grow from a root 
using an algorithm which splits the source set into subsets (at a node) based on an attribute 
value test. This process is repeated on each derived subset in a recursive manner called 
recursive partitioning. The recursion is completed when the subset at a node has the same 
value of the outcome variable (i.e. the node is pure), or when splitting no longer adds value to 
the predictions. At this point, the nodes become terminal and a leaf is created. A schematic 
visual representation of this process is shown in Figure 3.1. 
In the analysis leading to the development of CARTs, it is required to predict an outcome of 
interest, Y, from the given factors x1, x2, x3, …, xn in the domain X. Then in Figure 3.1, the 
graphic is the domain of all factors associated with Y in descending order of importance. In 
traditional regression models, single models are used to represent the entire dataset. CARTs 
are an alternative approach where the data space is partitioned into smaller sections in which 
the interactions between variables are broken down in a clearer manner. Each node in the tree 
is derived from a splitting test algorithm which applies to that node only. In this way, CARTs 
are analogous to other conditional modelling methods (such as testing for moderating effects 
between independent variables in regression models), because as a route is followed down the 
nodes of the tree the conditioning occurs on a specific variable. 
The above process is described in detail by Loh (2008). In essence, if it is required to find a 
function d(x) to map domain X to the response variable, Y, the existence of a sample is 
assumed on n observations L = {(x1, y1), …, (xn, yn)}. As in standard regression equations, the 
criterion for choosing d(x) is the mean squared prediction error E{d(x) – E(y|x)}
2
 for a 
regression tree, or the expected misclassification cost in the case of a classification tree. For a 
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regression tree, each leaf-node l and training samples in the regression tree (i.e. samples of 
data used to grow each of part of the tree), the model is ŷ = 


 
 , or the sample mean of 
the response variable at that node (Loh 2008). For a classification tree, each leaf-node l, 
training sample c and p(c|l), the probability that an observation l belongs to class c (i.e. the 
node splits) are determined by the Gini impurity criterion (1 - 
  p
2
(c|l)), where each split 
maximises the decrease in impurity. In the growth of both types of tree, reducing error is the 
primary driving force of tree growth. 
Figure 3.1 Visualisation of a CART 
 
In the present chapter, a classification tree is implemented using the statistical software 
programming language R. The tree is constructed using the rpart routines. The code listing is 
taken from Therneau and Atkinson (2014), which is based on the original programs of 
Breiman, Friedman and Olshen (1984). The dependent variable used for the CART analysis 
is interaction strategy type. All independent variables defined above are used, with the 
exception of the moderating variables (i.e. variable interaction terms), which are of course 
redundant in CART analysis. The time-dependent control variables (previous coop and 
previous fight) are also excluded from the CART analysis. Note again that the whole point of 
CART analysis is to assess moderating effects between independent variables by using an 
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alternative and complementary methodology to regression analysis. In summary, regression 
analysis is limited to the model specified and is theoretically motivated. As such, regression 
analysis does not test all the moderating effects between variables that may be important. 
CARTs on the other hand are atheoretical. They test all possible moderating effects that 
might exist and as a result, CARTs are more exhaustive than regression analysis   
Table 3.1 Descriptive statistics 
Level Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Dependent variables Cooperation 1126 0.67 0.47 0 1 
Fighting 
Strategy type 
 
1126 
1126 
0.10 
1.56 
0.29 
1.20 
0 
0 
1 
4 
Independent variables Ideological ties 1126 6.47 4.77 0 24 
Strong rebels 1126 0.14 0.34 0 1 
 Weak rebels 1126 0.36 0.48 0 1 
       
External threat 
proxies 
State strength 1126 0.46 0.62 -0.99 0.99 
Polity 1126 -0.21 6.72 -9 10 
       
Organisational 
characteristics proxies 
Leadership turnover 1126 1.28 0.51 1 4 
Fractionalised 1126 0.15 0.36 0 1 
New group 1126 0.49 0.50 0 1 
3.5 Results and discussions 
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 3.1. The 
strongest state in the dataset had a relative strength of 0.99 (India outnumbered the KCP by 
13,600:1 troops) and the weakest state had a relative strength of -0.99 (Burma was 
outnumbered by the CPB by 1:15 troops). Governments involved in multi-party conflicts 
generally had poor administrative capabilities (the mean polity score = -0.2).  
The maximum leadership turnover was 4 (the Congolese group, the RCD, who fought in 
Zaire) and the minimum leadership turnover was 1. Three quarters of the groups in the 
dataset had only one leader for the entire duration of conflict. 15% of the groups experienced 
fractionalisation, whereas about half the rebel groups (~ 49%) were new entrants to their 
conflict. A matrix of correlation coefficients for the pairs of these independent variables is 
shown in Table 3.2. All variables used in the analysis are independent of one another.  
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Table 3.2 Correlation matrix (Spearman rank correlation) 
 Ideol. 
ties 
Strong 
rebels 
Weak 
rebels 
State 
strength 
Polity Leader 
turn. 
Fract. New 
group 
Ideological ties 1.0        
Strong rebels -0.17 1.0       
Weak rebels 0.31 -0.30 1.0      
State strength 0.05 -0.10 -0.01 1.0     
Polity -0.21 0.04 -0.15 -0.19 1.0    
Lead. turnover 0.06 -0.06 0.02 0.15 0.11 1.0   
Fractionalised 0.07 0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.15 -0.07 1.0  
New group 0.01 -0.13 0.09 0.08 -0.07 0.18 -0.22 1.0 
3.5.1 Results of logistic regression analysis 
Table 3.3 shows logistic regression estimates for the effect of rebel group alliance credibility 
on the likelihood of cooperation. The coefficient for state strength is positive and significant 
(at the <0.01 level), indicating that rebel groups are more likely to form alliances when they 
are at war with a militarily strong state. The coefficient for fractionalisation is also 
significant (at the <0.01 level) but the coefficient is negative, indicating that rebel groups 
who experience fractionalisation are less likely to form alliances. The largest effect on 
cooperation is state strength, with an odds ratio = 2.03, compared to an odds ratio = 0.49 for 
the variable fractionalised. Predicted probabilities showing the effects of state strength and 
fractionalisation on cooperation are shown in Figures 3.2 and 3.3 respectively.  
Table 3.3 Logistic regression estimates showing the effect of rebel group credibility on 
the likelihood of alliance formation 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.132**  0.024  
Strong rebels -0.065**   0.241  
Weak rebels 0.341**  0.196  
State strength 0.710**  0.139  
Polity -0.001**  0.013  
Leadership turnover 0.112**  0.165  
Fractionalised -0.712**  0.228  
New group -0.097**  0.175  
Previous coop -1.779**  0.141  
Previous coop
2 
0.218**  0.024  
Previous coop
3 
-0.007**  0.001  
Constant 0.488**  0.274  
Number of obs.                 1126  
LR χ
2
 (11)                       501.82  
Log likelihood                -464.177  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.35  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
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Figure 3.2 Predicted probabilities of group cooperation for a range of assumed values of 
state strength (range = -1:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Predicted probabilities of group cooperation for a range of assumed values of 
rebel group fractionalisation (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
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Table 3.4 shows logistic regression estimates for rebel group cooperation with the inclusion 
of the variable interaction terms to test for moderating effects. The results for state strength 
and fractionalisation are robust (both at the <0.01 level). The size of the effect increases for 
state strength (as signified by an odds ratio = 2.81 compared to = 2.03 in the previous 
model), whereas the size of the effect for fractionalisation decreases (as signified by an odds 
ratio = 0.53 compared to = 0.49 in the previous model).  
No evidence is found in support of hypotheses 5a, but the variable, ideology * new group, is 
significant (at the <0.01 level), which provides evidence in support of hypothesis 6a, since it 
demonstrates a moderating effect between the variables ideology and new group. The 
coefficient is negative, indicating that rebel groups who are ideologically similar to their 
peers and who are also new entrants to the conflict are less likely to form alliances. Overall, 
the inclusion of the moderating variables improves the model fit (the pseudo R
2
 has increased 
to 0.37 compared to 0.35 in the previous model). 
Table 3.4 Logistic regression estimates showing the effect of rebel group credibility on 
the likelihood of alliance formation with the inclusion of moderating variables 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.178**  0.029  
Strong rebels -0.042**   0.244  
Weak rebels 0.306**  0.200  
State strength 1.032**  0.234  
Polity -0.004**  0.024  
Leadership turnover 0.088**  0.171  
Fractionalised -0.633**  0.240  
New group 0.069**  0.188  
Ideology * S. strength -0.031**  0.027  
Ideology * Polity -0.001**  0.004  
Ideology * L. turnover -0.011**  0.019  
Ideology * Fracted. -0.039**  0.032  
Ideology * New group -0.087**  0.029  
Previous coop -1.769**  0.142  
Previous coop
2 
0.220**  0.025  
Previous coop
3 
-0.007**  0.001  
Constant 0.492**  0.284  
Number of obs.                 1126  
LR χ
2
 (16)                        526.75  
Log likelihood                -451.734  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.37  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
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Brambor et al. (2006) suggest that moderating effects between two independent variables are 
best analysed by plotting the marginal effect of the primary independent variable versus the 
conditional variable while holding all other variables constant. The findings for the 
conditional relationship between rebel group cooperation and ideology * new group are 
plotted this way in Figure 3.4 using Boehmke’s (2006) grinter data utility in STATA. As is 
evident in Figure 3.4, the marginal effect of ideology on the probability of cooperation 
decreases as the variable new group increases, thus providing strong evidence in support of 
hypothesis 6a. The 95% confidence intervals (dashed lines) exclude zero at all values of new 
group indicating that this relationship is statistically significant across the entire range.  
Figure 3.4 Marginal effect of ideology on the probability of cooperation versus the 
conditional variable, new group (range = 0:1), generated from logistic estimates 
 
Table 3.5 shows logistic regression estimates for the effect of rebel group credibility on the 
likelihood of inter-rebel violence. The coefficients for leadership turnover, fractionalisation 
and new group are all positive and significant (at the <0.01, <0.01 and <0.05 levels 
respectively), indicating that rebel groups who have higher numbers of leaders, those who 
experience fractionalisation or those who are new entrants to a conflict are more likely to 
engage in inter-rebel violence. The odds ratio for fractionalisation = 2.59, new group = 1.77 
and leadership turnover = 1.75. Predicted probabilities for these effects are plotted in Figures 
3.5 – 3.7. In Figure 3.5, the slope is steeper at higher values of leadership turnover indicting 
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that the probability of inter-rebel violence increases more markedly with higher numbers of 
leaders, whereas the slopes in Figures 3.6 and 3.7 are relatively flat, indicating that the 
probability of fighting is less sensitive to changes in fractionalised and new group.  
Table 3.5 Logistic regression estimates showing the effect of rebel group credibility on 
the likelihood of inter-rebel violence  
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.045**  0.026  
Strong rebels 2.027**   0.310  
Weak rebels 0.668**  0.290  
State strength 0.091**  0.178  
Polity -0.014**  0.019  
Leadership turnover 0.560**  0.186  
Fractionalised 0.952**  0.274  
New group 0.573**  0.245  
Previous fight -0.537**  0.106  
Previous fight
2 
0.029**  0.010  
Previous fight
3 -0.001**  0.001  
Constant -3.601**  0.427  
Number of obs.                 1126  
LR χ
2
 (11)                       162.57  
Log likelihood                -272.295  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.23  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
 
Figure 3.5 Predicted probabilities of group fighting for a range of assumed values of 
leadership turnover (range = 1:4) generated from logistic regression estimates 
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Figure 3.6 Predicted probabilities of group fighting for a range of assumed values of 
group fractionalisation (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Predicted probabilities of group fighting for a range of assumed values of 
new group (range = 0:1) generated from logistic regression estimates 
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Table 3.6 shows logistic regression estimates for inter-rebel violence with the inclusion of the 
moderating variables. The results for leadership turnover, fractionalisation and new group 
are all robust. The coefficient for polity gains significance (at the <0.01 level) with a negative 
coefficient, indicating that rebel groups are less likely to engage in inter-rebel violence when 
they are at war with an administratively strong state. Predicted probabilities for the effect of 
polity on inter-rebel violence are shown in Figure 3.8. The effect is moderate as signified by 
the small change in the probability of inter-rebel violence between the lower and upper values 
of polity (this moderate effect is also signified by an odds ratio for polity = 0.89). The result 
on polity replicates the findings of Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) who suggest that if the state 
authority is weak, rebel groups are more likely to be concerned about their position relative to 
the other rebel groups, since these are all vying for political influence. This competition over 
political influence is likely to motivate inter-rebel violence because groups seek to eliminate 
their competitors in anticipation of the state being overthrown.   
Table 3.6 Logistic regression estimates showing the effect of rebel group credibility on 
the likelihood of inter-rebel violence with the inclusion of moderating variables 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Ideological ties 0.078**  0.032  
Strong rebels 2.140**   0.324  
Weak rebels 0.726**  0.293  
State strength -0.416**  0.290  
Polity -0.108**  0.035  
Leadership turnover 0.525**  0.195  
Fractionalised 1.028**  0.290  
New group 0.549**  0.269  
Ideology * S. strength 0.061**  0.031  
Ideology * Polity 0.016**  0.005  
Ideology * L. turnover 0.030**  0.026  
Ideology * Fracted. -0.038**  0.038  
Ideology * New group -0.019**  0.037  
Previous fight -0.558**  0.107  
Previous fight
2 
0.028**  0.010  
Previous fight
3 -0.001**  0.001  
Constant -3.939**  0.461  
Number of obs.                 1126  
LR χ
2
 (16)                        180.03  
Log likelihood                -263.566  
Pseudo R
2
                           0.25  
Note: ** denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.05 
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Figure 3.8 Predicted probabilities of fighting for a range of assumed values of polity 
(range = -10:10) generated from logistic estimates  
 
The variable, ideology * state strength, is significant (at the <0.05 level) but the coefficient is 
positive (contrary to the expectations of hypothesis 5b), indicating that rebel groups who are 
ideologically similar to their peers and who are at war with a militarily strong state are more 
likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. The variable ideology * polity also yields an effect 
contrary to expectations with a positive coefficient (significant at the <0.01 level). This 
suggests that groups who are ideologically similar to their peers and who are at war with an 
administratively strong state are also more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence.  
Although the outcomes described above are contrary to expectations, the effects are small. 
Further investigation using Boehmke’s (2006) grinter data utility in STATA, reveals the 
results plotted in Figures 3.9 and 3.10. In Figure 3.9 the slope showing the marginal effect of 
ideology on the probability of inter-rebel violence is essentially flat and the same is true in 
Figure 3.10, although in this latter figure there is a slight increase in the slope of the curve at 
higher values of polity. The confidence intervals in both figures exclude zero, indicating that 
the effects are statistically significant over the entire ranges of both state strength and polity, 
but since the curves are essentially flat, these results may be regarded as no-effect. 
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Figure 3.9 Marginal effect of ideology on the probability of inter-rebel violence versus 
the conditional variable, state strength (range = -1:1), generated from logistic estimates 
 
 
Figure 3.10 Marginal effect of ideology on the probability of inter-rebel violence versus 
the conditional variable, polity (range = -10:10), generated from logistic estimates  
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3.5.2 Results of CART analysis 
Results of the classification tree analysis are shown in Figure 3.11. The dependent variable 
interaction strategy type was used. The interaction strategy types were; operate 
independently, cooperate only, fight only, cooperate with one group and fight with another, 
fight with previous ally. The classification tree reveals that the most important variables 
associated with interaction strategy type are ideological ties, state strength, fractionalisation 
and leadership turnover. Importantly, in the CART analysis, the independent variables for 
relative rebel group size, strong rebels and weak rebels are shown to be unimportant 
predictors of interaction strategy type. Note that this result is contrary to the findings reported 
in Chapter II, which suggested that relative rebel group size was an important predictor of 
rebel group interactions. Instead, the first node is ideology, which suggests that the variable, 
ideological ties, is the most powerful predictor of interaction strategy type. 
At each node, the left branch is conditional on the node being true and the right branch is 
conditional on the node being false. In figure 3.11, the first left branch includes those 
observations where ideological ties < 10.5 (the condition is true), whereas the right branch 
includes those observations where ideological ties > 10.5 (the condition is false). Note again 
for reference; the range of the ideological ties variable is 0 to 24. The values under each node 
correspond to the number of observations of each of the five interaction strategy types. At the 
root level (i.e. underneath the first node), the numbers 116/ 679/ 54/ 134/ 143, signify the 
initial number of observations for each of the five interaction outcomes. Thus: operate 
independently = 116, cooperate only = 679, fight only = 54, cooperate with one group, fight 
with another = 134 and fight with previous ally =143). As a check, these numbers sum to 
1126, which is equal to the total number of observations included in the analysis. 
If a rebel group has an ideological ties value < 10.5, the variable state strength, is the second 
most powerful predictor of interaction strategy type, whereas if a group has an ideological 
ties value of > 10.5, then the variable fractionalised, is the second most powerful predictor of 
interaction strategy type. This provides evidence in support of hypotheses 6a and 6b as it 
implies that groups who are heavily ideologically tied to their peers are influenced by 
fractionalisation. The implication is that groups who are ideologically similar to their peers 
make interaction decisions on the basis of the organisational characteristics of other groups, 
whereas groups who are ideologically dissimilar to their peers make their interaction 
decisions on the basis of the level of external threat. 12% of rebel groups who adopted a 
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strategy of cooperate only had an ideological ties value > 10.5, whereas 88% of rebel groups 
who adopted a strategy of cooperate only had an ideological ties value < 10.5. In total, 11% 
of rebel groups who adopted a strategy of fight only had an ideological ties value > 10.5, 
whereas 89% of rebel groups who adopted a strategy of fight only had an ideological ties 
value < 10.5. This reflects the fact that the majority of rebel groups in the dataset have a low 
ideological ties score (the mean value of ideological ties = 6.5).  
The third level of the classification tree indicates that rebel groups who are ideologically 
dissimilar to their peers (i.e. ideological ties < 10.5) and who are engaged in conflict against 
relatively strong states (i.e. with a relative strength > -0.38, are most effected by leadership 
turnover, whereas groups who are ideologically dissimilar to their peers but who are engaged 
in conflict against weaker states (i.e. with a relative strength < -0.381) are most effected by 
ideological ties. Of those groups who are ideologically dissimilar to their peers, 92% who 
adopted a strategy of cooperate only were engaged in conflict against a stronger state. 
Table 3.7 shows summary results for the classification tree analysis. The first column shows 
the number of splits in the tree (= 25). The second column shows the complexity parameter 
(CP), which signifies the Gini impurity measure at each split. Classification trees use Gini 
impurity to determine each split from the root of the tree (i.e. to grow the tree). Gini impurity 
is a measure of statistical inequality which measures how often a randomly chosen element 
from the set (in this case interaction strategy type) would be incorrectly labelled if it were 
randomly labelled according to the distribution of labels in the subset.  
Table 3.7 Summary results for the interaction strategy type classification tree analysis 
shown in Figure 3.11 
 
N splits CP Relative 
error 
x error SD 
0 0.031 1.000 1.000 0.037 
5 0.022 0.832 0.906 0.036 
6 0.020 0.810 0.846 0.035 
10 0.018 0.732 0.837 0.035 
11 0.016 0.714 0.817 0.035 
14 0.015 0.667 0.767 0.035 
22 0.013 0.544 0.734 0.034 
25 0.010 0.503 0.613 0.032 
Number of observations = 1126 
Root node error: 447/1126 = 0.397 
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Gini impurity is computed by summing the probability of each item being chosen, multiplied 
by the probability of a mistake in categorising that item. It reaches its minimum (zero) when 
all cases in the node fall into a single target category. The classification tree algorithm selects 
the splits that result in the greatest decrease the Gini impurity measure. The minimum CP 
value (set at a default of = 0.01) occurs at 25 splits, indicating that at 25 splits, all cases at 
each node fall into a single category. 
On occasions the algorithms used to grow the trees in classification tree analysis can produce 
a large number of nodes and splits, such that certain variables, which are not very informative 
themselves, may lead to highly informative subsequent splits. This problem is known as over-
fitting and to overcome this issue, a cross-validation method is used to prune the tree.  
To achieve this, the data are randomly divided into two sets (‘training data’ 50% and ‘testing 
data’ 50%). The tree-growing algorithm described above is then applied to the training data 
only and the tree grown from the training data is then cross-validated using the testing data. 
The error rate for the training data and testing data is evaluated for each split at each node. 
For classification trees, the error rate refers to the misclassification rate (i.e. the fraction of 
cases assigned to the wrong class at each split). If the error rate of the testing data is 
decreased by removing a split at a node, the tree is pruned and the split is removed. This 
process is repeated until pruning no longer improves the error on the testing data.  
In Table 3.7, the column, relative error, shows the error at each split for the tree grown by the 
training data and the column, x error, shows the error at each split when the testing data is 
fitted. It is evident that the error on the testing data (x error) is larger than the error on the 
training data (relative error) at all splits. Crucially, the fit improves at every split for both 
trees grown by the training and the test data, which confirms that the tree is not over-fitted 
and thus contains the optimum number of splits. Figure 3.12 shows a graphical depiction of 
this. If the classification tree was over-fitted, there would be an increase in the x error at 
larger tree sizes. Reassuringly, the graph shows a continuous decrease in the x error with 
increased numbers of splits.  
The final column in Table 3.7 shows the standard deviation of the data at each split of the 
classification tree. At each branch of the tree, the data is partitioned into subsets that contain 
similar values and the standard deviation for all possible subsets is calculated. The subset that 
creates the highest reduction in the standard deviation is selected to form new branches of the 
tree and a split is formed on the basis of this calculation. This process is repeated at each 
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branch. The resulting standard deviation is subtracted from the standard deviation before the 
split. Thus, CARTs seek to create the most homogenous branches by achieving the highest 
possible standard deviation reduction at each split.  
The root node error shows the presences and absences (i.e. the frequency of each response 
class) at nodes for the entire tree. The root node error of the classification tree in this case is ~ 
40%, a value that signifies the number of presences in the data. 
Figure 3.12 Plot showing cross-validation results for the interaction strategy type 
classification tree analysis shown in Figure 3.11 
 
Robustness checks for CART analysis 
Figure 3.13 shows a classification tree for the binary outcome, cooperate. The results 
obtained from this classification tree can be compared directly to the logistic regression 
results presented earlier in this chapter. Inspection of Figure 3.13 reveals that the most 
important variables associated with rebel group cooperation (in order of importance) are 
ideological ties, state strength, fractionalised and leadership turnover.  
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This confirms the robustness of results obtained from the logistic regression models, with the 
exception of the variable new group, which was found to be important in the logistic 
regression models but not in the CART analysis, and the variable leadership turnover, which 
has explanatory power in the CART analysis but was not found to be statistically significant 
in the logistic regression models. The main result obtained from Figure 3.13 is that groups 
who are ideologically similar to their peers (i.e. with ideological ties > 4.5) are influenced by 
fractionalisation. This provides some further evidence in support of hypothesis 6a.  
Figure 3.13 Classification tree for rebel group cooperation 
 
Table 3.8 shows the summary of cross-validation results obtained from the cooperation 
classification tree. The root node error is ~ 33%. In this case, the x error and SD are not 
reduced between splits 2 and 9 and the complexity parameter is <0.01 after 9 splits. This 
suggests that the tree is slightly over-fitted (as is evident by the fact that all branches after 5 
splits are subsets of the state strength variable. 
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Table 3.8 Summary results for the cooperation classification tree analysis 
 
N splits CP Relative 
error 
x error SD 
0 0.068 1.000 1.000 0.042 
2 0.014 0.863 0.866 0.041 
6 0.012 0.791 0.866 0.041 
9 0.005 0.748 0.858 0.041 
12 0.001 0.732 0.842 0.040 
Number of observations = 1126 
Root node error: 373/1126 = 0.331 
 
Figure 3.14 Plot showing cross-validation results for the cooperation classification tree 
analysis shown in Figure 3.13 
 
Figure 3.15 shows a classification tree for the binary outcome fight. The results obtained from 
this classification tree can be compared directly to the logistic regression results presented 
earlier in this chapter. Inspection of Figure 3.15 reveals that the most important variables 
associated with inter-rebel violence (in order of importance) are strong rebels, ideological 
ties, leadership turnover and fractionalised. This confirms the robustness of results obtained 
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from the logistic regression models, with the exception of the variables weak rebels and new 
group which were statistically significant in the logistic regression models but not in the 
CART analysis. The main result obtained from Figure 3.15 is that groups who are 
ideologically similar to their peers (i.e. with ideological ties > 7.5 and < 13.5) are influenced 
by the variable fractionalisation.  
But, inspection of the cross-validation results (shown in Table 3.9 and plotted in Figure 3.16) 
show that the x error and SD increases with increased numbers of splits in the tree. This 
indicates that the data do not fit the tree well. One possible reason could be the extent of 
absences in the data, shown via the root node error = ~ 10%. As such, it is not possible to 
draw strong results from the classification tree in this instance.  
 
Figure 3.15 Classification tree for inter-rebel violence
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Table 3.9 Summary results for the inter-rebel violence classification tree analysis 
 
N splits CP Relative 
error 
x error SD 
0 0.023 1.000 1.000 0.092 
2 0.012 0.953 1.047 0.094 
6 0.010 0.907 1.000 0.092 
Number of observations = 1126 
Root node error: 107/1126 = 0.095 
 
Figure 3.16 Plot showing cross-validation results for the inter-rebel violence 
classification tree shown in Figure 3.15 
 
Advantages and limitations of CART analysis 
The main advantage of CARTs is that they are self-explanatory and easy to follow. They can 
handle outcomes that are continuous or discrete, they are not affected by outliers and they can 
be adapted easily to deal with missing values. This makes them highly suitable for the 
analysis of cross-country conflict data, which indeed often has missing values. Since CARTs 
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are a non-parametric method, they are not based on distributional assumptions, making them 
highly amenable to the study of a wide range of real-world situations. As such, they are 
especially useful for studying complex problems, such as rebel group interaction strategies, 
since they inherently measure the moderating effect of one independent variable on another.  
A number of limitations do exist however and these can be divided into two categories, 
namely (i) algorithmic problems that complicate the goal of finding a small tree and (ii) 
problems inherent to the tree representations (Friedman et al. 1996). One of the algorithmic 
limitations is that CARTs represent a divide-and-conquer method. This means that they 
perform well if a few highly relevant attributes exist but perform badly if many complex 
interactions between variables are present (Pagallo and Huassler 1990). This limitation is 
perhaps applicable to the first classification tree presented in this chapter (Figure 3.11), which 
shows a large number of moderating effects between the independent variables over different 
ranges. A second algorithmic limitation is that CART algorithms are greedy (i.e. they make 
the locally optimum choice at each node of the tree, with the hope of finding a global 
optimum). This means that CARTs are over-sensitive to noisy data and might propagate this 
noise down the tree (Quinlan 1993).  
One of the problems inherent with tree representation arises when the datasets contain large 
numbers of relevant features. The classification tree may then be too large and complex, 
making it hard to read and difficult to understand. Again, this limitation arguably applies to 
the classification tree shown in Figure 3.11, in which most of the independent variables are 
important. On the other hand, in some cases when there are too few relevant explanatory 
variables, a tree will not be grown beyond the root. Alternatively, if an outcome is under 
prevalent, it is likely that the tree will over-fit (as was the case for the classification tree 
shown in Figure 3.15). 
3.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this chapter has been to address the previously unanswered question of why some 
rebel groups form alliances with their peers while other groups, driven by apparently similar 
identity-based motives, engage in inter-rebel violence. The main contribution of the present 
work has been to propose novel theory relating to rebel group interactions, based on Walter’s 
(1997) theory of credible commitments. On the basis of this theory, it was argued that rebel 
groups who are ideologically similar to their peers are more likely form alliances if they are 
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perceived by other groups as being able to credibly commit to an alliance. If a group is 
ideologically similar to their peers but lacks alliance credibility however, it was argued that 
the group is more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence.  
Alliance credibility was measured against two criteria: (i) the level of external threat faced by 
the rebel groups and (ii) the organisational characteristics of the groups themselves. External 
threat levels were proxied using two measures of state strength (the relative military 
capabilities of the state compared to the rebel group, state strength, and the administrative 
capabilities of the state, polity). The organisational characteristics of rebel groups, that were 
assumed to effect a group’s perceived credibility, were leadership stability (proxied by 
leadership turnover), group cohesion (proxied by fractionalisation) and group longevity 
(proxied according to whether the group was a new group or new entrant to the conflict).  
A set of conditional hypotheses were tested using two contrasting methodologies, namely 
logistic regression modelling with the inclusion of moderating variables (i.e. variable 
interaction terms) and classification and regression trees (CARTs). The application of CARTs 
in civil war research is novel. As such, the value of CARTs for testing moderating effects 
between variables has been highlighted. Unlike regression analysis that is theoretically 
motivated and limited to the model specified, CARTs are atheoretical. CARTs search the 
entire parameter space and test every combination of variables (and their values) to classify 
particular outcomes. The two methodologies are complimentary because CARTs can be used 
to validate the results obtained from regression models. If the conclusions drawn from both 
methods are the same then the results may be regarded as being more convincing. 
3.6.1 Results of logistic regression analysis 
Results of the logistic regression modelling suggest that rebel groups who are ideologically 
similar to their peers are less likely to form alliances if they are also a new entrant to a 
conflict. This provides evidence in support of the proposed conditional hypothesis that groups 
who lack alliance credibility in the eyes of their peers are less likely to form alliances with 
other groups. Results also suggest that rebel groups are less likely to form alliances if they are 
fractionalised (i.e. not cohesive), but are more likely to form alliances if they are engaged in 
conflict against a militarily strong state. Although these results support the theoretical 
arguments put forward in this chapter, no evidence is found in support of a moderating effect 
between the independent variable, ideological ties, and the two conditional variables, 
fractionalised and state strength.  
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With regards to the interaction outcome of inter-rebel violence, results of the logistic 
regression modelling show that rebel groups with high leadership turnovers are more likely to 
fight with other groups. Although this result supports the theoretical arguments put forward in 
this chapter, no evidence is found in support of a moderating effect between the independent 
variable, ideological ties, and the conditional variable, leadership turnover.    
3.6.2 Results of CART analysis 
Results of the CART analysis show that the most important variables associated with rebel 
group interaction strategy type (in order of importance) are ideological ties, state strength, 
fractionalisation and leadership turnover. Ideology is found to be the most important 
predictor of rebel group interactions. A moderating effect between the variables ideological 
ties and fractionalisation is found, which indicates that groups who are ideologically similar 
to their peers are most likely to base their interaction decisions on the cohesiveness (i.e. 
organisational characteristics) of their peers. This result provides additional evidence in 
support of the conditional hypotheses put forward in this chapter. 
3.6.3 Comparison of results obtained from logistic regression versus CART analyses 
The results obtained from the two methods are somewhat in agreement. The CART for 
alliance formation showed that the most important variables associated with cooperation (in 
order of importance) were ideological ties, state strength, fractionalised and leadership 
turnover. This confirmed the robustness of results obtained from the logistic regression 
models, with the exception of the variable new group, which was found to be important in the 
logistic regression models but not in the CART analysis, and the variable leadership 
turnover, which was found to have explanatory power in the CART analysis but was not 
found to be statistically significant in the logistic regression models. The main result obtained 
from the CART for alliance formation was that groups who are ideologically similar to their 
peers are most influenced by fractionalisation.  
The CART for inter-rebel violence showed that the most important variables associated with 
fighting (in order of importance) were strong rebels, ideological ties, leadership turnover and 
fractionalised. This confirmed the robustness of results obtained from the logistic regression 
models, with the exception of the variables weak rebels and new group which were 
statistically significant in the logistic regression models but not in the CART analysis. The 
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main result obtained from the CART for rebel group fighting was that groups who are 
ideologically similar to their peers are influenced by fractionalisation.  
3.6.4 Additional lines of enquiry 
Theories in the conflict literature assume that non-state actors adopt interaction strategies to 
increase their chance of military victory, to decrease their chance of being eliminated or to 
increase their bargaining power at the negotiating table with the aim of receiving concessions 
from the state. But few studies have examined the effects that alliance formation and inter-
rebel violence have on rebel group credentials. Do rebel groups who adopt interaction 
strategies survive longer than those who operate independently? Do rebel groups who interact 
have an increased chance of attaining favourable conflict outcomes against the state? From 
the viewpoint of conflict resolution, gaining knowledge on the motivations and conditions 
responsible for rebel group interactions is only of value to policy-makers if we know how 
these interactions shape civil war dynamics. This aspect is considered next in Chapter IV. 
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Chapter IV 
 
Rebel group interactions and civil war 
dynamics 
 
Abstract 
Theories regarding the motivations for rebel group interactions are based on the 
assumption that non-state actors interact to maximise their chance of military victory, to 
minimise their chance of being eliminated or to increase their bargaining power at the 
negotiating table with the aim of receiving concessions from the state. But these 
assumptions have not been tested empirically. Do rebel groups who interact survive 
longer than groups who operate independently? Do rebel groups who interact have an 
increased chance of attaining favourable conflict outcomes against the state? This 
chapter seeks to address these questions by exploring how alliance formation and inter-
rebel violence influence the longevity and termination-type of rebel groups. Results 
show that groups who interact with their peers do not have increased longevity in 
comparison to groups who operate independently. Groups who engage in inter-rebel 
violence are more likely to concede to peace deals, whereas groups who align are less 
likely to concede to peace deals. Groups who form alliances are also less likely to 
suffer defeat and they are less likely to end up in a state of persistent war. The 
implications of these results are that states can maximise the chances of peaceful 
resolution by capitalising on moments that are opportune for offering peace deals. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
In multi-party conflicts, rebel groups coexist with others; some groups may have similar 
objectives or identities and others may not. Similarly, the state must account for the presence 
of multiple groups, some of which may pose a large threat because of their military 
capabilities, or the nature of their demands, whilst other groups may pose a lesser threat. In 
general, rebel groups start out weak, so the probability of their defeat is high in the initial 
stages of war. But if a rebel group is able to increase its military capabilities and reach a 
threshold where they are at parity with or stronger than the state, their chance of victory is 
clearly increased. These aspects pose the following fundamental questions. Why are states 
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with substantial advantages in military capabilities and resources often unable to attain even 
limited objectives against much weaker insurgent groups? How do rebel groups starting out 
with weak capabilities and limited resources manage to avoid early elimination by stronger 
states? Unlike two-sided conflict, groups engaged in multi-party conflicts have the potential 
to gain strategic advantages by adopting interaction strategies. Weak rebels, who may be 
perceived as low-risk initially, might have the potential to pose a credible future threat if they 
interact with their peers in an advantageous way. Thus, rebel group interactions might explain 
why weak groups sometimes survive against low odds, or why strong states sometimes suffer 
defeat against seemingly less capable enemies (Akcinaroglu 2012). 
The theories regarding the motivations for rebel group interactions discussed in the previous 
chapters are based on the assumption that non-state actors interact to increase their chance of 
military victory, to decrease their chance of being eliminated or to increase their bargaining 
power at the negotiating table with the aim of receiving concessions from the state. But few 
studies have examined the effects that interaction strategies have on rebel group survival and 
outcomes. Do rebel groups who adopt interaction strategies survive longer than those who 
operate independently? Do rebel groups who interact have an increased chance of attaining 
favourable conflict outcomes against the state? Answers to these questions are essential from 
the viewpoint of policy-makers concerned with conflict resolution. Gaining knowledge on the 
determinants of interactions is of value, only if we know how these interactions affect a rebel 
group’s chance of success. For example if groups who engage in inter-rebel violence get 
eliminated quickly or achieve less favourable outcomes, such as government defeat, policy-
makers may be less concerned about the onset of conflict between rebel groups. But, if 
violence between non-state actors increases the chance of survival for some groups (who 
have survived at the expense of others), and if this results in favourable outcomes for the 
victorious group, such as rebel victory, then policy-makers might take the opposite view.  
This aim of this chapter is to examine how alliance formation and inter-rebel violence alter 
the prospects of rebel groups in civil wars. The analyses presented in this chapter build on the 
insights gained from Akcinaroglu (2012) who has shown that the presence of multiple 
groups, alliances among rebel groups and the cumulative capabilities of those alliances, shape 
civil war outcomes. In the present work, survival models are employed so that the effect of 
rebel group interactions (alliance formation and inter-rebel violence) on group survival and 
conflict outcomes (i.e. termination-type) can be assessed. The next part of this chapter 
provides some further background and outlines the data, variables and modelling methods 
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used. Results and discussions are provided. Conclusions are drawn and additional lines of 
inquiry intended for the final chapter of this thesis are discussed.  
4.2 Background 
Research on civil war dynamics has shown that if a government is unable to defeat rebels 
during the early stages of a conflict, the chances of a swift resolution are remote (Bapat 2005, 
Regan 2002). If a rebel group is able to avoid early elimination, it might then have the 
opportunity to replenish its resources via the assistance of external actors who could be 
strategically interested in prolonging the conflict (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; 
Akcinaroglu and Radziszewski 2005). This happened in the Sudanese and Ugandan conflicts, 
where both governments supported each others’ rebel groups in an effort to weaken the other 
state (Prunier 2004). Rebels in Angola and Mozambique also received support from the 
government of South Africa who pursued a policy of external involvement in several civil 
wars (Minter 1994). External involvement also occurred in the Iranian and Iraqi conflicts, 
where both countries provided substantial support to one another’s rebel organisations during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s as a result of their ongoing territorial dispute surrounding the Shatt Al-
Arab waterway (Salehyan, Gleditsch and Cunningham 2011). The literature has shown that 
conflicts involving external actors last longer (Regan 2002), cause more fatalities (Heger and 
Salehyan 2007), and are more difficult to resolve through negotiations (Cunningham 2006). 
By avoiding early defeat, a rebel group may also have the opportunity to gain control of 
natural resources and use the profits to assist recruitment (Olson 1965; Popkin 1979; Tullock 
1971). Weinstein (2007) notes that resource constraints are often a major impediment against 
the formation and survival of rebel groups and Le Billon (2003) suggests that the extraction 
of natural resources provides one way for groups to overcome this constraint. Gates (2002) 
and Weinstein (2007) argue that groups with access to valuable resources can use profits, not 
only to mobilise troops, but also to supply weapons and other equipment. This occurred in 
Sierra Leone, when the two rebel groups, the AFRC and RUF, were able to build their 
military strength from international businessmen and arms suppliers who were willing to 
provide the groups with resources up-front, in exchange for mineral concessions (Humphreys 
and Weinstein 2008).  
Swerving initial defeat might also boost a group’s reputation, enabling them to establish 
themselves as a formidable force, giving them the opportunity to make use of repression as a 
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mobilisation tool (Byman 1998; Kalyvas 2006; Wood et al. 2012). Insurgent groups in 
northern Uganda, Burma and Colombia all forcibly abducted children to fill their fighting 
ranks and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) and Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in 
Africa adopted recruitment strategies involving amputations and rape (Humphreys and 
Weinstein 2006). In a related matter, insurgents may also target civilians to emphasise the 
government’s inability (or unwillingness) to protect vulnerable civilians. This occurred in 
Mozambique when the Frente de Libertaçao de Moçambique (FRELIMO) shelled villages to 
demonstrate that the Portuguese forces could not protect civilians (Henriksen 1983). 
Despite these varied attempts to identify the mechanisms that enable rebel groups to avoid 
early defeat, few studies have considered the role of rebel group interaction strategies. A 
notable exception is the recent study by Akcinaroglu (2012) who has shown that alliances 
between non-state actors influence the dynamics of civil war. Akcinaroglu analyses civil 
conflict outcomes using competing-risks regression. She finds that rebels are more likely to 
avoid defeat if there are a large number of groups engaged in the conflict, or if the groups are 
able to form alliances against their common enemy. Akcinaroglu also finds that peace 
agreements are unlikely if rebel groups have access to high levels of ally capabilities and she 
finds that the chance of rebel victory is highest for groups who formally merge. Whilst this 
study represents an important contribution to the rebel group dynamics literature, its scope is 
limited, firstly because rebel group survival is not examined (the study considers civil war 
outcomes only), but also because the strategy, inter-rebel violence, is overlooked.  
This chapter builds on the insights gained from Akcinaroglu (2012) by exploring how 
alliances and inter-rebel violence influence the conflict prospects of rebel groups. Theories 
regarding the motivations for rebel group interactions are based on rationalist explanations. 
They assume that rebel groups interact to maximise their chance of military victory, minimise 
their chance of being eliminated or to increase their bargaining power. On this premise, we 
should expect allied groups to have a higher chance of survival than non-allied groups. In-
line with the findings of Akcinaroglu (2012) we should also expect allied rebels to terminate 
in favourable outcomes. This was the case for the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF) in the Ethiopian civil war. In 1974 the emperor of Ethiopia, Haile Selassie, was 
overthrown in a military coup and his government was replaced with a Marxist-Leninist 
dictatorship. Almost immediately, the new regime faced armed insurgency from a number of 
groups who called for democracy and self-determination for all Ethiopian ethnic groups, 
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many of whom (such as the Tigrayans), felt that they had been discriminated against under 
Haile Selassie and continued to be so under the new dictatorship. In the late 1970’s and early 
1980’s the Mengistu government had the upper hand against the insurgents, far outnumbering 
them in military capacity. But by the late 1980’s, the momentum had shifted, largely as a 
result of the political and military alliances that had been forged between the TPLF and a 
number of other rebel groups (now fighting under the banner Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front, EPRDF).  
In 1989, soon after the rebels had aligned, the government offered to conduct bilateral 
negotiations with the insurgent groups, but that offer was rejected and in 1991, the TPLF 
(with support from its allies) surrounded Addis Ababa and defeated the Ethiopian army, even 
though it was only one tenth the size. As a result, President Mengistu fled the country and the 
rebels took control of the capital. In this case, the TPLF was able to avoid early elimination 
by forming an alliance. The group increased its bargaining power, which meant that it refused 
to concede to the peace deal offered by the state. As a result of this alliance, the TPLF was 
subsequently able to defeat the much larger Ethiopian state; an outcome that would have been 
highly unlikely had the TPLF been operating on its own. 
Devising possible expectations regarding the effect of inter-rebel violence on group survival 
is not a simple task, firstly, because the nature of the effect is likely to differ between the 
initiators and targets of violence (an aspect that is not coded in the available data), but also 
because the effect of inter-rebel violence on group survival will differ according to the 
outcome of the battle that takes place between the rebel groups. Clearly, if a rebel group is 
able to entirely defeat the other, then the victorious group might increase both its longevity 
and its chance of outright victory against the state by absorbing the resources of the defeated 
group and by eliminating competition over vital resources such as recruits or financial profit 
from natural resources (Fjelde and Nilsson 2012). That is of course assuming the victorious 
group did not encounter too heavy losses whilst engaging in inter-rebel violence. In this 
example the defeated group would inherently have decreased its longevity. On the other 
hand, if inter-rebel violence between two rebel groups does not result in an outright victory 
for either, then it might be expected that both groups would have decreased longevity as a 
result of eroding their capabilities by attempting to sustain conflict on multiple fronts. Under 
this condition, we might also expect rebel groups to be more likely to concede to peace deals 
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in response to their diminishing capacity. This occurred in the conflict which took place in 
the Shan region of Burma (now Myanmar).  
The Shan region was ruled separately during the British colonial period but was joined with 
Burma (as Shan State) upon independence in 1948. A provision was included in the 
constitution however, that Shan state could hold a referendum for independence after a period 
of ten years. In the early years after independence, Shan state experienced spill-overs from 
two neighbouring conflicts and these, combined with the government’s move to centralise 
power, motivated the Shan population to start seeking independence. But when the time came 
for a referendum, the Myanmar government refused to give the Shan state an option to 
declare independence and in 1958, armed conflict erupted between the government and a 
number of Shan insurgent groups.  
One group that emerged was the Mong Tai Army (MTA), which managed to gain control of a 
large amount of Shan territory along the border with Thailand by attacking other Shan 
insurgent groups in the region. By the late 1980’s and 1990’s, after a long period of conflict, 
the Myanmar government pursued a dual strategy of escalating the military conflict on the 
ground, at the same time as pursuing negotiations with the insurgent groups. In the face of 
increased intensity conflict from the state, combined with the losses being made a result of 
inter-rebel violence, several of the groups, including the MTA, agreed to ceasefire and they 
soon signed peace agreements with the Myanmar state.  
These various dynamics are explored in more detail in this chapter using statistical models. 
Survival models are employed so that variations in rebel group survival (longevity) and 
conflict outcomes (termination-type) can be assessed according to the two rebel group 
interaction strategies discussed above; alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. The aim is 
to investigate whether rebel groups who interact have increased longevity compared to 
groups who operate independently and/or if groups who interact have a higher chance of 
attaining favourable outcomes against the state. The next part of this chapter describes the 
research design. Results and discussions are provided, limitations are discussed and 
conclusions are drawn. Additional lines of enquiry intended for Chapter V are outlined. 
4.3 Research design 
This section describes the dataset, variables and methods used to assess how rebel group 
interactions shape civil war dynamics. 
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4.3.1 Dataset and dependent variables 
A sample containing all two-sided and multi-party conflicts is analysed using the dataset 
described in Chapter II. The unit of analysis is conflict-year. The total sample consists of 373 
rebel groups, operating in 90 conflicts for 2,361 conflict-years. The outcomes of interest are 
rebel group longevity and termination-type. The dependent variable, longevity, is simply 
coded as the number of years the rebel group survived before termination. The dependent 
variable, termination-type, is coded at the rebel group level using the Cunningham et al. 
(2009) Dyadic Dataset. Table 4.1 shows the distribution of rebel group termination-types.  
Table 4.1 Distribution of rebel group termination-types 
Outcome N % 
Peace agreement 106 31.27 
Government victory 69 20.35 
Rebel victory 41 12.09 
Ongoing conflict 123 36.28 
Total 339 100 
The majority of rebel groups in the sample were engaged in ongoing conflict (36%). This 
outcome refers to conflicts that were still active at the end of the dataset but also, for some 
cases, this outcome refers to attrition. A state of attrition is assumed to occur when all sides 
are equally matched and have adequate resources to continue fighting (usually at diminishing 
intensity), but no side is able to achieve a decisive victory, nor are they prepared to negotiate 
a peace deal. Approximately one third of groups accepted a negotiated peace settlement 
(31%). One fifth suffered defeat, which resulted in government victory (20%) and a small 
minority (12%) of groups achieved an outright military victory against the state. 
4.3.2 Independent variables 
Two interaction strategies are examined; alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. These 
are coded in two different ways. Firstly, they are coded as binary variables as in Chapter II, 
but also as continuous variables indicating the number of consecutive years the group 
interacted with another group. This continuous variable was constructed because it might be 
the case that rebel groups are able to achieve favourable conflict outcomes only when they 
interact with other groups over a sustained period of time.       
Coop: a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the rebel group cooperated with one or more 
other rebel groups in that year and 0 otherwise.  
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Coop duration: a continuous variable indicating the number of consecutive years the group 
cooperated with one or more other rebel groups.  
Fight: a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the rebel group fought with one or more other 
rebel groups in that year and 0 otherwise. 
Fight duration: a continuous variable indicating the number of consecutive years the group 
fought with one or more other rebel groups. 
4.3.3 Control variables 
Rebel strength: a variable for rebel group size, expressed as thousands of troops. This is 
included because groups with higher military capabilities are likely to be able to survive 
longer than militarily weak groups. Strong rebels are also expected to have increased chances 
of achieving a decisive victory (Cunningham et al. 2009). 
Rebel support, government support: two binary variables, taking the value of 1 if the rebels 
or government received external support from a foreign actor and 0 otherwise. These are 
included because foreign support has been shown to increase the duration of war (Regan 
2000; 2002). Foreign support is also likely to increase the chances of decisive victory for the 
recipient (Cunningham et al. 2009). 
Number of groups: a variable corresponding to the number of overlapping rebel groups in any 
single conflict-year. This is coded according to the definition provided earlier in Chapter II. It 
is included as a control because multi-party conflicts have been shown to last longer than 
two-sided civil wars (Cunningham 2006).  
Polity: a variable representing the administrative capabilities of the government and political 
freedom within a state. Polity scores are used (data are taken from the Polity IV Project, 
1800-2009). This is included as a control because in a politically free atmosphere negotiated 
peace settlements might more likely because rebels have increased incentives to return to 
civilian life and states may be more accommodating of rebels as a result of the potential 
positive dividends associated with peace (Collier 1995). 
Intensity: a variable corresponding to the intensity of conflict. A value of 1 signifies low 
intensity conflict (25 - 999 battle related deaths) and a value of 2 signifies high intensity 
conflict (1000 battle related deaths or more). Data are taken from the UCDP Dyadic Dataset 
(Harbom, Melander and Wallensteen 2008). This is used as a control because heavy losses on 
all sides are likely to affect rebel group survival and termination-type.  
GDP (ln): a variable equal to the gross domestic product of a state, transformed by taking the 
natural log. This variable is associated with the duration of civil war. Higher GDP indicates 
larger state capacity, but also lower opportunity costs for rebellion (Fearon and Laitin 2003; 
Collier and Hoeffler 2004). 
Data are taken from the Cunningham et al. (2009) Dyadic Dataset, except where stated.  
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4.3.4 Methods of estimation 
The effects of the covariates on rebel group longevity are tested using the semi-parametric 
Cox proportional hazards model, or CPH model (1972). This type of model deals with 
censored data, where the likelihood of observing an outcome differs across subjects (in this 
case rebel groups) due to each subject having different entry dates in the dataset (in this case 
when the rebel group first became active) and due to each subject surviving for different 
periods of time (in this case how long the rebel group participated in the conflict before 
termination). The CPH model estimates the effect of covariates on the cause-specific hazard 
function. The hazard rate for an observation i at a specific point in time t, is given by; 
)exp()()( 0, XtXt iii ′= βλλ        (4.1) 
where )(0, tiλ is the baseline hazard of the event and X’ is a matrix of covariates. The CPH 
model is particularly useful because hazard rates refer to cessation, i.e. termination of a rebel 
group. Unlike parametric models, which assume a particular form of the hazard function 
(thus making them sensitive to distributional assumptions), the CPH baseline hazard function 
is flexible and unspecified. Note that the CPH model does not require estimating the baseline 
hazard )(0, tiλ because the term cancels out when the hazard rates are calculated at cessation. 
The coefficients, βi indicate the impact of each covariate on the hazard function. A positive 
coefficient indicates that the hazard of termination in a given time period is increased, 
whereas a negative coefficient indicates that the hazard of termination is decreased. 
The effect of rebel group interactions on termination-type is tested using the competing-risks 
regression model described in detail by Fine and Gray (1999). This is similar to the CPH 
model, except that sub-distributional hazard rates are computed for categorical outcomes, 
which in this case are (i) peace agreement, (ii) government victory, (iii) rebel victory and (iv) 
ongoing conflict. Crucially the competing risks model relies on the assumption that all 
possible outcomes are modelled (i.e. rebel groups can only terminate by one of these four 
outcomes). The appropriate equation detailed by Haller et al. (2012) is:  
)exp()()( 0, XtXt iii ′=
∗∗∗ βλλ        (4.2) 
where )(0, ti
∗λ  denotes the sub-distribution baseline hazard function. In this model, the sub-
distribution hazard is linked directly to the cumulative incidence function (CIF) making the 
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interpretation of the effect straightforward (Fine and Gray 1999; Gutierrez 2010). A sub-
distributional hazard rate (SHR) >1 indicates that the covariate increases the hazard of 
termination by that outcome, while a SHR <1 indicates that the hazard of termination by that 
outcome is decreased. In both types of model (i.e. the CPH model and the competing risks 
model), robust standard error estimates are reported, which take into account the nesting of 
observations within conflicts. Summary statistics of all variables used in the analysis are 
shown in Table 4.2. A matrix of Spearman correlations is shown in Table 4.3.  
Table 4.2 Summary statistics 
Variable Obs. Mean SD Min Max 
Longevity  2361 7.616 8.631 1 59.178 
Coop 2361 0.496 0.500 0 1 
Coop duration 2361 3.200 5.773 0 41 
Fight 2361 0.073 0.260 0 1 
Fight duration 2361 0.207 0.989 0 12 
Rebel strength 2347 12.488 43.717 0.05 1000 
Rebel support 2361 0.598 0.490 0 1 
Government support 2361 0.565 0.496 0 1 
Number of groups 2361 3.031 2.204 1 8 
Polity 2361 -0.263 6.706 -10 10 
Intensity 2356 1.233 0.423 1 2 
GDP (ln) 2352 4.937 4.883 0.153 42.887 
4.4 Results and discussions 
Table 4.2 shows that groups in the dataset survive for an average of ~8 conflict-years. The 
longest surviving group was the Karen National Union (KNU) in Myanmar, who survived for 
59 conflict-years. The most durable alliance lasted 41 conflict-years, between the Arakan 
Insurgents and the Communist Party of Burma in Myanmar. The most durable bout of inter-
rebel violence lasted 12 conflict-years, again in Myanmar by the KNU. Table 4.3 shows that 
there is little association between the variables used in the analyses, with the exception of 
positive correlations between three pairs, coop and coop duration (0.56), fight and fight 
duration (0.74) and coop and N groups (0.55). The variables coop duration and fight duration 
are not included in the CPH model (which examines rebel group longevity) since it is implicit 
that durable interactions can only occur if a group survives for long time periods. The 
variables for durable interaction strategies are included the Competing-risks regression 
analysis (which examines termination-type) but, because of the high levels of association 
observed, coop duration and fight duration are examined separately from coop and fight. 
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4.4.1 Results for rebel group longevity 
Results for rebel group longevity are shown in Table 4.4.  
Table 4.4 Cox proportional hazard estimates showing the effect of alliances and inter-
rebel violence on the hazard of rebel group termination (SE’s clustered by country) 
 Coefficient              SE 
Coop -0.430**  0.310  
Fight 0.269**  0.219  
Rebel strength 0.001**  0.001  
Rebel support -0.521**  0.230  
Government support -0.395**  0.227  
N groups -0.079**  0.047  
Polity -0.025**  0.014  
Intensity -0.340**  0.193  
GDP (ln) -0.025**  0.028  
Number of obs.                 2333  
Wald  χ
2
 (9)                       54.19  
Log pseudo likelihood               -2444.77  
Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
Only the variable, rebel support, is statistically significant (at the 0.05 level) with a negative 
coefficient, indicating that support from external actors increases the longevity of rebel 
groups. This result is plotted in Figure 4.1, which shows the cumulative hazard of termination 
for rebel groups who received foreign support compared to the cumulative hazard of 
termination for rebel groups who did not receive support. The cumulative hazard of 
termination for groups who received support is approximately 39%, a value much lower than 
the hazard of termination for groups who did not receive support (~ 68%). 
The coefficient for coop is negative, suggesting that rebels who form alliances have increased 
longevity and the coefficient for fight is positive, suggesting that rebels who engage in inter-
rebel violence have decreased longevity. These correlations lack statistical significance 
however and although they are indicative, it must be concluded that interaction strategies 
have little or no effect on rebel group longevity. This result is intriguing given the above 
discussions, which argue that groups might adopt interaction strategies to gain military 
advantages against the state. One possible explanation for this result is that groups with 
strong credentials, or those who have high expectations about their longevity, might be 
unwilling to interact. This might be reflected by the fact that about a third of rebel groups in 
the dataset, operate independently for the entire duration of war. This implies that groups 
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might only adopt interaction strategies out of desperation when their expectations of survival 
are poor. These interactions may not be sufficient, or might have occurred too late in the 
conflict to increase the rebel group’s longevity. An alternative explanation might be that 
groups with larger capabilities are attacked by the state more often and on a wider scale than 
smaller groups because they pose a larger threat. If a rebel group increases its military 
capabilities via an alliance, it would be more heavily targeted as a result of its increased size 
and status. This mechanism might also explain why rebel strength is not statistically 
significant - a result that is also intriguing given the intuition that larger groups ought to have 
a lower hazard of termination in comparison to their smaller peers.     
Figure 4.1 Cumulative hazard rates versus conflict days for rebel groups who received 
support from external actors compared to groups who did not receive external support 
 
4.4.2 Results for rebel group termination-type 
Results for rebel group termination-type are shown in Table 4.5. For the first outcome, peace 
agreement, results show that groups who engage in inter-rebel violence have an increased 
hazard of termination by peace agreement, whereas groups who form durable alliances have a 
decreased hazard of termination by peace agreement (both significant at the < 0.05 level). 
This suggests that alliances between groups decrease the likelihood of peace settlements, 
whereas violence between rebel groups increases the likelihood of peace settlements. 
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The cumulative incidence functions (CIFs) for these statistically significant effects are 
plotted in Figures 4.2 and 4.3. Figure 4.2 shows that the incidence of termination by peace 
agreement for groups who engaged in inter-rebel violence is ~0.2, much higher than the 
incidence of peace agreements for groups who did not (~0.1). In Figure 4.3, the incidence of 
peace agreements for the maximum alliance duration of 41 years is ~0.02, much lower than 
the incidence of peace agreements for alliances that lasted 21 years (~0.05) and lower still 
compared to groups who did not form an alliance at all (~0.16). 
These results are potentially explained by bargaining power. On the one hand, weak groups 
who are the targets of violence might be keen to terminate by peace agreement out of the fear 
of elimination. On the other hand, strong groups who have the capacity to engage in inter-
rebel violence might be offered more favourable deals by the state. Indeed, when faced with a 
strong group, a weak state might be willing to concede to the demands of a strong group, 
rather than risk suffering defeat. This effect is highlighted by the significant result obtained 
for state capacity (proxied by GDP), which indicates that conflicts involving weak states are 
more likely to end in peace deals (significant at the <0.01 level).  
Groups that are able to strike durable alliances also have increased bargaining power against 
the state. In this instance, weak states have an incentive to offer peace deals, but rebel groups 
have an incentive to reject them on the basis of their capabilities, which are increased as a 
result of alliance formation. This effect is highlighted by results obtained for the second 
outcome, government victory, which show that groups who form durable alliances are more 
likely to avoid suffering defeat (this effect is significant the 0.01 level). The cumulative 
incidence function for this effect is plotted in Figure 4.4.  
In Figure 4.4 the incidence of termination by government victory for groups who did not 
form an alliance is ~0.04 compared to an incidence of ~0.002 for groups who formed a 
durable alliance of 20 consecutive years. The incidence of government victory for the 
maximum alliance duration of 41 years (not shown in Figure 4.4) is 0. These incidence rates 
are much lower than the incidence rates observed in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 for the termination-
type, peace agreement. This reflects the fact that government victory occurs less frequently 
(20% of groups suffer government defeat compared to 31% of groups who terminate by 
peace agreement). Inter-rebel violence is found not to have a statistically significant effect on 
the hazard of termination by government victory. For the third outcome rebel victory, alliance 
formation and inter-rebel violence are found to have no effect on the hazard of termination. 
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Instead, militarily strong rebels, or those who face weak governments are more likely to 
emerge victorious (the result for rebel strength is >1 at the <0.01 significance level, GDP is 
<1 at the <0.01 level). These results replicate the findings of Cunningham et al. (2009), who 
obtained similar results, but using multinomial logistic regression analysis, to predict rebel 
group termination-type.  
Results obtained on the final outcome ongoing conflict show that rebel groups who form 
durable alliances are less likely to terminate by this outcome (the effect is significant at the 
<0.01 level). In other words, rebels who strike durable alliances with their peers are more 
able to sustain conflict against the state. This result relates to the point made earlier, that 
durable alliances increase the conflict prospects of the groups involved.  
The effect of durable alliances on the incidence of the outcome, ongoing conflict, is plotted in 
Figure 4.5. For groups who did not form an alliance, the incidence of termination by ongoing 
conflict is ~0.15, a value much higher than the incidence for groups who formed durable 
alliances (of 20 years) where the cumulative incidence is ~0.001. Inter-rebel violence is 
found not to have a statistically significant effect on the outcome, ongoing conflict. 
Table 4.5 Competing risks regression estimates showing the effect of cooperation and 
fighting on rebel group termination-type (SE’s clustered by country) 
 Peace agreement Government victory 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 SHR SE SHR SE SHR SE SHR SE 
Coop 0.707 0.221 - - 0.960 0.517 - - 
Coop duration - - 0.943** 0.028 - - 0.845** 0.058 
Fight 2.049** 0.696 - - 0.387 0.266 - - 
Fight duration - - 1.001 0.085 - - 0.713 0.196 
Rebel strength 0.991 0.016 0.992 0.015 1.000 0.001 1.000 0.001 
Polity 1.015 0.021 1.012 0.020 0.916** 0.026 0.918** 0.026 
Rebel support 0.948 0.295 0.921 0.279 0.325** 0.119 0.341** 0.122 
Gov. support 0.951 0.253 1.001 0.270 0.685 0.255 0.678 0.260 
N groups 0.844** 0.055 0.854** 0.058 0.570** 0.106 0.715** 0.112 
Intensity 0.430** 0.170 0.437** 0.174 0.794 0.254 0.785 0.255 
GDP (ln) 0.886** 0.041 0.896** 0.040 1.036 0.030 1.039 0.030 
N obs.                 2333 2333 2333 2333 
Wald  χ
2
 (9)                       50.01 45.62 69.50 66.05 
Log pseudo 
likelihood               
-688.04 -688.69 -453.71 -448.89 
   Note: ** denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.05 
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 Rebel victory Ongoing conflict 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 1 Model 2 
 SHR SE SHR SE SHR SE SHR SE 
Coop 1.579 0.647 - - 0.657 0.288 - - 
Coop duration - - 0.980 0.038 - - 0.850** 0.027 
Fight 0.611 0.318 - - 1.220 0.358 - - 
Fight duration - - 0.856 0.145 - - 1.038 0.087 
Rebel strength 1.004** 0.001 1.004** 0.001 0.953* 0.019 0.949** 0.019 
Polity 1.027 0.054 1.016 0.056 0.973* 0.016 0.953** 0.015 
Rebel support 1.454 0.744 1.458 0.728 0.645* 0.174 0.583** 0.163 
Gov. support 0.455** 0.190 0.488* 0.199 0.589* 0.170 0.588** 0.138 
N groups 0.832** 0.090 0.905 0.090 1.033 0.075 1.148** 0.080 
Intensity 6.049** 2.072 5.603** 1.896 0.287** 0.026 0.267** 0.117 
GDP (ln) 0.655** 0.096 0.668** 0.103 1.021 0.03 1.033* 0.027 
N obs. 2333 2333 2333 2333 
Wald  χ
2
 (9)                       124.55 182.66 78.70 122.56 
Log pseudo 
likelihood               
-248.89 -249.45 -842.31 -816.03 
   Note: ** denotes significance at p ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p ≤ 0.05 
 
Figure 4.2 Cumulative incidence functions versus conflict days showing the effect of 
inter-rebel violence on the incidence of termination by peace agreement  
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Figure 4.3 Cumulative incidence functions versus conflict days showing the effect of 
durable alliances on the incidence of termination by peace agreement  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Cumulative incidence functions versus conflict days showing the effect of 
durable alliances on the incidence of termination by government victory 
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Figure 4.5 Cumulative incidence functions versus conflict days showing the effect of 
durable alliances on the incidence of termination by government victory 
 
4.5 Limitations 
A few limitations of the present work exist. Firstly, results from the Cox Proportional 
Hazards model that suggest that groups who receive foreign support survive longer than 
groups who do not receive support. But the direction of this effect is ambiguous. It could be 
the case that rebel groups who receive foreign support survive longer as a direct result of 
receiving the external aid (as was proposed in this chapter). Alternatively, the rebel group 
might receive foreign support in the first place, only because they are perceived by others as 
being able to survive for a long period of time. After all, it is unlikely that an external patron 
would be willing to provide financial or military support to a group whose elimination was 
imminent. A second limitation is that the data analysed are correlational and not 
experimental. As such, it is not possible to know what the specific mechanisms underlying 
the statistically significant effects are. Results obtained from the competing risks regression 
analyses suggest that allied groups are less likely to terminate by peace agreement, whereas 
groups that engage in inter-rebel violence are more likely to terminate by peace agreement. 
But, some of these effects could have emerged simply because states are more likely to offer 
peace when violence breaks out than at other times.  
coop duration = 0 years
coop duration = 20 years
0
.0
5
.1
.1
5
c
u
m
u
la
ti
v
e
 i
n
c
id
e
n
c
e
0 5000 10000 15000 20000
conflict days
142 
 
4.6 Conclusions 
These results suggest that rebel groups who adopt interaction strategies do not increase their 
survival (i.e. decrease their chance of being eliminated) compared to groups who operate 
independently. This might occur because rebel groups adopt interaction strategies in 
desperation, as a matter of last resort. In these instances, gaining strategic advantages may not 
be possible if the interactions were not initiated early enough to ensure survival. An 
alternative explanation for this effect might be that rebel groups who increase their capacity 
as a result of interacting with their peers may simply become more heavily targeted by the 
state as a result of their increased size.  
But, if rebels are able to strike alliances early on, so that cooperation is maintained over a 
number of years, groups are more likely to achieve favourable conflict outcomes. Rebel 
groups who form durable alliances are less likely to suffer defeat, they are less likely to 
concede to peace settlements and they are more likely to achieve decisive war outcomes (i.e. 
avoid the outcome of ongoing conflict). Other results show that rebel groups who engage in 
inter-rebel violence are more likely to sign peace deals. This might occur because the targets 
of non-state violence become pressured into accepting peace deals out of fear of being 
eliminated by another group, whereas the initiators of non-state violence may be offered 
sweeter deals by the state as a result of their large capacity. 
The main implications of these results are that states could maximise the likelihood of 
peaceful resolution by capitalising on opportune moments for offering peace deals. If there is 
some expectation that rebel groups might form alliances, then states have a higher chance 
achieving peaceful resolution if negotiations take place before a group is able to increase its 
bargaining power by aligning with its peers. If violent conflict breaks out between rebel 
groups, the state may also benefit from offering peace deals instead of waiting for the groups 
to eliminate one another, especially in light of the finding that groups who engage in inter-
rebel violence do not have a higher hazard of termination than groups who operate alone.  
4.6.1 Additional lines of enquiry 
In this chapter, survival models were used to explore whether groups who adopt interaction 
strategies survive longer, or terminate in more advantageous conflict outcomes, than groups 
who operate independently for the entire duration of war. An advantage of survival-analysis 
models is that they capture the dynamic reality of civil war more effectively than other types 
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of statistical modelling, such as the regression models used in the previous chapters. Survival 
models however, are not able to fully capture the strategic actions and reactions taken by the 
actors involved. For example, in Burma the MTA opted into a ceasefire and a subsequent 
peace agreement with the state as a result of encountering heavy losses from inter-rebel 
violence. The survival models allow us to draw conclusions regarding the macro-level effect 
of inter-rebel violence on the likelihood of termination by peace agreement, but they cannot 
provide information regarding the underlying mechanisms responsible for these effects (as 
alluded to in the previous section of this chapter). Statistical modelling alone cannot inform 
on whether the MTA opted for a peace agreement as a direct result of encountering losses 
from engaging in inter-rebel violence or if other mechanisms were operating.  
The present results show that allied groups do not have an increased longevity compared to 
groups who operate alone. Two possible explanations for this effect were proposed. The first 
was that rebel groups might form alliances in desperation as a matter of last resort and these 
take place too late in the conflict for the group to reap the benefits. The second explanation 
was that rebel groups might become more heavily targeted by the state after forming an 
alliance as a result of their increased size. Once again, by using statistical modelling methods 
alone, it is not possible to test these mechanisms.  
The two aspects described above, illustrate some of the limitations of statistical modelling of 
civil conflict. These are that statistical correlations can be determined by these methods and 
these assist in the construction of physical models. The final chapter of the thesis examines 
how the underlying generative mechanisms of civil war dynamics can be investigated by the 
use of computer simulation techniques. 
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Chapter V  
 
Potential uses of numerical and agent-based 
simulation for the modelling of rebel group 
interactions 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores ways in which civil conflict can be simulated using numerical 
methods and agent-based computer models. A general two-party model of the dynamics 
of conflict is developed by extending an approach suggested by Christia (2012), which 
is based on the metric of relative power. This is defined as the relative military 
capabilities between a rebel group and the state and the evolution of a conflict is 
reflected by changes in this metric. Various definitions of relative power are evaluated 
and the optimal choice is used to illustrate different types of two-sided armed conflict, 
namely direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare. The inclusion of stochastic effects 
(which models random or unexpected events) and the inclusion of terms for rebel group 
recruitment of civilians and for state deployment of troops is described. The model of 
two-sided conflict is extended so that multi-party conflicts can also be simulated. 
Various model parameters are implemented in this multi-party model and the ways in 
which the model can be used to simulate rebel group interaction strategies is explored. 
Examples are given for some simple cases. These studies illustrate that numerical and 
agent-based simulation techniques have great potential for modelling rebel group 
interactions in multi-party civil wars. It is shown that the Christia (2012) approach 
provides an excellent basis from which conflict models can be built and can be used to 
great visual effect in illustrating the dynamics of civil conflict.  
 
5.1 Introduction 
Computer-generated modelling techniques are a useful alternative approach for studying 
complex problems, in addition to statistical methods (Gilbert and Terna 1999; Ostrom 1988). 
Statistical methods (such as those used in the studies described in Chapter I and employed in 
Chapters II – IV) involve the analysis of empirical data with the aim of uncovering 
correlations that are consistent with particular theories or mechanisms. But, since statistical 
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approaches are correlational and not experimental, they cannot be used to demonstrate 
causality (i.e. there are issues with internal validity). Moreover, since many variables and 
constructs in civil war research are measured using proxy variables, it is difficult to isolate 
the role of particular mechanisms (i.e. there are issues with construct validity). Experimental 
approaches allow for more control and reduce issues associated with validity, but they are 
often costly and in many cases are unethical (such as in conflict research). Simulation 
modelling is an alternative, generative approach, which aims to uncover the underlying 
mechanisms that generate an observed, macro-level phenomenon (Smith and Conrey 2007). 
Unlike statistical modelling, where empirical data are processed via a statistical program and 
results produced that describe the relationships that exist within the data, simulation models 
are themselves computer programs that incorporate the critical aspects of the phenomenon 
being modelled (Groff 2007). As Doreian (2001) points out, simulation modelling tries to 
capture the generative mechanisms underlying the social phenomena under study, whereas 
statistical modelling seeks a numerical summary of relationships between variables. 
Computer simulations may therefore be regarded as simple representations of real-world 
systems (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005) and a platform to test hypotheses and predict real-world 
outcomes in cases where data are non-existent.  
The first computational models of armed conflict appeared during the Cold war era (Cioffi-
Revilla and Rouleau 2010). These early models were implemented using a system dynamics 
approach and utilised ordinary differential equations (ODEs) to model two-sided conflicts 
between a state and a rebel group (Forrester 1968; Hanneman 1988). ODEs arise in many 
contexts throughout mathematics and science. They are equations containing a function of 
one independent variable and its derivatives and as such, are used to describe dynamic 
phenomena, evolution and variation. Quantities are defined as the rate of change of other 
quantities. In the context of civil war, these rates of changes are often in the form of time 
derivatives. For example, ODE models have been used to model the progression of different 
types of two-sided conflict over time, including; direct-fire warfare (a type of battle in which 
each side shoots directly at the other), guerrilla warfare (where each side has to search for 
their enemy before making a kill) and asymmetric warfare (where one side adopts a direct-
fire approach while the other adopts a guerrilla approach). See Lanchester (1956) for an early 
overview of these types of conflict. ODE models were often empirically informed by 
prominent insurgencies of the time, such as the Vietnamese War or the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan (Milstein and Mitchell 1969; Ruloff 1975; Allan and Stahel 1985) and they 
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attained their greatest success in representing asymmetric two-sided conflict at a national 
level (Gilbert and Troitzsch 2005). Mathematical and numerical modelling has been 
extensively used over a long period and these types of systems dynamics models remained 
the dominant approach to computational modelling of armed conflict until the more recent 
introduction of object-oriented approaches such as agent-based models (ABM). 
Agent based models have proved to be a particularly useful method for representing real-
world systems. ABM involves the simulation of automated agents in the context of an 
artificial environment and the analysis of macro-level patterns emerging from these micro-
level agent behaviours and interactions (Epstein and Axtell 1996; Gilbert and Troitzsch 
1999). Agents are ‘autonomous, goal-directed software entities’ that engage in behaviours 
described as condition-action-rules (O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000). Agents commonly 
represent people, but they can also represent groups, organisations or governments for 
example. The characteristics and behavioural rules of agents can be assigned according to 
agent-type (i.e. government agents, civilian agents), or they can be assigned according to a 
known distribution observed in the population, or at random, so that specific societal 
averages can be modelled. Thus, ABM allows for heterogeneity among individuals that more 
closely approximates the empirical reality than many other computational modelling methods 
(Groff 2007).  
Agents interact with each other on the basis of their condition-action-rules and their 
characteristics can be dynamically changed as a result of those interactions. In effect, agents 
are able to pass information to each other and react to that information on the basis of their 
programmed preferences, which may be fixed or acquired. This allows an examination of the 
evolution and history of the process under study, since information on the dynamics of the 
system can be collected as the ABM computer model runs (Axtell 2000). As such, ABM is a 
bottom-up approach that models global behaviour as emergent properties of local interactions 
between agents. It is thus well suited for studying complex and non-linear social processes 
that can produce cumulative effects over a protracted time scale (Keller et al. 2010). For 
example, ABM can be used to elucidate the process of, and conditions for, certain outcomes. 
Sometimes the process itself can be more important than the outcomes (e.g. a knowledge of 
the way in which an infection spreads may ultimately be more important than a knowledge of 
the number of deaths in a specific epidemic). In other cases, the macro-level outcomes of 
agent-based models can be counter-intuitive despite complete initial knowledge of the micro 
properties of individual agents (Epstein 1999). 
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The condition-action-rules assigned to agents may be based on a rational choice framework 
with agents programmed for example, to consider the costs and benefits of a given decision. 
In the real world however, rationality is bounded (or imperfect), in that individuals lack 
complete information or the cognitive ability to make purely rational decisions when faced 
with multiple choices (Simon 1997). ABM is able to accommodate this feature through the 
incorporation of stochastic processes. This is achieved by building randomness into an agent-
based model by assigning different probabilities to the range of actions from which an agent 
can choose. Thus, rather than agents making purely deterministic choices by always selecting 
the optimal choice, agents may programmed to act in random or unexpected ways (Grimm 
and Railsback 2005). This sets ABM apart from other modelling methods such as ODEs, 
which are generally based on deterministic mechanisms. 
In ABM, agents interact in a virtual environment. They are placed on an artificial landscape 
upon which they move and interact with each other and their environment (Gilbert and 
Troitzsch 2005). The agent environment may include patches which represent some physical 
aspect of the virtual world (i.e. a patch of grass in an ecological model, or the presence of 
some natural resource in economic or conflict models). Agents have the ability to recognise 
and react to their environment, make decisions and undertake goal-directed behaviour to meet 
objectives (Gilbert 2007). For example, an agent may be given the ability to detect whether 
another agent or a patch is nearby. The agent may then assess the characteristics of these 
entities and execute actions according to their condition-action rules. ABM also allows the 
use of Geographic Information Systems (GIS) data to provide ‘real’ landscapes, a feature that 
can provide an advantage over artificially created environments, when the impact of the 
landscape on agent behaviours is likely to be significant (Brown et al. 2005; Groff 2007; 
O’Sullivan and Haklay 2000).    
Numerical models (i.e. ODEs and ABM) are generally used for two purposes; (i) to test or 
falsify a theory or hypothesis and (ii) to answer “what if” questions (Gilbert 2007). They can 
be used to test whether a theory is sufficient to generate an expected outcome, or if other 
processes are necessary for that outcome to be generated (Eck and Lui 2008). In this case, a 
researcher formalises a theory by identifying the relevant parameters of the system, 
establishing their properties and interactions and articulating the mechanisms underpinning 
these interactions in the form of agent condition-action rules (Gilbert 2008). The model can 
then be validated by comparing generated outcomes to theoretical expectations or empirical 
data. Numerical models can also be used for prediction. In this case a facsimile model can be 
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constructed which seeks to replicate the social system under study as accurately as possible 
(Gilbert 2007). Different parameters within the model can then be manipulated so that their 
impact on model outcomes can be evaluated (Gilbert 2007).  
The accuracy of numerical modelling methods in general, is of course a function of the 
validity of the assumptions on which the model is based and just like statistical models, they 
therefore reflect the quality of the theoretical ideas or empirical data available (Groff 2007).  
All numerical models remain approximations of the complexity of their real world 
counterpart, since certain features of human actors (such as irrationality, preoccupation and 
other psychological or emotional factors) are difficult to quantify and incorporate into a 
model (Keller et al. 2010). This means that care must be taken when analysing the findings 
from purely numerical models. The results obtained do not represent either an absolute 
empirical test of a theory nor produce guaranteed predictions of future events. Instead, the 
findings from numerical models should be used to indicate the plausibility of a theory or to 
highlight a range of potential outcomes (Groff 2007) given a certain set of assumptions and 
conditions.  
ABM has become increasingly favoured over ODE models as a method of modelling armed 
conflict (Choucri et al. 2007), the main reason being the recognition of the importance of the 
bottom-up causal processes in civil war (Fearon and Laitin 2003; de Rouen and Sobek 2004; 
Kalyvas 2006; Cederman and Girardin 2007). In addition, ABM allows for the influence of 
stochastic processes that are often less easily accounted for in ODE models.  The 
SUGARSCAPE model of Epstein and Axtell (1996) was one of the first ABM simulations of 
social unrest. By formalising a few simple rules, SUGARSCAPE allowed for the 
experimental investigation of some of the theorised micro-level mechanisms responsible for 
the dynamics of civil war. Subsequently, Epstein (2002) produced the first ABM simulations 
of armed conflict. These simulations modelled the emergence of rebellion and ethnic 
cleansing behaviour as a product of the rebel agent’s perception of the police force numbers 
(i.e. the size of government forces) and intervention tactics at individual (civilian) level. This 
research was pioneering in that it examined the citizen-based impetus for rebellion and the 
model was generative, analysing civil conflict from an individual level up, as opposed to 
simply identifying those variables at the state level that increased the likelihood of civil war. 
Since then a number of researchers have extended Epstein’s model of civil conflict. The 
ISAAC and EINSTEIN models (Ilachinski 2004) use a similar technique to model combat at 
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the level of individual soldiers. Doran (2005) has constructed the IRUBA model which 
represents a meso-scale replication of Epstein’s model. The IRUBA model uses simple 
geographic features, such as terrain and the spatial distribution of rebel resources and troops, 
to test the impacts on model outcomes of various insurgency and counterinsurgency tactics. 
Bennett (2008) omits variations in terrain but instead includes social emotions in the civilian 
population such as fear and anger felt against the state (the aim was to model the US 
military’s strategy of appealing to the ‘hearts and minds’ of the US population). Bhavnani et 
al. (2008) have created the first simulations of civil war involving state repression and Cioffi-
Revilla and Rouleau (2010) have devised the MASON model which considers how the 
administrative strength, or polity, of the state results in different emergent conflict outcomes. 
All of these computer simulations examine the macro-level conflict dynamics emerging from 
rebel agent and civilian agent behaviours in two-sided conflicts.  
The models developed in this chapter build on these previous models using both ODE and 
ABM methods. The main contributions made are as follows (i) extending previous two-sided 
models of conflicts to include multi-party conflicts and (ii) proposing ways in which 
computer based simulation techniques could be used to model rebel group interactions. The 
next section describes the aims and objectives of this chapter. This is followed by a section 
describing general models of two-sided armed conflict. Finally models of multi-party conflict 
are presented, which are used to illustrate the influences of rebel group interactions such as 
alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. 
5.2 Aims and objectives  
The aim of this chapter is to assess the potential of numerical simulation techniques (namely 
ODEs and ABM) for the modelling of rebel group interactions. The previous chapters have 
used statistical modelling methods (i.e. top-down methods) to examine the motivations for 
rebel group interactions (Chapter II), the conditions that influence interaction decisions 
(Chapter III) and the effect of interactions on rebel group survival and termination, and 
subsequent conflict dynamics (Chapter IV). In this chapter, ways are proposed in which these 
statistical findings and other empirical findings could be implemented into numerical models. 
As described in the section above, ABM has certain features that are attractive for civil 
conflict modelling. ABM allows not only the elucidation of the relevant dynamic processes, 
but also the modelling of stochastic processes. One purpose of this chapter is to assess the 
utility of various options and to propose ways in which ODEs and ABMs of conflicts can be 
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developed. One approach is examined in particular; that proposed by Christia (2012), who 
suggests that a two-sided conflict might be modelled by using the concept of the relative 
power that exists between the two sides. This concept is developed in the present chapter and 
used in simulations of two-sided conflict. The model is extended to include rebel group 
recruitment, government deployment of troops and the influence of stochastic processes is 
investigated. The relative power concept is extended to describe multi-party conflicts and a 
numerical model of these conflicts is developed. Possible ways to model rebel group 
interactions are then proposed and some are tested in the current model. Finally, general 
conclusions are drawn regarding the potential uses of computer-based simulation for the 
modelling of rebel group interactions. It is important to note that the aim of this chapter is to 
provide examples that demonstrate the scope and utility of ODE and ABM approaches for the 
modelling of rebel group interactions. These examples are based on assumptions and 
parameter estimates and are not intended to provide evidence of real effects. The example 
models can be used to provide evidence of real effects (by tuning model inputs and outcomes 
to match empirical data) but this was not within the scope of the present work.    
5.3 A general model of two-sided armed conflict 
5.3.1 Modelling relative power between the state and a rebel group 
Christia (2012) has proposed that the progress and outcome of a civil war can be modelled 
using a metric p, which relates to the relative power between the groups involved. In 
Christia’s model it is assumed that there are two sides at war; the government (side A) and a 
rebel group (side B). Rebel groups are assumed to have two objectives: (i) to win the war (or 
at least sustain conflict against the state) and (ii) to maximise their returns. The metric of 
interest is relative, rather than overall, power and the basis of the model is that the evolution 
of relative power over time defines the progress of a conflict. The conflict between the 
government and a rebel group starts at t = 0, when the relative power of the government is p0 
and the relative power of the rebel group is 1 – p0. Christia proposes that the change in the 
value of p throughout a conflict can be described by an expression that contains the sum of a 
deterministic component f(p)dt and a stochastic component Ψ(p,t). Thus; 
),()( tpdtpfdp Ψ+=         (5.1) 
where dp is the change in p over a time increment dt and f(p) is a drift term that depends on 
the current level of p, which in the absence of the stochastic term, is simply the derivative of 
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p with respect to time dp/dt. Based on this deterministic component in equation (5.1) alone, if 
the level of p at time t0 were known, it would be possible in principle to ascertain how p 
would evolve over time. In the model, a rebel group with an initial value p > 0.5, would 
eventually be expected to win because it would keep increasing its relative power over time 
eventually reaching p = 1. Conversely, if a rebel group were to start with p < 0.5, the rebels 
would eventually lose with the relative power reaching a value p = 0. Evidently, the rebel 
group would prefer to have a higher p at the start of the conflict because that would ensure a 
quicker victory. The deterministic function proposed by Christia (2012) must be continuously 
increasing and symmetric about p = ½ such that  f(p) > 0 for p > ½,  f(p) < 0 for p < ½ and 
f(p) = 0 for p = ½.  
An important aspect of the concept is that the evolution of p over time is not just 
deterministic. If it were (assuming complete and symmetric information), then rational parties 
would never go to war simply because they would be able to predict the outcome of the 
conflict in advance and act accordingly. But, as represented by the second term in equation 
(5.1), there must also a stochastic component. This is intended to capture the inevitable 
randomness that arises in conflicts and might include battlefield mistakes, or other exogenous 
factors such as changes in external support, unexpected weather conditions, disease or other 
factors beyond the control of the actors involved. The random change in p over some time 
interval, dt, is represented by the term Ψ(p,t), where Ψ determines the amount of randomness 
in the relative power change dp. Lower values of Ψ correspond to a lower random 
component, with no randomness if Ψ = 0. Thus, for the rebel side with p > 1/2 at t0 with the 
deterministic component only, rebel victory would always be expected. But, if a stochastic 
component is included, victory need not necessarily occur. If victory does occur, it may be 
either quicker, or slower to attain than in the deterministic case, or indeed it is possible for the 
side that starts out weaker to emerge victorious. Christia (2012) suggests that the trajectory of 
a conflict resembles one of biased random walk, where at each time interval, there is a step in 
a direction of increased or decreased relative power that is random in part, but also influenced 
by the initial value of the relative power. 
It is thus clear that equation (5.1) has attractive general features that make it suitable for 
modelling conflict, namely (i) it can be used to model a range of different scenarios relating 
to power-based theories of conflict, (ii) it models civil war as a dynamic process, (iii) it 
allows randomness to be implemented in the simulation of conflict and (iv) the expression is 
highly amenable to graphical representation which means that simulated conflict processes 
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can be visualised to great effect. As such, the expression represents a promising basis from 
which simulations of multi-party conflict and rebel group interactions might be developed. If 
the expression is to be used effectively, the general concept proposed by Christia (2012) 
needs to be extended to include more specific aspects as follows (i) the development of 
mathematical descriptions of the deterministic function and the consideration of alternative 
possibilities, (ii) defining relative power in terms of actual parameters that could be used in a 
numerical model and that might also be amenable to statistical analysis of actual conflict 
data, (iii) exploring the ability and utility of the expression to illuminate different types of 
warfare and (iv) investigate how terms might be included in the expression that account for 
other conflict characteristics such as government troop deployment and rebel group growth. 
These aspects and their implications for modelling conflict are examined in the following 
sections. The efficacy of equation (5.1) as a graphical means of visualising conflict 
progression is also addressed in detail. Because the dynamics of conflict are complex (and 
often contain randomness), the appropriate differential equations are often not easily 
amenable to analytical methods. Thus in the following, attention is paid to determining the 
most suitable modelling methods for specific types, namely, ODE’s or ABM.  
5.3.2 Mathematical descriptions of the deterministic function  
A specific mathematical description of the deterministic function is not given by Christia 
(2012) but various functions can be chosen that satisfy the required properties of the 
deterministic component f(p). One obvious possibility is the relationship: 
)12()( −== p
dt
dp
pf β         (5.2) 
where β is a constant having units time
-1
. The function (2p – 1) has the properties required by 
Christia (2012), namely that it is zero at p = ½, positive when p > ½ and negative when p < 
½. For victory to occur when p = 1 and defeat when p = 0, the function takes the values + 1 
and - 1 respectively. It is required dimensionally to insert the term β into equation (5.2). This 
gives equivalent values of dp/dt of + β and - β respectively. Victory or defeat then 
corresponds to the situation where the critical rates of change ± β are reached. Although the 
inclusion of the function (2p – 1) into the expression is in accord with the proposal of Christia 
(2012) and provides a promising way forward, the symmetry of the function about the value p 
= ½ is somewhat arbitrary. An alternative and simpler representation may be useful as 
described by the relationship: 
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ppf β ′=)(           (5.3) 
Unlike equation (5.2), which is symmetrical about p = ½, this function is symmetrical about 
p = 0, such that dp/dt = 0 when p = 0 with dp/dt > 0 for p > 0 and dp/dt < 0 for p < 0. 
5.3.3 Physical interpretations of ‘relative power’ 
The general concept of relative power is not defined by Christia (2012) in terms of actual 
parameters that could be used in conflict modelling, but an obvious first approach is to 
assume that relative power is related simply to the numbers of group members. Thus if there 
are N1 and N2 members in group-1 and group-2 respectively, the relative power may then be 
defined in several ways, such as the fractional values f1 = N1/(N1 + N2) and  f2 = N2/(N1 + 
N2), the differences ∆1 = N1 – N2 and ∆2 = N2 – N1, or the ratios R1 = N1/N2 and R2 = N2/N1. It 
may also be useful to normalise the ∆ terms as follows:  (N1 – N2)/(N1 + N2) and (N2 – N1)/(N1 
+ N2), where the reference value is N1 + N2. The implications of these various definitions of p 
are as follows. If p is defined as the number of group members represented as a fraction of 
the total number of troops in the conflict, then: 
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These definitions have the properties required by Christia, namely that p2 = 1 – p1, there is 
symmetry about p = ½ (when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = ½). The victory/defeat criteria are also 
identical. Thus, when N2 << N1 then 11 →p , 02 →p  and group-1 wins. On the other hand if 
N1 << N2 then 02 →p , 12 →p and group-2 wins.  
The second representation of the relative power is in terms of the (normalised) difference: 
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In this case, p2 ≠ 1 – p1 and there is symmetry about p = 0 (when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 0). 
When N2 << N1 then ∞→1p  and 12 −→p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 
11 −→p and ∞→2p and group-2 wins.  
The third representation of the relative power is in terms of the difference (N1 – N2), 
normalised instead by the total number (N1 + N2). Thus: 
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In this case, p1 + p2 = 0 and there is symmetry about p = 0 (when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 0). 
When N2 << N1 then 11 +→p  and 12 −→p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 
11 −→p and 12 +→p and group-2 wins. 
Finally, a simple ratio may be used to represent the relative power between groups. Thus: 
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In this case, p2 ≠ 1 – p1 and there is symmetry about p = 1 (when N1 = N2 then p1 = p2 = 1). 
When N2 << N1 then ∞→1p  and 02 →p and group-1 wins. When N1 << N2 then 01 →p  
and ∞→2p and group-2 wins.  
5.3.4 Use of ‘relative power’ in the theoretical analysis of conflict 
In a two-party conflict, fatalities are incurred by both sides and if there is no concurrent 
replenishment of forces, each side must suffer a decrease in their number of troops over time. 
If the attrition rate of one group depends only on the size of the other, this is known as a 
‘direct-fire’ conflict. In its simplest form this involves each side firing directly at its 
adversary, for example in a long-bow type of battle with lines of opposing archers, or a 
modern direct-fire tank battle (Lanchester 1956). Direct-fire conflict is governed by the 
coupled solution of the two differential equations: 
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where (dN1/dt) and (dN2/dt) are the rates of change in numbers in groups 1 and 2 respectively. 
The killing rate experienced by one group depends on the number in the opposing group.  
The proportionality constants B1 and B2 relate to the respective killing effectiveness of each 
side. Coupled differential equations are often difficult to solve analytically and commonly 
require numerical methods of solution. (For this specific case however, the analytical solution 
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of a similar system of differential equations does exist
§
). A numerical solution of equations 
(5.8 and 5.9) can be achieved by using the following computational scheme. Values of the 
constants B1 and B2 and the initial numbers in both groups (N1)0 and (N2)0 are user-defined 
and the numbers in each group can be set to these values. Using a small time increment ∆t, 
the incremental changes in the numbers in each group during this interval can be computed as 
follows: 
tNBNN tttt ∆−=∆+ )()()( 2211        (5.10) 
tNBNN tttt ∆−=∆+ )()()( 1122        (5.11) 
These expressions are iterated repeatedly in the computer program and the elapsed time 
calculated by summation of the values of ∆t. The program output gives the time-dependence 
of N1 and N2 and the computation is terminated when either N1 or N2 reaches zero. The 
summed time then represents the duration of the conflict. A flow diagram detailing the 
computational method shown in equations (5.10 and 5.11) is provided in Appendix II (a). 
The numerical solution obtained by the iterative method described above, was compared to 
those predicted by using the analytical solution shown in the previous footnote. The curves 
showing the variation of numbers of troops versus time were in excellent agreement, thus 
validating the numerical method. For the case of the modelling of a direct-fire conflict, it is 
regarded that this numerical scheme is preferable to the analytical solution because it is more 
amenable to modifications such as the inclusion of stochastic terms and the inclusion of other 
terms describing government troop deployment and rebel group recruitment. Both of these 
features are considered later in this chapter.  
To investigate the utility of the various definitions of relative power given by equations (5.4, 
5.5, 5.6 and 5.7), the time dependence of N1 and N2 determined from either the analytical or 
numerical method described above can be used to calculate the values and time dependences 
of p1 and p2 as follows: 
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 The solutions adapted from Kreysig (1983) are: [ ])cosh()()sinh()()( 01011 mtNmtNmtN += &  and 
[ ])cosh()()sinh()()( 02022 mtNmtNmtN += & , where 2/121 )( −= BBm and (N1)0, (N2)0 are the initial 
values of group size and
01 )(N
& ,
02 )(N
& are the initial rates.  
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For the first illustration of the model outcome, the values of p1(t) and p2(t) for these above 
four definitions, were generated to simulate a direct-fire conflict using the computational 
method described above. The initial size of the government side was taken to be N2 = 1000 in 
all four cases and the initial size of the rebel side (N1) was varied for each computation. The 
progress of each hypothetical conflict is shown in Figures 5.1 – 5.4, using the four definitions 
of p(t) from equations (5.12 – 5.15). For convenience it was assumed that B1 = B2 = 0.01 and 
time is represented in the normalised form (mt), where m = (B1B2)
-1/2
. This normalisation was 
chosen for consistency with the analytical solution in the previous footnote.  
Figure 5.1 Representation of a direct-fire conflict using the variation of p1(t) and p2(t) 
with time from equation (5.12). Time is expressed in the normalised form (mt). Values 
for initial group sizes are N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 respectively and the 
curves are labelled as values of N1/N2  
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Figure 5.2 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation 
(5.13) 
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Figure 5.3 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation 
(5.14) 
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Figure 5.4 As for the previous figure but using p1(t) and p2(t) values given by equation 
(5.15) 
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Figures 5.1 and 5.2 are similar in shape, but differ in the range and symmetry of p. The range 
is between +1 and -1 with symmetry about the value p = 0 in Figure 5.1, but the range is 
between 0 and 1 with symmetry about the value p = ½ in Figure 5.2. Both figures show that 
rebel groups with a large initial starting size (e.g. troop ratio 0.8) are able to sustain conflict 
longer than rebel groups with a small initial starting size (e.g. troop ratio 0.2). The rebels 
suffer a defeat in all cases because they start the conflict weaker than the government. Figures 
5.3 and 5.4 show illustrations of the same conflict but with p values defined by equations 
5.14 and 5.15 respectively. Inspection of the graphs suggests that these are less satisfactory 
for illustrating conflicts. In Figure 5.3, p ranges between 0 and 2, but the curves are 
asymmetric around the value 1. In Figure 5.4, p ranges between 1 and -2, again with the 
curves being asymmetric about the value 0. These curves are arguably less desirable because 
they do not convey the progress of relative power during a conflict in an intuitive or aesthetic 
manner. Since one of the potential strengths of the current extension of the method proposed 
by Christia (2012) is to provide a way of visualising conflict, it is reasoned that the 
definitions shown in equations (5.12 and 5.13) are those most suitable for modelling relative 
power. As such, the definition shown in equation (5.13) and plotted in Figure 5.2 is used as 
the template for all subsequent simulations performed in this chapter.  
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5.3.5 Interpretation of the rate constants B1 and B2 
The constants B1 and B2 in equations (5.8 and 5.9) relate to the fighting capabilities 
(expressed in terms of the killing ‘effectiveness’) of each side in a direct-fire conflict. The 
products B1N1 and B2N2 may thus be regarded as weighted parameters. Thus for the example 
given by equations (5.8 and 5.9), the rates of loss dN1/dt and dN2/dt are equal, not when N1 = 
N2, but rather when B1N1 = B2N2. The implication of this is that a small group with a high B-
value can emerge victorious over a larger group with a low B-value. In the initial proposal by 
Christia (2012), war is assumed to be equally costly for both sides and indeed in the above 
initial numerical ‘experiments’, this was implicit, in that the same killing effectiveness was 
used for both sides in all calculations (B1 = B2 = 0.01). In general this will not be the case in 
real conflicts and in this respect the present approach extends that of Christia (2012).  
In cases where B1 ≠ B2, it is clear that the relative power may be represented in a modified 
form of equation (5.6) as follows: 
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The other definition of relative power given by equations (5.4, 5.5 and 5.7) can also be 
modified in a similar way. 
Note that for simplicity in all subsequent simulations reported, the values are kept constant at 
B1 = B2 = 0.01 and the definition of normalised time is mt, where m = (B1B2)
-1/2
.  
The next section considers how the relative power concept developed so far may be utilised 
for illustrating other types of conflict, namely ‘guerrilla’ and ‘asymmetric’ warfare.   
5.3.6 Modelling other types of two-sided armed conflict 
A second type of conflict is ‘guerrilla’ warfare (Lanchester 1956; Deitchman 1962). This 
differs from direct-fire warfare in that each opposing side has to ‘search’ for their opponent 
before firing (e.g. in jungle warfare). This means that the overall killing rate must contain a 
term similar to that in a direct-fire type of conflict, but also reflect the fact that it must be 
moderated as the number of opponents decrease and therefore become progressively more 
difficult to find. This type of conflict is described by the following coupled equations: 
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These equations are similar to equations (5.8 and 5.9) where the terms C1N1 and C2N2 are 
equivalent to B1N1 and B2N2. However, the equations contain the additional terms D1N1 and 
D2N2 to describe the decrease in killing rate as the remaining number decreases. The 
corresponding constants are D1 and D2 and may be regarded as ‘search’ probabilities. The 
analytical solution of these coupled equations is complex and to the author’s knowledge no 
solution is available. However, numerical analysis can be performed relatively easily by 
using a method similar to that described earlier for the direct-fire conflict, but using modified 
forms of equations (5.10 and 5.11) shown below: 
tNNDCNN ttttt ∆−=∆+ )()()()( 121211        (5.19) 
tNNDCNN ttttt ∆−=∆+ )()()()( 212122        (5.20) 
In the previous case of direct-fire war, agent-based models have little advantage over 
numerical computational methods. In the case of guerrilla warfare however, agent-based 
modelling methods can be more suitable. One facility of ABM is that virtual agents can be 
created and instructed to move around their environment randomly. They can then be 
instructed to engage in certain behaviours when they interact (or collide) with other 
(specified) agents. Thus for a conflict involving two groups, government agents and rebel 
agents may be instructed to move randomly and on interaction, prescribed killing 
probabilities for both types of agent can be enabled, so that each side experiences a decrease 
in numbers of troops over time. ABM is an ideal method for modelling guerrilla conflict 
because the random motion of the agents in two-dimensional space can be used as an 
analogue of the search-and-kill sequence that characterises this type of conflict.  
Both the numerical computational method and the ABM method were used to model guerrilla 
conflict. The results of the numerical method based on equations (5.19 and 5.20) are shown in 
Figure 5.5, using an assumed initial size of the government forces N2 = 1000, with four 
different initial rebel sizes; N1 = 800, 700, 600 & 500. For illustration purposes, the killing 
probability constants C1 and C2 were taken to be the same as the constants B1 and B2 used 
earlier for direct-fire example. In the numerical models the search parameter values D1 = D2 
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= 0.0003 were used. These were selected by performing sensitivity analyses until the 
numerical computational method and ABM were calibrated. 
The variation of the relative power with normalised time is shown in Figure 5.5 and the 
corresponding flow diagram is given in Appendix II (b). Note the distinct difference in shape 
between Figure 5.5 for guerrilla conflict and Figure 5.2 for direct-fire conflict. The curvatures 
of the lines are of opposite sign for these two cases and this characteristic emphasises the 
utility of the current approach in the visual representation of conflict type. The ‘long-tailed’ 
curves for guerrilla conflicts reflect the increasing difficulty of eliminating the last few rebels 
in this type of conflict and demonstrate clearly why such conflicts are protracted. 
Figure 5.5 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) with normalised time for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 
700, 600 & 500 respectively during a guerrilla-conflict. Values were generated using the 
numerical algorithms described by equations (5.19 and 5.20) 
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Values of p1(t) and p2(t) were also generated assuming the same parameters as described in 
the above numerical model, but using an agent-based model. The flow diagram 
corresponding to the ABM of a guerrilla conflict is shown in Appendix II (c) and the 
variation of relative power with time for the rebel groups and the government is plotted in 
Figure 5.6. Although the characteristic curvatures of these curves are similar to those derived 
from the numerical model, a significant difference is that the curves derived from the ABM 
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are ‘noisy’, a feature that relates to the inherent stochastic nature of ABM. This arises 
because the agents are programmed to move randomly in two dimensions and the random 
collisions between agents from each side is a proxy for killing, which then occurs according 
to an input value of probability. Because the government agents have to randomly ‘search’ 
for rebel agents before killing them, this effect naturally reflects guerrilla conflict. This 
‘noisy’ nature of the curves illustrates this effect. Thus, the ‘built-in’ stochastic effects of 
ABM modelling illustrate how the progress of conflicts with the same starting conditions can 
have different trajectories. Towards the end of the conflict when the numbers of troops are 
small, the level of noise increases. Hypothetically, with smaller assumed initial values for the 
state and rebel groups, it is clear that in some circumstances, the relative power curves for the 
state and rebel group could cross over, so that the weaker side emerges victorious.  
Figure 5.6 Results generated from an Agent-Based Model for the variation of p1(t) and 
p2(t) with normalised time for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 700, 600 & 500 respectively 
during a guerrilla conflict. Note that one run for each rebel size (N1) is shown.  
0 20 40 60
time
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
re
la
ti
v
e
 p
o
w
e
r
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
 
A third type of conflict is ‘asymmetric’ conflict (Lanchester 1956; Schaffer 1968). Typically 
this might occur when a large force, such as the government, is matched against a smaller 
force such as a rebel group, with the latter employing guerrilla tactics and the former 
employing direct-fire tactics. In asymmetric conflict, the rebel side can have an advantage 
over the government, in spite of their smaller size, because the government must search for 
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their opponents before they can make a kill. The extent of this rebel advantage depends on 
how difficult it is for the government to locate the rebels. The corresponding differential 
equations describing an asymmetric conflict are as follows: 
)( 1122
1 NDNC
dt
dN
−=          (5.21) 
11
2 NC
dt
dN
−=           (5.22) 
Once again, a numerical solution can be achieved by using a method similar to the ones used 
previously. The finite difference equations corresponding to equations (5.21 and 5.22) are 
given by: 
{ } tNDNCNN ttttt ∆−=∆+ )()()()( 112211       (5.23) 
tNCNN tttt ∆−=∆+ )()()( 1122                     (5.24) 
Values of relative power, p1(t) and p2(t), were generated to simulate asymmetric warfare 
using equations (5.23 and 5.24). In this evaluation, the government side was assumed to 
adopt a search-then-kill strategy (with a trial search probability D1 = 0.0003) and the rebels a 
direct-fire approach. The initial size of the government side was N2 = 1000 and four different 
initial rebel sizes were assumed; N1 = 800, 600, 400, 200. The flow diagram for the 
computation is shown in Appendix II (d) and the results are plotted in Figure 5.7. An 
important feature of asymmetric warfare (which is illustrated in Figure 5.7) compared to 
direct-fire (illustrated in Figure 5.1) and guerrilla warfare (illustrated in Figure 5.5), is that 
the rebels can emerge victorious despite starting out weaker than the government. Figure 5.7 
shows, for the present choice of parameters, that rebel victory ensues in all cases, even when 
they start the conflict with a troop size ratio of 0.2. The victory of the initially weaker side 
manifests itself in Figure 5.7 by the curves intersecting and crossing. This figure again 
illustrates the use of the present relative-power approach in producing highly visually-
effective representations of conflict progress.  
The classic empirical case of asymmetric conflict is the Vietnamese-US war (Mack 1975; 
Paul 1994; Arreguin-Toft 2001). The present analysis produces a new representation of 
asymmetric concept based on the relative-power approach proposed by Christia (2012).  
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Figure 5.7 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 during 
an asymmetric conflict with a ‘search’ probability D1 = 0.0003. Each pair of lines cross 
in this example, indicating that rebel victory occurs in all cases 
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Figure 5.8 As for the previous figure but with D1 increased by a factor of 5. This means 
that the state forces can find rebels more easily and in this case, rebel victory now 
occurs only for the largest rebel group size  
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Figure 5.8 illustrates the results of a repeat evaluation of that shown in Figure 5.7 using the 
same parameters, except that D1 is increased by a factor of 5. This causes a major change of 
conflict outcome compared to that illustrated in Figure 5.7. Only the case where N1 = 800 
now results in a rebel victory. These curves clearly illustrate the expectation that when rebels 
are easier to find, their advantage is diminished. A further important point, is that the curves 
in Figure 5.8 for cases where rebels suffer defeat have the same sign for their curvature as 
those for guerrilla warfare (see Figure 5.5). Thus for cases where rebel defeat ensues, the 
curves for asymmetric warfare and guerrilla warfare are similar.   
5.3.7 Inclusion of stochastic effects 
Christia (2012) suggests that the variation of the relative power p during a conflict is unlikely 
to be smooth, but may be likened to a biased random walk, where random steps occur in the 
direction of increased or decreased relative power. The general ‘drift’ direction is driven at 
the onset by the initial values of p, but random influences are likely to occur over time. The 
agent-based model for guerrilla conflict illustrated in Figure 5.6 clearly shows the importance 
of such stochastic effects, but the numerical evaluations performed so far have not included 
any attempts to model stochastic terms.  
It is important to re-emphasize the importance of the stochastic term in equation (5.1). In its 
absence, conflict outcomes would always be predictable if the initial conditions were known. 
In principle, there would be no need for a conflict. Christia (2012) does not describe ways in 
which the stochastic term could be implemented practically for the purposes of illustrating 
conflict progress. This section of the chapter examines specific ways in which such a term 
might be applied to deterministic models of two-sided conflict. These are not intended to 
model actual physical processes that might occur, but are simply used to illustrate the above 
important point, namely that random events can produce unexpected outcomes. 
The next section will consider how randomness might be introduced into the value of the 
probability parameters (B1 and B2 or C1 and C2), then the following section will consider how 
it could be introduced via sudden random changes that might occur in the number of troops 
(N1 or N2). 
In the first instance, random changes were incorporated into the term describing the ‘killing’ 
probability (i.e. incorporate randomness to the constants B1 or B2 that feature in equations 
(5.8 and 5.9). Since these are related to the fighting capability of a group, the real-life 
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interpretation of this might be the unexpected acquisition of military equipment and arms 
from an external source, or indeed the unexpected loss of equipment and arms as a result of 
bad weather, illness, bombardment or looting. One way in which the randomness can be 
incorporated is by changing the values of B1 and B2 after each time step ∆t in the 
computation, using the uniform distributions defined by the the relationships: 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
lowerupperlower
BBUBB 1111 −+=       (5.25) 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
lowerupperlower
BBUBB 2222 −+=       (5.26) 
where 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 is a random number and (B1)lower, (B2)lower  and (B1)upper and (B2)upper  are the 
lower and  lower limits for the chosen range of values for any chosen illustration.  
Figures 5.9, 5.10 and 5.11 show the effect of applying the above stochastic variation to the 
killing probability of just the rebel side, for the cases of direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric 
warfare respectively.  
A random increase or decrease in the killing probability of the rebels was introduced after 
each time step of the computation according to equation (5.25). In the previous simulations 
constant values B1 = B2 = 0.01 were assumed. In this simulation it was assumed that the 
lower limits were zero in all cases i.e. (B1)lower = 0 , with an upper limit (B1)upper = 0.05 for 
the direct-fire conflict (Figure 5.9) and (B1)upper = 0.04 for the guerrilla and asymmetric 
conflicts (Figures 5.10 and 5.11). Once again N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200. The 
flow diagrams corresponding to these experiments are shown in Appendices II (e) and (f).  
Inspection of the results obtained for one specific run, are shown in Figure 5.9. Comparing 
this to the equivalent case with no stochastic component (Figure 5.1), shows that the above 
stochastic contribution does not change the rebel outcome for N1 = 600, 400 & 200, but 
slightly increases the timescale over which the conflict is sustained. For the largest rebel 
group (N1 = 800), inclusion of the stochastic term has resulted in rebel victory. Inspection of 
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 (compared with Figures 5.5 and 5.8) reveals a similar effect. For the 
case of guerrilla warfare shown in Figure 5.10, the rebels have emerged victorious for N1 = 
800 & 600, unlike the outcome illustrated in Figure 5.5, where all rebel groups suffered 
defeat. In Figure 5.11, for the case of asymmetric conflict, the rebels achieve victory for N1 = 
800, 600 & 400, unlike the outcome in Figure 5.8, where rebel victory occurred only for the 
largest rebel group, N1 = 800.  
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Figure 5.9 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 and 200 
during a direct-fire conflict with a stochastic element applied to killing probability (B1) 
of the rebel side. This leads to rebel victory for the largest group 
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Figure 5.10 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 
during a guerrilla conflict with a stochastic element applied to killing probability (C1 ) 
of the rebel side only. Rebel victory occurs for the two largest groups 
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 Figure 5.11 Variation of p1(t)
during an asymmetric conflict with a stochastic 
(C1) of the rebel groups only. A search probability is applied to just the government side 
with the value 1.5 10
-3
. Rebel victory occurs in three cases
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An alternative approach to implementing stochastic effects is to introduce random changes to 
the number of troops of one or both sides (i.e. add randomness to either 
world interpretation of this might be an increase in troops as a resul
or a decrease in troops as a result of disease. Unlike the previous case, where randomness was 
applied to the search probability, a different strategy is necessary in the case of adding 
stochastic changes to group numbers. An ob
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This type of distribution is common in nature and is characterised by a high frequency of 
small values, an intermediate frequency of medium-sized values, with large values occurring 
more rarely. Power-law distributed random values of a variable z in the range zmin ≤ z ≤ zmax 
can be generated from the standard relationship: 
α
αα
αα
1
maxmin
maxmin
)1( 





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−+
=
zUUz
zz
z         (5.28) 
where 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 is a uniformly distributed random number.  
In the present case, to obtain the stochastic contribution for incorporation into the model, 
values of z were calculated from equation (5.28) after each time step (∆t) in the computation. 
The random value ∆N = z(N1)init was then determined, where (N1)init is the initial number in 
the rebel group. A second (uniformly distributed) random number in the range 0 ≤ U ≤ 1 was 
then used such that if U ≥ 0.5, then ∆N was added to N1 or was subtracted otherwise. An 
exponent α = 2 was assumed and zmin = 0.0001 and zmax = 1 were taken as the lower and 
upper limits of possible values.  
Once again, it was assumed that the group sizes were N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 
200. A direct-fire conflict was assumed, the corresponding flow diagram is shown in 
Appendix II (g) and results are shown for one example run in Figure 5.12. By comparison 
with the direct-fire conflict with no stochastic term illustrated in Figure 5.1, it is clear that 
inclusion of the stochastic term can lead to rebel victories (intersecting curves are observed 
for two cases) that would not be expected from predictions based on deterministic reasoning 
alone. No equivalent illustrations are given here for guerrilla and asymmetric conflict. The 
message is sufficiently clear from the above examples, namely that stochastic effects can give 
rise to radically different conflict outcomes. 
It is important to reiterate here that the examples shown are driven by parameter values, 
which were selected by performing sensitivity studies. The purpose of these examples is to 
demonstrate the scope of the various models, not to demonstrate what might be typical over a 
number of experimental runs. That is, with the parameter values selected for the experiment 
shown in Figure 5.12, it is possible to observe a cross-over effect, where the group who starts 
off weaker (in this case, the rebels) may emerge victorious as a result of stochastic effects. 
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Figure 5.12 Variation of p1(t) and p2(t) for N2 = 1000 and N1 = 800, 600, 400 & 200 
during a direct-fire conflict with a stochastic element applied to the rebel groups only 
(N1). Rebel victory ensues for the two largest rebel groups 
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5.3.8 Inclusion of rebel recruitment and government deployment 
The types of conflict described above, involve only the mutual attrition of two opposing 
groups and in the absence of stochastic events, it is assumed that there is no replenishment of 
state or rebel group members during the conflict. In most real-world cases however, numbers 
are likely to be replenished. This can be modelled in various ways, including one or more of 
the following possibilities: i) instantaneous increments of troop numbers occur, ii) time-
dependent increases of troop numbers occur iii) increases of troop numbers occur in response 
to the size of the opposing group and iv) time-dependent increases of troop numbers occur 
either in response to (or independent of) the size of the opposing group, but with a time-lag.   
In either ODE models or in an ABM, items i) and ii) can be modelled simply by allowing 
either an instantaneous step increase in numbers at a specific time, or enabling a time-
dependent increase as the computation progresses. Items iii) and iv) can be modelled by 
incorporating a term that allows for a rate of increase in group numbers that depends on the 
number in the opposing group. Note that the inclusion of troop replenishment in conflict 
models represents an important novel contribution of the present work. 
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Consider first the growth of a rebel group with no attrition by an opposing force, whose 
growth follows the ‘limited growth equation’ described in detail in Appendix III. This takes 
the form: 
)( 1max11
1 NNNA
dt
dN
−=         (5.29) 
where Nmax is the maximum number of potential rebel recruits in the population and A1 is a 
recruitment rate constant. To model an asymmetric conflict with concurrent rebel 
recruitment, the above growth term can be incorporated into equation (5.21) to give the 
expression for the overall rate of change of rebel group numbers as follows: 
11221max11
1 )()( NDNCNNNA
dt
dN
−−=       (5.30) 
During a conflict it is likely that the state will respond to increases in the rebel threat by 
increasing its own strength. One of the strategies listed at the beginning of this section is that 
the state increases its troop numbers at a rate proportional to the current number of rebels (i.e. 
A2N1, where A2 is a constant). This response term can then be incorporated into equation 
(5.22) to give the overall rate of change of state troop numbers as follows: 
1112
2 NCNA
dt
dN
−=          (5.31) 
Note that the ‘loss’ terms (C2N2)D1N1 and C1N1 in equations (5.30 and 5.31) are those for an 
asymmetric conflict. That is, the state troops are killed by a direct-fire process and the rebels 
by a search-and-kill, guerrilla strategy. This type of warfare is used for all subsequent 
numerical experiments because asymmetric fighting is common to most civil wars. 
The progress of a hypothetical conflict with concurrent recruitment of the rebel group and 
deployment of state troop numbers in response is shown in Figure 5.13. The various constants 
were chosen to illustrate the important case that even if the state initially outnumbers the 
rebels (in this case by a ratio 20:1), the rebels can emerge victorious because of their high 
rate of concurrent recruitment. The following values were used: Nmax = 2000, N1 = 100, N2 = 
2000, A1 = 10
-5
, A2 = 5 x 10
-2
, C1 = C2 = 1 x 10
-2
 and D1 = 3 x 10
-4
. In Figure 5.14, the time-
dependence of the state and rebel numbers during the course of the above conflict are shown 
represented as a fraction of their initial numbers.  
172 
 
Figure 5.13 Variation of relative power with normalised time for the state and a rebel 
group in an asymmetric conflict with concurrent rebel recruitment and state 
deployment. In this example the rebel group gains victory even though it is 
outnumbered initially in the ratio 20:1  
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Figure 5.14 Time-dependence of the state and rebel numbers during the course of the 
conflict illustrated in the previous figure. Numbers are represented in terms of the 
fractions of their initial values 
0.0 0.4 0.8 1.2
time
0
1
2
3
4
tr
o
o
p
 s
iz
e
 (
n
/n
0
)
state
rebels
 
173 
 
A further numerical investigation was performed by using the same values for the constants 
as those used for the previous hypothetical conflict, except that D1 was increased by a factor 
of ten. The results are plotted in Figure 5.15. This illustrates that the outcome changes from a 
rebel victory to a state victory, since changing D1 means that rebels are easier to locate by the 
state troops. In Figure 5.16, results are re-plotted in terms of the variation of troop numbers 
with time. In this particular case, state troop numbers remained almost unchanged throughout 
the conflict. 
The influence of reducing the initial state strength on the outcome of a conflict otherwise 
similar to that described above is illustrated in Figure 5.17, where the ratio of rebels to state 
was changed from 1:20 to 1:6. The state still emerges victorious, but the conflict lasts longer. 
Figure 5.18 shows the variation of troop numbers, normalised in terms of the initial number, 
as a function of the normalised time.  
 
Figure 5.15 As for the hypothetical conflict illustrated in the previous two figures, 
except that the constant D1 was increased by a factor of ten. This results in state, rather 
than rebel, victory since rebel agents are now easier to find 
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Figure 5.16 Results for the hypothetical conflict illustrated in the previous figure, 
plotted as the variation of troop numbers, normalised in terms of the initial number, as 
a function of time 
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Figure 5.17 Effect of decreasing the initial state strength. The value of the rebel/state 
ratio is1/6, compared to the value 1/20 used for the previous conflict 
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Figure 5.18 Results for the conflict illustrated in the previous figure, plotted as the 
variation of troop numbers, normalised in terms of the initial number, as a function of 
time 
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Figure 5.19 illustrates the effect on the outcome of the previous conflict if the value of the 
state deployment constant (A2) is reduced by a factor of 10. The rebels are now victorious 
because the state cannot deploy enough troops. The conflict also becomes more prolonged. 
Figure 5.20 shows the variation of troop numbers with time for this conflict. Comparison 
with Figure 5.18 shows that the curves representing the state and for rebels become inverted.  
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Figure 5.19 Influence of reducing the state troop deployment constant by a factor of 10, 
in the previous conflict. Note by comparison to Figure 5.17, that the conflict outcome is 
reversed; rebel victory occurs 
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Figure 5.20 Variation of normalised state and rebel troop numbers with normalised 
time for the previous conflict  
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5.4 Modelling multi-party conflict 
The models presented in the previous section were restricted to two-sided conflicts between 
the state and a single rebel group. In this section, the model is extended to cover conflicts 
with multiple rebel groups versus the state. The frequency distribution of the numbers groups 
involved in various conflicts was described in Chapter II. Approximately half of all civil wars 
occurring between 1945 and 2008 were multi-party conflicts. 
An important feature that emerged from the statistical analysis in Chapter II was that the 
number of rebel groups tends to be smaller for conflicts involving strong states and also that 
rebel groups commonly interact during multi-party conflicts. These interactions may take the 
form of cooperation, fighting or both cooperation and fighting with another group or groups. 
Since these features are an important aspect covered by this thesis, it is relevant to investigate 
how the present modelling approach might be used to provide some insight into them. Multi-
party conflicts can be modelled by either ODEs or ABM. Numerical models based on ODE’s 
are described in the following section. 
5.4.1 Description of the numerical model 
The first model was based on the following scheme. It is assumed that the state forces with 
initial size NS are simultaneously in conflict with n rebel groups having initial sizes N1, N2,…. 
Nn. Each rebel group is considered to increase in size by a self-recruitment growth process, as 
was assumed earlier for the case of dyadic conflicts. The recruitment expression is given by: 
( )iiiiiinc NNNAN −= )()( max&         (5.32) 
where Ai is the growth rate constant for the i
th
 group and (Nmax)i is the maximum number of 
potential rebel recruits for the i
th
 group in the total population. (The approximate form of the 
equation, corresponding to the case where ii NN >>)( max is: iiiiinc NNAN )()( max≈& ). The state 
forces are assumed to grow directly in response to the total number of rebels that exist at any 
instant, so that: 
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where γ is the growth rate constant for the state forces.  
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In this version of the model, the state is assumed to fight simultaneously with all the rebel 
groups, with the number of state troops employed in combat with each rebel group, being 
partitioned in accordance with the relative size of that group with respect to the total number 
of rebels. Thus if the i
th
 rebel group occupies a fraction fi of the total then: 
,
1
∑
=
=
==
ni
i
i
i
TOT
i
i
N
N
N
N
f          (5.34) 
The number of state troops fighting this i
th
 group is thus (NS)i = fiNS and the attrition rate of 
the i
th
 rebel group is therefore given by: 
( ) ( )( )iiSiSiiiSSidec NNfNNN ξβξβ −=−= )()( &       (5.35) 
where βS is the killing rate constant for the state and ξi the search probability constant. 
Since the number of state troops becomes depleted by a direct-fire process, the attrition rate is 
the sum of the attrition rates due to all rebel groups. The total attrition rate of the state is thus: 
( ) ∑
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where βi are the appropriate killing rate constants of state troops by each rebel group.  
In the numerical scheme, for rebel and state growth respectively, the incremental increments 
in numbers, in each time step ∆t are thus: 
tNN iinciinc ∆=∆ )()( &          (5.37) 
and 
tNN SincSinc ∆=∆ )()( &         (5.38) 
For rebel and state shrinkage respectively, the decrements are: 
tNN idecidec ∆=∆ )()( &          (5.39) 
and 
tNN SdecSdec ∆=∆ )()( &          (5.40) 
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The progress of a conflict is then calculated by solving the above set of equations numerically 
in a manner similar to that used for the two-sided conflict examples in the previous section. 
This involves calculating the various ∆N values from each of the above equations for small 
time steps ∆t and then updating the numbers using the algebraic sums as follows: 
SdecSinctSttS NNNN )()()()( ∆+∆+=∆+       (5.41) 
ideciinctitti NNNN )()()()( ∆+∆+=∆+        (5.42) 
During the course of the computation, the total time elapsed was obtained by summing the ∆t 
values and the relative power for each group pi and for the state, pS was calculated from the 
expressions: 
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In the first instance, a hypothetical conflict was modelled that assumed no rebel or state 
recruitment occurred during the conflict (i. e. all Ai = 0 and γ = 0). The initial state troop size 
was 2000 and four rebel groups were assumed with sizes 200, 400, 600 & 800 respectively. 
All βi and ξi values were assumed to be 0.01 and 0.0003 respectively. The results are 
illustrated in Figure 5.21 and indicate a straightforward victory for the rebel forces. 
The next conflict modelled was identical except that the state initial size was increased from 
2000 to 8000. The results are shown in Figure 5.22, which indicates that the much stronger 
state now leads to a state victory, this time after a more extended time period. This ‘long-tail’ 
is again characteristic of asymmetric conflicts because the rebels become harder to locate as 
they decrease in number. The details of the converging rebel curves in the long-tail region are 
illustrated more clearly in Figure 5.23, which shows part of Figure 5.22 plotted on an 
expanded scale. The results of the hypothetical conflict illustrated in Figures 5.22 and 5.23, 
confirm the expectation that a state victory can be assured if its initial size is increased 
sufficiently. By the same token, the expectation that with the same number of troops but with 
a higher killing power, state victory would be achieved. This is indeed confirmed in Figure 
5.24, where the state killing probability was increased in the computation by a factor of 20.  
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Figure 5.21 Representation of an asymmetric conflict between the state (NS = 2000) and 
four rebel groups (with sizes 200, 400, 600, 800). It is assumed that no recruitment 
occurs (i.e. all Ai = 0 and γ = 0). Rebel victory is indicated in all cases. (It is assumed that 
all βi = 0.01 and ξi = 0.0003) 
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Figure 5.22 As for the previous conflict but with the state size increased from 2000 to 
8000. This now results in a state victory. Note the more extended timescale that results 
because of the asymmetric conflict 
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Figure 5.23 Enlarged part of the previous figure, showing details of the convergence of 
the curves 
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Figure 5.24 The same conflict as that illustrated in Figure 5.21 except the state killing 
power was increased by a factor of 20. This now leads to a state, rather than rebel 
victory 
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In the models leading to the results illustrated in Figures 5.21 – 5.24, no account is included 
for the effect of concurrent group recruitment or the deployment of state troops. In the next 
model, both rebel recruitment and state deployment were enabled in the computation. The 
influence is shown in Figures 5.25 and 5.26. In the computation, rebel recruitment was 
characterised by the value Ai = 0.00001 for all rebel groups.  
Figure 5.25 illustrates that the outcome with the state recruitment constant γ = 0.005 is rebel 
victory, whereas Figure 5.26, with the state troop deployment rate increased by a factor of 10, 
the result is rebel defeat. These outcomes confirm the expectations that arise from changing 
the relative rates of recruitment and deployment. An important feature to be noted in Figure 
5.26 is the convergence of the curves for the rebel groups, with the curves becoming almost 
coincident at the longest times. This convergence occurs because it is easier for the state to 
locate and kill the rebels in the early stages when the groups are larger and more difficult 
when they are smaller.  
Figure 5.25 The same conflict as that illustrated in Figure 5.21, but with rebel 
recruitment and state deployment enabled in the numerical model 
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Figure 5.26 As for Figure 5.25 but with state deployment increased by a factor of 10 
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5.4.2 Modelling rebel group interactions 
The numerical models described above provide a platform from which a wide range of 
hypothetical interaction strategies of rebel groups can be modelled with relative ease. One 
result that emerged from the statistical analyses in Chapter II is that there is a higher 
likelihood of alliance formation between groups that are militarily small relative to other 
groups in the conflict. To test the effect of this type of interaction strategy, the conflict 
illustrated in Figure 5.26 was modified such that the two smallest groups were allowed to 
combine at the (arbitrary) value of normalised time of 0.5. The results are shown in Figure 
5.27 and on an expanded scale in Figure 5.28. These figures clearly show that on initiation of 
the alliance, the curve representing the smaller rebel group drops to zero as it loses its 
members to the larger group and the curve for the other group increases as it gains members. 
The important result is that after forming an alliance, the curve for the newly-aligned group 
soon becomes almost coincident with the closely-converged set of curves for all the other 
groups. This is an important finding, in that it mirrors the results obtained from the statistical 
modelling in Chapter IV, namely that when small groups merge there is little ultimate impact 
on a group’s longevity. This is explained by the fact that gains made from forming an alliance 
are balanced by the increased rate of attrition experienced as a result of increased group size. 
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Figure 5.27 Representation of the same conflict as that shown in Figure 5.26 but with 
the two smallest groups merging at a value of normalised time 0.5 
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Figure 5.28 Enlarged portion of the previous figure 
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In Chapter II, another important statistical finding was that rebel groups are more likely to 
engage in inter-rebel violence when they are either militarily large or militarily small relative 
to their peers, a result replicating that obtained by Fjelde and Nilsson (2012) who used a 
different construct of relative rebel group size. Inter-rebel violence can be modelled relatively 
easily in the present model by including a subroutine in the program that is utilised after each 
incremental time step in the computation. Thus if the i
th
 and j
th
 rebel group fight each other in 
a guerrilla conflict, a subroutine identical to that described earlier by equations (5.17, 5.18, 
5.19 and 5.20) can be incorporated for this purpose, where the subscripts 1 and 2 in these 
equations are replaced by i and j.  
The outcome of fighting between the largest and smallest group in the conflict depicted in 
Figure 5.26 is shown in Figure 5.29. The onset of inter-rebel violence is assumed to 
commence at the (normalised) time 0.5. The kill-rate constants and the search probabilities 
are taken to be identical to the earlier values. For these specific values, the progress of the 
conflict is changed only slightly by inter-rebel fighting, as can be observed by comparing 
Figures 5.29 and 5.30 with the corresponding case where fighting does not occur (in Figure 
5.26).    
Figure 5.29 Outcome of a conflict identical to that illustrated in Figure 5.26 but with the 
assumption that the largest and smallest groups engage in a guerrilla conflict 
commencing at the normalised time 0.5 
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Figure 5.30 Enlarged portion of the previous figure 
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In the case where the kill rate constant for both fighting groups is increased by an order of 
magnitude, the influence of fighting between the two groups has a more profound influence 
on the curves. This is illustrated in Figures 5.31 and 5.32. The change in the rate of loss of 
troops from both groups is now clearly illustrated.  
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Figure 5.31 Representation of the same conflict as that shown in Figures 5.29 and 5.30, 
but the kill rate constant for both fighting rebel groups is increased by a factor of 10 
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Figure 5.32 Enlarged portion of Figure 53.1 
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5.5 Concluding remarks  
In this chapter, various ways in which civil conflict can be modelled have been explored by 
using an expression, based on the concept of ‘relative power’ described by Christia (2012). 
General numerical models of two-sided conflict were developed and various aspects were 
investigated, including the optimal definition of relative power, the different mechanisms of 
two-sided conflict (direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric warfare), inclusion of a stochastic 
element (both to the number of rebel troops and the rebel group killing constant) and 
inclusion of terms for rebel recruitment and the deployment of government troops.  
A comparison of ordinary differential equation (ODE) modelling and agent-based modelling 
(ABM) allowed an assessment of the suitability of these two types. ABM was found to be 
particularly suited to the modelling of guerrilla warfare due to an inherent feature of ABM 
programming software, where agents can be programmed to move randomly and collide with 
other agents (thus replicating the search-and-kill characteristic of guerrilla warfare). ABM 
was found to be less suited to the modelling of direct-fire and asymmetric warfare because 
both of these types of warfare involve a direct-fire mechanism on at least one side. Since a 
direct-fire mechanism does not require the agents to search for their opponent before more 
making a kill, the random movement of agents around an artificial environment (which is 
inherent in ABM) is superfluous.  
The work presented in this chapter showed that Christia’s general concepts provide an 
excellent basis from which models of multi-party conflict can be developed. The concept of 
relative power and how it varies throughout a conflict provides a highly effective and clear 
visual representation of conflict dynamics and rebel group interactions. Striking differences 
are illustrated in the characteristic curves representing the different types of conflict.  
Civil wars are commonly asymmetric and conflicts are more protracted owing to the fact that 
the rebel agents becomes increasingly difficult to locate as they decrease in number. This 
means that rebels can be at a significant advantage despite their small size. In the context of 
civil war, this might explain why some conflicts, involving weak rebels, are protracted. This 
work has shown that implementing a random element to numerical models of conflict can 
dramatically change the duration and outcome of war. Similarly, the effects of rebel 
recruitment and government deployment are shown to have important influences on conflict 
outcomes in ways that might be expected intuitively.  
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In the second part of this chapter, the general model of two-sided conflict was extended to 
multi-party civil wars. This represents a novel contribution to conflict modelling, since 
previous computer based simulations of civil war have all been limited to two-sided conflict. 
This model has great potential to explore hypothetical rebel interaction strategies. Various 
aspects were modelled including simultaneous conflict between the state and four rebel 
groups of different initial sizes, varying the rates of rebel group recruitment and government 
deployment of troops and modelling of two rebel group interaction strategy types, alliance 
formation and inter-rebel violence. The simulations of multi-party asymmetric conflict (in 
which all rebel groups fought the state simultaneously) revealed convergence in rebel group 
sizes over time. This finding has important implications in that it provides possible 
information regarding the mechanism responsible for the empirical finding in Chapter IV that 
alliance formation does not have a strong effect on group longevity. This is simply explained 
by the convergence in the curves at longer times. 
Overall, this chapter has demonstrated that differential equation modelling and agent-based 
simulation techniques have great potential for modelling rebel group interactions in multi-
party civil wars. The development of the relative power concept provides an excellent basis 
from which multi-party conflicts, and subsequently rebel group interactions, can be 
simulated. These simulations can be used to model a wide range of conflict processes, 
including stochastic events, rebel group recruitment of civilians, government responses and 
the deployment of troops.  Importantly, in relation to the theme of this thesis, they can be 
used to model rebel group interaction strategies such as alliance formation and inter-rebel 
violence.  
5.5.1 Possible extensions to the multi-party conflict model 
An obvious extension to the currently developed multi-party conflict model would be to 
explore the effect of varying the number of rebel groups according to their known frequency 
distribution described in Chapter II. Similarly, the initial sizes and capabilities of the rebel 
groups could also be varied according to those in the empirical data set. For example, the data 
from Cunningham et al. (2009) includes information on rebel group characteristics, including 
the initial size, their arms procurement capability (a proxy for the killing rate constant) and 
their mobilisation capability (a proxy for the recruitment term). In addition, one of the 
findings of Chapter II, that the number of rebel groups varies as an inverse function of state 
strength, would provide an additional degree of realism in the multi-party model.  
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In the present illustrations of group interactions, it is assumed that the onset of interaction 
simply occurs at an arbitrarily chosen time. While this is useful for illustration purposes, it is 
not likely to accurately model real-world events. An obvious way forward is to explore 
various criteria that are likely to determine the onset of interactions other than to simply 
chose an arbitrary time. A possible alternative criterion that might provide insight into the 
onset of interactions concerns possible uses of the metric ‘relative power’. The multi-party 
model presented earlier explores only the relative power that exists between the state and 
each of the rebel groups. But relative power between rebel groups themselves may provide 
important clues in unravelling the reasons for the different types of interaction strategy that 
are known to occur. The statistical findings presented in Chapter II suggest that rebel groups 
who are militarily weak relative to their peers are more likely to form alliances, whereas 
groups who are militarily strong and those who are militarily weak relative to their peers are 
more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence. In other words, weak rebel groups align to 
balance their power against the state, whereas strong rebel groups target weak groups for 
elimination via inter-rebel violence. The relative power between groups could be used to 
model the initiation of interactions accordingly. For example, when the relative power 
between two rebel groups crosses a threshold, inter-rebel violence between those two groups 
could be initiated. 
Instead of using the relative power between groups as a criterion for initiating interactions, a 
further approach could be the use of the rate of change in relative power (either between the 
rebel group and the state, or between the rebel groups themselves). When this exceeds a 
certain critical value, or when there is a discontinuity in its variation, this might trigger some 
type of interaction. The initiation of rebel group interactions might be modelled using a 
matrix, where rebel groups consider their own power relative to the state and to each (or all) 
of the other rebel groups in the conflict. This could give further insight into the findings of 
Chapter III and other empirical research (see Fjelde and Nilsson 2012), which show that 
conflicts involving strong states are more likely to encounter alliances between groups, 
whereas conflicts involving weak states are more likely to encounter inter-rebel violence 
between groups.  
Another extension to the multi-party model would involve modelling the target choices made 
by rebel groups in a manner driven not by power considerations, but rather by identity-based 
factors. This could give insight into explaining the statistical findings presented in Chapter II, 
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which provided evidence in support of this argument. One of the difficulties in the modelling 
of identity-based attributes lies in their qualitative nature. However, the network approach 
developed in Chapter II, gives a measure of the degree of ideological similarity between 
groups and this provides a possible way of overcoming this issue. Thus each rebel group 
could be assigned an array of identity-based attributes at the initialisation stage of the 
computer program. These could be used either to direct the rebel group’s interaction 
decisions (or target choices) entirely, or use them as a weighting factor on interaction 
decisions made on the basis of relative power. Interaction decisions might also be made by 
rebel groups in terms of cost-benefit considerations. This might have the advantage that it 
allows rebel groups to sometimes adopt the interaction strategy of operate independently in 
cases where the costs of interacting always outweigh the benefits.  
The model presented earlier in this chapter concerns the state in simultaneous conflict with all 
of the rebel groups, but it is an easy matter to model the potential scenario of sequential 
battles (Akcinaroglu 2012). In these types of conflict, the state fights a battle with one rebel 
group then switches to a battle elsewhere with another. This allows the other group to rest 
and recuperate (and possibly recruit new members). This occurred in Liberia for example, 
where the two rebel groups MODEL and LURD engaged in clashes with the Liberian state 
within days of the other’s battle. These battles were highly dispersed, covering a range of 
locations including Monrovia, Buchanan, Klay and Grand Bassa. Crucially, this meant that 
after each battle, one group could replenish its resources, whilst the state was subjected to 
another battle elsewhere.  
As a general final comment, the numerical models presented in this chapter could be used to 
investigate the micro-level mechanisms underpinning civil conflict duration and outcome. 
Multi-party conflicts last longer (Cunningham 2006) and they are less likely to terminate by 
negotiated peace agreement (Cunningham 2006; Nilsson 2010) but the statistical models used 
in previous research (and in the previous chapters of this thesis) have not been able to directly 
test the mechanisms responsible for these effects. The numerical models presented in this 
chapter, have great potential for uncovering the micro-level mechanisms responsible for 
conflict duration and outcome. To accomplish this, sensitivity studies could be performed and 
the various model parameters could be tuned, or set according to empirical distributions, so 
that the simulated conflict outcomes match those observed in the real world. It might then be 
possible to gauge what micro-level factors lead to certain macro-level war dynamics. 
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Conclusions to the thesis 
Chapters II – V presented in this thesis were written as distinct contributions addressing 
different gaps in the rebel group interactions literature. These gaps were highlighted in 
Chapter I. The distinct contributions made by Chapters II – V are now reviewed and the 
conclusions for each chapter summarised below. 
Chapter II investigated the determinants of two types of rebel group interaction strategy; 
alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. Two competing theories regarding the 
motivations for rebel group interactions were tested empirically. The first theory tested was 
based on the assumption that rebel group interactions are motivated solely by power 
considerations (i.e. group size), whereas the second theory tested was based on the 
assumption that identity considerations are dominant. A novel methodology based on social 
network analysis was utilised so that a quantitative index, which measures the degree of 
ideological similarity between groups, could be developed. This addressed one of the gaps in 
the literature, since few studies have examined the influence of social ties on group 
interactions. The potential use of network approaches for examining social ties between 
groups was also highlighted. Findings from the statistical analyses presented in Chapter II 
suggested that power-based factors have greater utility in explaining rebel group interactions. 
Identity-based factors were found to play a role in motivating cooperative alliances but there 
was less convincing evidence found regarding their role in motivating inter-rebel violence.  
Future research on the determinants of interactions should consider using a dyadic design 
when appropriate data becomes available. This would be advantageous as it would allow 
interaction mechanisms to be tested more directly. Alternatively, future research may benefit 
from moving away from dyadic designs, shifting instead towards the use of network 
approaches since these provide an opportunity for multiple interdependencies to be explored. 
The utility of these network approaches was demonstrated in Chapter II. Additional factors, 
such as the role of geography or technology should also be explored since these features may 
also be important in determining rebel group interactions. The role of the state (and various 
state-level attributes such as military/administrative capabilities or state ability to induce 
collaboration) should also be included in empirical models in future research. These state 
attributes were not specified in the models presented in Chapter II, since the aim was to test 
two prominent theories relating directly rebel group-level attributes (identity and group size). 
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But since rebel groups in civil war inherently exist in the presence of state forces, interactions 
between rebels and other group dynamics (such as defection) should not be considered as 
being independent from the state.  
Another useful line of enquiry for future research concerns the question of why some 
conflicts contain multiple rebel groups. This question was briefly addressed in Chapter II but 
further empirical research is needed and the theoretical explanations of why multi-party 
conflicts arise in the first place (and why some conflicts involve larger numbers of rebel 
groups) need developing. 
Chapter III set out to answer the question of why some rebel groups form alliances with their 
peers while other groups, driven by apparently similar identity-based motives, engage in 
inter-rebel violence. This addressed one of the gaps in the literature since previous empirical 
research has not considered that the motives for inter-rebel violence and alliance formation 
might be the same (i.e. both cooperative and conflictual interactions might be driven by the 
same identity-based motives). The main contribution made in Chapter III was the proposal of 
novel theory based on Walter’s (1997) theory of credible commitments. The main theoretical 
argument put forward was that rebel groups who are ideologically similar to their peers are 
more likely to form alliances if they are perceived by other groups as being able to credibly 
commit to an alliance. If a group lacks alliance credibility however, it was argued that they 
are more likely to engage in inter-rebel violence.  
These expectations were tested using two contrasting methodologies, namely logistic 
regression modelling with the inclusion of moderating variables (i.e. variable interaction 
terms) and classification and regression trees (CARTs). Since CARTs have not been utilised 
in previous research on rebel group interactions, this aspect represents a novel contribution. 
The potential utility of CART analysis for conflict research has also been demonstrated. 
Rebel group alliance credibility was measured against two criteria: (i) the level of external 
threat faced by the rebel groups and (ii) the organisational characteristics of the groups 
themselves. Some evidence was found in support of the theoretical arguments put forward.  
Results from the logistic regression modelling suggest that rebel groups who are ideologically 
similar to their peers are less likely to form alliances if they are also new entrants to a 
conflict. One theoretical explanation for this effect is that new entrants to a conflict lack the 
previous history that is required to build to trust. Since these groups lack trust, they also lack 
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alliance credibility in the eyes of their peers and so, they are less likely to be able to form 
alliances. In the CART analysis, a conditional relationship between ideology and rebel group 
fractionalisation was also found, which indicates that groups who are ideologically similar to 
their peers are most likely to base their interaction decisions on the cohesiveness (i.e. 
organisational characteristics) of their peers. Once again, this provides some evidence in 
support of the theoretical proposition that credibility (proxied by group cohesion) influences 
rebel group interactions.  
Results obtained from the logistic regression modelling and CARTs were generally in 
agreement. The CART for rebel group cooperation showed that the most important predictors 
of alliance formation (in order of importance) were ideology, the level of external threat (i.e. 
state strength) and the organisational characteristics of rebel groups (i.e. group 
fractionalisation and leadership turnover). This confirmed the robustness of results obtained 
from the logistic regression models, with the exception of two results (for new entrants, 
which was found to be important in the logistic regression models but not in the CART 
analysis, and leadership turnover, which had explanatory power in the CART analysis but 
was not found to be statistically significant in the logistic regression models). The CART for 
inter-rebel violence showed that the most important predictors of rebel group fighting (in 
order of importance) were strong rebels (i.e. groups that are militarily large relative to their 
peers), ideology and the organisational characteristics of rebel groups (i.e. leadership turnover 
and group fractionalisation). This confirmed the robustness of results obtained from the 
logistic regression models, with the exception of two results (for weak rebels and new 
entrants, which were statistically significant in the logistic regression models but not in the 
CART analysis). 
Theories of rebel group interactions (discussed and tested in Chapters I – III) assume that 
rebel groups interact to avoid elimination, to maximise their chance of victory or to increase 
their bargaining power against the state. But previous empirical studies have not established 
whether groups who adopt interaction strategies do indeed have improved prospects in civil 
war (such as avoiding early elimination or achieving a decisive victory against the state). 
Chapter IV addressed this gap in the literature by examining the effect of alliance formation 
and inter-rebel violence on rebel group survival and termination-type.  
Results from Chapter IV suggest that interaction strategies have no effect on rebel group 
survival. Put differently, rebel groups who interact have the same hazard of termination as 
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groups who operate independently for the entire duration of war. One explanation for this 
effect could be that rebel groups adopt interaction strategies out of desperation, as a matter of 
last resort. In these instances, gaining strategic advantages may not be possible if the 
interactions were not initiated early enough to ensure their survival. An alternative 
explanation might be that rebel groups who increase their capacity as a result of interacting 
with their peers may simply become more heavily targeted by the state as a result of their 
increased size. But, if rebels are able to strike alliances early on, so that cooperation is 
maintained over a number of years, results show that groups are more likely to achieve 
favourable conflict outcomes. Rebel groups who form durable alliances are less likely to 
suffer defeat, they are less likely to concede to peace settlements and they are more likely to 
achieve decisive war outcomes (i.e. avoid the outcome of ongoing conflict).  
Results from Chapter IV also show that rebel groups who engage in inter-rebel violence are 
more likely to terminate by peace agreement. This might occur because the targets of non-
state violence become pressured into accepting peace deals out of fear of being eliminated by 
another group, whereas the initiators of non-state violence may be offered sweeter deals by 
the state as a result of their large capacity. These results have several implications for policies 
regarding conflict resolution. Firstly, states could maximise the likelihood of peaceful 
resolution by capitalising on opportune moments for offering negotiated deals. If there is 
some expectation that rebel groups might form alliances (for example if the groups share the 
same identity or if there are a number of groups who are militarily weak relative to their 
peers), then states have a higher chance achieving peaceful resolution if negotiations take 
place before a group is able to increase its bargaining power by aligning with its peers. If 
violent conflict breaks out between rebel groups, the state may also benefit from offering 
peace deals, instead of waiting for the groups to eliminate one another. 
The empirical contributions reviewed in Chapter I, and the analyses presented in Chapters II 
– IV, all used statistical modelling methods to test theories relating to rebel group interactions 
in multi-party civil wars. The main issue with these approaches is that they do not provide 
any information regarding the underlying mechanisms of the phenomenon under study. 
Chapter V set out to address this issue by investigating the potential uses of ordinary 
differential equation (ODE) modelling and agent-based simulation (ABM) for the modelling 
of rebel group interactions. The advantage of these methods, compared to the statistical 
modelling methods used in Chapters II – IV, is that the generative mechanisms underlying 
certain macro-level conflict outcomes are specified in the models. This means that if the 
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model outcomes can be validated using empirical data, then information can be gained 
regarding the possible underlying mechanisms responsible for those effects.   
The simulations performed in Chapter V were based on the expression described by Christia 
(2012), who suggests that civil conflict processes can be modelled using the metric of  
‘relative power’ between two sides (i.e. the state and a rebel group). General models of two-
sided conflict were developed using both ODE modelling and ABM. Various extensions to 
Christia’s expression were investigated, including the optimal definition of relative power, 
the different mechanisms of two-sided conflict (direct-fire, guerrilla and asymmetric 
warfare), inclusion of a stochastic element (both to the number of rebel troops and the rebel 
group killing constant) and inclusion of terms for rebel recruitment and the deployment of 
government troops. A comparison of ODE modelling and ABM allowed an assessment of the 
suitability of these two types. ABM was found to be particularly suited to the modelling of 
guerrilla warfare due to an inherent feature of the ABM programming software, where agents 
can be programmed to move randomly and collide with other agents. ABM was found to be 
less suited to the modelling of direct-fire and asymmetric warfare, again because of the nature 
of ABM programming software, which inherently models a guerrilla warfare mechanism 
(with a search strategy for both sides), instead of a direct-fire mechanism that is required for 
the modelling of direct-fire and asymmetric warfare.  
In the second part of Chapter V, the general model of two-sided conflict was extended so that 
multi-party conflicts could be simulated. This represents a novel contribution to conflict 
modelling, since previous ODE models and ABMs have been limited to two-sided conflict. 
Various aspects were explored including simultaneous conflict between the state and four 
rebel groups of different initial sizes, varying the rates of rebel group recruitment and 
government deployment of troops and modelling the two rebel group interaction strategy 
types, alliance formation and inter-rebel violence. The most important finding emerging from 
the multi-party conflict simulations was that, in an asymmetric conflict with all rebel groups 
fighting simultaneously against the state, there is convergence in rebel group sizes over time. 
This means that if a rebel group forms an alliance, the gains made through increased military 
capabilities are, in effect, lost because the allied group gets eliminated more quickly by the 
state, converging to the size they would have originally been had they not aligned. This 
provides one possible explanation for the empirical result obtained in Chapter IV, which 
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showed that groups who form alliances do not decrease their hazard of termination compared 
to groups who operate independently.   
In summary, Chapter V demonstrated that differential equation modelling and agent-based 
simulation techniques have great potential for modelling rebel group interactions in multi-
party civil wars. The development of the relative power expression proposed by Christia 
(2012) was found to provide an excellent basis from which multi-party conflicts, and 
subsequently rebel group interactions, could be simulated. One of the main advantages of 
using numerical algorithms, such as ODE modelling and ABM, is that the possibilities for 
extending a general model, once it has been built, are vast. A number of suggestions for 
possible extensions to the multi-party model were outlined and these add weight to the 
overall conclusions that ODE modelling and ABM, represent a positive way forward for civil 
conflict research. 
Overall, this thesis has contributed to the civil conflict literature by addressing several gaps in 
previous research. Two prominent theories regarding the motivations for rebel group 
interactions have been tested empirically. Novel theory regarding the conditions that 
influence the interaction decisions made by rebel groups has been developed. Empirical data 
on rebel group characteristics and civil war dynamics has been analysed using different 
methods, including statistical modelling methods and machine learning techniques (namely 
classification and regression trees). The utility of network approaches and of classification 
and regression trees for future civil conflict research has been demonstrated. The potential 
use of computer based simulation techniques (such as ODE and ABM) for the modelling of 
rebel group interactions has also been explored. 
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Importance of research to current conflicts 
The findings presented in this thesis have important implications for the counter-insurgency 
tactics deployed in current conflicts. In 2014, the UK and US ended their combat operations 
in Afghanistan after nearly 15 years of military intervention. This intervention was originally 
initiated in response to concerns regarding the increasing power of the Taliban, but it 
subsequently led to US invasion as a result of the US led ‘War on Terror’ after the 9/11 
attacks in 2001. One of the distinguishing features of the recent bout of conflict in 
Afghanistan has been the number of UK and US fatalities incurred as a result of routine 
patrols. For example, the UK armed forces suffered a total of 454 fatalities, of which, 224 (~ 
49%) were killed by improvised explosive devises (IEDs) whilst on patrol (BBC 2015).  
The findings presented in Chapter V of this thesis showed that rebels gain huge advantages in 
asymmetric warfare because the state forces must search for the insurgents before making a 
kill (in the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban were difficult to find because they were dispersed 
in villages, deserts and mountains), whilst insurgents are able to kill state forces through a 
direct-fire mechanism (in the case of Afghanistan, the Taliban were able to achieve a direct 
kill by placing IEDs on the routine patrol routes of the UK and US forces). Thus, by 
conducting routine patrols, the US and UK forces were, in effect, increasing the Taliban’s 
direct-fire capabilities.  
The main implication of the findings presented in Chapter V is that the state forces must 
ensure that the direct-fire capabilities of the insurgents are reduced. This could be achieved 
by removing routine patrols from operations and by minimising the number of troops on the 
ground; perhaps by replacing troops with intelligence officers and specialised field agents. 
These discussions demonstrate the importance of intelligence-led operations and the premium 
that should be placed on intelligence in future conflicts. The advantages associated with 
asymmetric warfare (highlighted in Chapter V) might also explain the increasing world-wide 
trend towards the use of suicide-bombers by insurgent and terrorist groups (i.e. suicide 
bombers are more difficult to locate than troops on the ground, meaning that they represent a 
more efficient means of violent protest). 
The findings of this thesis are also highly relevant to the current conflicts taking place in Iraq 
and Syria, from which the insurgent group Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) has 
formed. Ideology has been a major factor governing the behaviour of ISIL, who is an 
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extremist Islamic jihadi group comprised of Sunni Arabs from Iraq and Syria. The group 
emerged during the Iraq insurgency that ensued as a result of the 2003 invasion of Iraq by 
Western forces. In 2004, the group (now named ISIL) pledged allegiance to the ideologically 
similar Islamic jihadist group al-Qaeda and in 2006, it forged alliances with other Sunni 
Muslim groups to form the Mujahedeen Shura Council. These alliances were forged on the 
basis of ideological ties, as discussed in Chapters I and II.  
But, in the absence of an external threat (i.e. a legitimate Iraqi government and the weakened 
neighbouring state of Syria), these allied group’s started vying for political power and in 
2014, al-Qaeda cut ties with ISIL on the basis of organisational characteristics, citing the 
failure of ISIS to consult and its notorious intransigence (Reuters 2014). ISIL has since 
engaged in combat with a large number of rival groups, successfully gaining control of 
territory, natural resources and recruits. These dynamics provide further anecdotal evidence 
in support of the theory proposed in Chapter III.  
The main counter-insurgency lessons resulting from the Iraq war and ISIL have been well 
documented; state forces must ensure that a vacuum of stable governance is not left in the 
aftermath of the removal of state leadership. This could be achieved by establishing elections, 
installing a democratic government and by providing military training and equipment to the 
state army. Indeed, the lessons learnt from Iraq and ISIL have guided the current counter-
insurgency policies being in implemented in Afghanistan by the US and UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
200 
 
References 
Acharya, Amitav. (2001). Constructing a Security Community in South-east Asia: ASEAN 
and the Problem of Regional Order. London: Taylor Francis.  
Addison, Tony, Philippe Le Billon, and S. Mansoob Murshed. (2003). “Conflict in Africa. 
The cost of peaceful behaviour.” Journal of African Economies 11 (3): 365-386. 
Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett. (1998). “A Framework for the Study of Security 
Communities” in Adler, Emmanuel and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 29-65.   
Akcinaroglu, Seden. (2012). “Rebel Interdependencies and Civil War Outcomes.” Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 56 (5): 879-903. 
Akcinaroglu, Seden and Elizabeth Radziszewski. (2005). “Expectations, Rivalries and Civil 
War Duration”. International Interactions. 31 (4): 349-74.  
Allan, Pierre and Albert A. Stahel. (1985). “Tribal Guerrilla Warfare Against a Colonial 
Power: Analyzing the War in Afghanistan.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 27: 590-617. 
Anderson, Christopher J., and Matthew M. Singer. (2008). “The sensitive left and the 
impervious right: multilevel models and the politics of inequality, ideology, and legitimacy in 
Europe.” Comparative Political Studies. 
 
Angrist, Joshua. E and Adriana. D. Kugler. (2008). “Rural Windfall or a New Resource 
Curse?: Coca, Income and Civil Conflict in Columbia.” Review of Economics and Statistics 
90 (2): 191-215. 
Anselin, Luc and John O’Loughlin. (1990). “Spatial Econometric Analysis of International 
Conflict.” in Manas Chatterji & R.E. Kuenne eds. Dynamics and Conflict in Regional 
Structural Change. New York: New York University Press pp 325-345. 
Anselin, Luc and John O’Loughlin. (1992). ‘Geography of International Conflict and 
Cooperation: Spatial Dependence and Regional Context in Africa’ in Michael D. Ward, eds., 
The New Geopolitics Philadelphia, PA: Gordon and Breach pp.39-75. 
Arreguin-Toft, Ivan. (2001) "How the weak win wars: A theory of asymmetric conflict." 
International Security. 26 (1): 93-128. 
Axelrod, Robert. (1970). Conflict of Interest: A Theory of Divergent Goals with Applications 
to Politics. Chicago: Markham Publishing Co. 
Axelrod, Robert. (1984). The Evolution of Cooperation. New York: Basic Books. 
Axtell, Robert. (2000). “Why agents?: On the varied motivations for agent computing in the 
social sciences.” Brookings Institution Press, Washington DC.  
Balcells, Laia. (2010). “Rivalry and Revenge: Violence against Civilians in Conventional 
Civil Wars.” International Studies Quarterly 54 (2): 291-313. 
Balcells, Laia. (2011). “Continuation of Politics by Two Means: Direct and Indirect Violence 
in Civil War.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 55 (3): 397-422. 
Balch-Lindsay, Dylan and Andrew Enterline. (2000). “Killing Time: The World Politics of 
Civil War Duration, 1820-1992.” International Studies Quaerterly. 44 (4): 615-42. 
201 
 
Bapat, Nevin. A. (2005). “Insurgency and the Openinf of Peace Processes.” Journal of Peace 
Research. 42 (6): 699-717. 
Bapat, Navin. A. and Kanisha. D. Bond. (2012). “Alliances between Militant Groups.” 
British Journal of Political Science 42 (4): 793-924. 
Barkow, Jerome, Leda Ed Cosmides and John Ed Tooby. (1992). The adapted mind: 
Evolutionary psychology and the generation of culture. Oxford University Press. 
Bates, Robert. H. (1983). “Some Core Assumptions in Development Economics.” In Ortiz, 
Sutti, ed., Economic Anthropology: Topics and Theories: Monographs in Economic 
Anthropology. No.1. New York: University Press of America pp 361-398. 
BBC News. (2015). “UK Military Deaths in Afghanistan: Full List.” URL: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10629358. 
Bellows, John and Edward Miguel. (2008). War and Local Collective Action in Sierra Leone 
UC Berkeley. 
Bennett, Scott .D. (2008). “Governments, Civilians, and the Evolution of Insurgency: 
Modeling the Early Dynamics of Insurgencies.” Journal of Artificial Societies and Social 
Simulation..11 (4) Online journal. 
Bennett, Scott. D. and Allan C. Stam. (1996). “The duration of interstate wars, 1816–
1985.” American Political Science Review. 90(2): 239-257. 
Bhavnani, Ravi, Dan Miodownik and Jonas Nart. (2008) “REsCAPE: an Agent-Based 
Framework for Modelling Resources, Ethnicity and Conflict.” Journal of Artificial Societies 
and Social Simulation. 11 (2) Online journal. 
Boehmke, Frederick. (2006). Grinter: A Stata Utility for Graphing the Marginal Effect of an 
Interacted Variable in Regression Models. URL: 
http://myweb.uiowa.edu/fboehmke/methods. html). 
Boulding, Kenneth E. (1962). Conflict and Defense: A General Theory. New York: Harper 
and Row. 
Braithwaite, Alex. (2005). “Location, Location, Location... Identifying Conflict Hot Spots.” 
International Interactions 31 (4): 251-272. 
Braithwaite, Alex. (2006). “The Geographic Spread of Militarized Disputes.” Journal of 
Peace Research 43 (5): 507-522. 
Brambor, Thomas, William R. Clark, and Matt Golder. (2006). “Understanding interaction 
models: Improving empirical analyses”. Political Analysis 14 (1): 63–82. 
Breiman, Leo, Jerome Friedman, Charles J. Stone, and Richard A. Olshen. (1984). 
Classification and regression trees. CRC press. 
Brown, Daniel .G, Rick Riolo, Derek T. Robinson, Michael North and Williiam Rand. 
(2005). “Spatial processes and data models: toward integration of agent-based models and 
GIS.” Journal of Geographic Systems 7: 25-47. 
Buhaug, Halvard and Jan Ketil Rød. (2006). “Local Determinants of African Civil wars, 
1970-2001” Political Geography 25 (3): 315-335. 
202 
 
Buhaug, Halvard, Lars-Erik Cederman, and Jan Ketil Rød. (2006). Modelling Ethnic Conflict 
in Centre-Periphery Dyads. Paper presented at the Workshop on Polarization and Conflict, 
Nicosia, Cyprus, April 26-29 2006. 
Buhaug, Halvard, Scott Gates, and Päivi Lujala. (2009). “Geography, Rebel Capability and 
the Duration of Civil Conflict.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 544-569. 
Burgess, Phillip M. and D.W. Moore. (1973) “Inter-nation alliances: an inventory and 
appraisal of propositions,” in J.A. Robinson (eds.) Political Science Annual, Vol.3. 
Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill. 
Byman, Daniel. (1998). “The Logic of Ethnic Terrorism”. Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 
21(2): 149-169. 
Carter, David B. and Curtis S. Signorino. (2012). “Back to the Future: Modeling Time 
Dependence in Binary Data.” Political Analysis 18: 271-292. 
Castles, Francis G., and Peter Mair. (1984). “Left–right political scales: Some ‘expert’ 
judgments.” European Journal of Political Research 12 (1): 73-88. 
 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, and Luc Girardin. (2007). “Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping 
Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies.” American Political Science Review 101 (1): 173-
185. 
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Luc Girardin, and Kristian S. Gleditsch. (2009). “Ethnonationalist 
Tryads: Assessing the Influence of Kin Groups on Civil Wars.” World Politics 61 (3): 403-
437.  
Cederman, Lars-Erik, Andreas Wimmer, and Brian Min. (2010). “Why Do Ethnic Groups 
Rebel? New Data and Analysis” World Politics 62 (1): 87-119. 
Choucri, Nazli, Daniel Goldsmith, Stuart.Madnick, Dinsha Mistree, J. Bradley Morrison and 
Michael Siegel. (2007). “Using System Dynamics to Model and Better Understand State 
Stability.” Paper presented at the 25
th
 International Conference of the Systems Dynamics 
Society, Boston MA. 
Christia, Fotini. (2008). “Following the Money. Muslim versus Muslim in Bosnia’s Civil 
War.” Comparative Politics 43 (2): 461-480. 
Christia, Fotini. (2012). Alliance Formation in Civil Wars. New York, NY: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Cioffi-Revilla, Claudio and Mark Rouleau. (2010). “MASON RebeLand: An Agent-Based 
Model of Politics, Environment , and Insurgency.” International Studies Review. 12: 31-52. 
Collier, Paul. (1995). “Civil War and the Economics of the Peace Dividend.” Working Paper. 
WPS/95-8 Oxford Centre for the Study of African Economies. 
Collier, Paul. (2000). “Doing Well Out of War” in Greed and Grievance in Civil War edited 
by Mats Berdal and David Malone: 91-111. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner. 
Collier, Paul and, Anke Hoeffler. (2000). Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank 
Policy Research Paper 2355, World Banks, Washing DC. 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (2004). “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford 
Economic Papers 50 (4): 563-573. 
203 
 
Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. (2007). ‘Civil War’ in Handbook of Defence Economics K. 
Hartley & T. Sandler eds.: Elsevier North Holland. 
Coser, Lewis A. (1956). The Functions of Social Conflict. New York: Free Press.  
Cox, David.R. (1972). “Regression models and life-tables”. J R Stat Soc Serr. B 34:187-220. 
Cranmer, Skyler and Bruce A. Desmarais. (2011). “Towards a network theory of alliance 
formation.” International Interactions. 38 (3): 295-324. 
Cranmer, Skyler, Bruce A. Desmarais, and Elizabeth J. Menninga. (2012). “Complex 
Dependencies in the Alliance Network.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 29 (3): 
279-313. 
Cunningham, David E. (2006). “Veto Players and Civil War Duration.” American Journal of 
Political Science 50 (4): 875-892. 
Cunningham, David E, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. (2009). “It Takes Two: 
A Dyadic Analysis of Civil War Duration and Outcome.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 
(4):570-597. 
Cunningham, David E, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch and Idean Salehyan. (2013). “Non-State 
Actors in Civil Wars: A New Dataset.” Conflict Management and Peace Science: 
0738894213499673. 
Cunningham, Kathleen Gallagher, Kristin M. Bakke and, Lee J.M. Seymour. (2012). “Shirts 
Today, Skins Tomorrow: Dual Contests and the Effects of Fragmentation in Self-
Determination Disputes.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 67-93. 
Deitchman, Seymour.J. (1962). “A Lanchester Model of Guerrilla Warfare”. Operations 
Research. 10 (6): 818-827. 
De Swaan, Abram. (1973). Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formation: A Study of Formal 
Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments after 1918. 
Amsterdam, Elsevier Scientific. 
Diehl, Paul. F. (1991). “Geography and War: A Review and Assessment of Empirical 
Literature.” International Interactions 17 (1): 11-27. 
Doran, Jim. (2005). “”IRUBA: An Agent-Based Model of Guerrilla War Process.” In 
Representing Social Reality, pre-proceedings of the Third Conference of the European Social 
Simulation Association (ESSA), 198-205. 
Doreian, Patrick. (2001) “Causality in social network analysis.” Sociological Methods 
Research. Vol. 30 (1): 81-114. 
Eck, Kristine. (2009). “From Armed Conflict to War: Ethnic Mobilization and Conflict 
Intensification.” International Studies Quarterly 53 (2): 369-388. 
Eck, John. E. and Lin Lui. (2008). “Contrasting simulated and empirical experiments in crime 
prevention.” Journal of Experimental Criminology. 4. (3): 195-213. 
Epstein, Joshua. M. (1999). “Agent-based computational models and generative social 
science.” Complexity. 4(5): 41-60. 
204 
 
Epstein, Joshua .M. (2002). “Modeling Civil Violence: An Agent-Based Computational 
Approach.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Science of the USA. Suppl.3: 7243-
7250.   
Epstein, Joshua M. and Robert Axtell. (1996). Growing artificial societies: Social Science 
from the Bottom Up. Cambridge MA: The MIT Press.   
Fearon, James. (1995). “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 
(3): 379-414. 
Fearon, James. (1998). “Commitment Problems and the Spread of Ethnic Conflict.” In Lake, 
David and Donald Rothchild eds., The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, 
Diffusion, and Escalation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 107-126. 
Fearon, James. (2003). “Ethnic and cultural diversity by country.” Journal of Economic 
Growth. Vol.8 (2): 195-222. 
Fearon, James, and David Laitin. (1996). “Explaining Interethnic Cooperation.” The 
American Political Science Review 90 (4): 715-735. 
Fearon, James, and David Laitin. (2003). “Ethnicity, Insurgency and Civil War.” American 
Political Science Review 97 (1): 75-90. 
Fine, Jason P. and Robert .J. Gray. (1999). “A proportional Hazards Model of the 
Subdistribution of a Competing Risk.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 94 
(446): 496-509. 
Fjelde, Hanne, and Desirée Nilsson. (2012). “Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence 
between Rebel Groups.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (4): 604-628. 
Forrester, Jay W. (1968). Principles of Systems. Cambridge, MA: Wright-Allen Press.  
Friedman, Jerome H, Ron Kohavi and Yeogirl Yun. (1996) “Lazy decision trees”. in 
AAAI/IAAI, Vol. 1, pp. 717-724. 
Gabel, Matthew J., and John D. Huber. (2000). “Putting parties in their place: Inferring party 
left-right ideological positions from party manifestos data.” American Journal of Political 
Science: 94-103. 
 
Garcia-Montalvo, Jose and Marta Reynal-Querol. (2004). “Ethnic polarization, potential 
conflict, and civil wars." Potential Conflict, and Civil Wars (July 2004). 
Garlaschelli, Diego and Maria I. Loffredo. (2004) “Patterns of link reciprocity in directed 
networks.” Physical Review Letters. 93, No.26: 268701. 
Gates, Scott. (2002). “Recruitment and Allegiance: The Micro-foundations of Rebellion.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1): 111-130. 
Gilbert, Nigel. (2007). Agent-Based Models: Quantitative applications in the social sciences. 
London: SAGE Publications. 
Gilbert, Nigel. (2008). Agent-Based Models. Sage Publications, LA CA.  
Gilbert, Nigel and Pietro Terna. (1999). “How to build and use agent-based models in social 
science.” Discussion paper.  
205 
 
Gilbert, Nigel and K.G Troitzsch. (1999). Simulation for the Social Scientist (first edition). 
Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Gilbert, N and Klaus G. Troitzsch. (2005). Simulation for the Social Scientist (second 
edition). Open University Press, Buckingham. 
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede. (2002). “Transnational dimensions of civil war.” Journal of 
Peace Research 44 (3): 293-309. 
Goodwin, Jeff. (2001). No Other Way Out: States and Revolutionary Movements, 1945-1991. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Greenhill, Kelly. M and Solomon Major. (2006). “The Perils of Profiling: Civil War Spoilers 
and the Collapse of Intrastate Peace Accords”.  International Security Vol.31 (3): 7-40. 
Grimm, Volker, and Steven F. Railsback. (2005). Individual-based Modeling and Ecology. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Groff, Elizabeth R. (2007). “Simulation for Theory Testing and Experimentation: An 
Example Using Routine Activity Theory and Street Robbery.” Journal of Quant. 
Criminology. 23: 75-103. 
Grofman, Bernard. (1982). “A Dynamic Model of Protocoalition Formation in Ideological n-
Space.” Behavioural Science 27 (1): 77-90. 
Gutierrez, Roverto G. (2010). “Competing Risks Regression in Stata 11.” Presented at Boston 
Stata Conference. http://ideas.repec.org/p/boc/bost10/14.html. 
Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel Posner, and Jeremy Weinstein. (2007). 
“Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Good Provision?” American Political 
Science Review 101 (4): 709-725. 
Haller, Bernard, Georg Schmidt and Kurt Ulm. (2012). “Applying competing risks regression 
models: an overview.” Lifetime Data Analysis Vol.19 (1): 33-58. 
Hanneman, Robert A. (1988). Computer Assisted Theory Building: Modeling Dynamic Social 
Systems. Newbury Park, CA: Sage. 
Hanneman, Robert A. and Mark Riddle. (2005). “Introduction to social network methods.” 
URL: http://faculty. ucr. edu/hanneman/nettext. 
Harbom, Lotta, Erik Melander and Peter Wallensteen. (2008). “Dyadic Dimensions of Armed 
Conflict, 1946-2007.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (5): 697-710. 
Heckman, James J. (1979). “Sample selection bias as a specification error." Econometrica: 
Journal of the econometric society: 153-161. 
Heger, Lindsay and Idean Salehyan. (2007). “Ruthless Rulers: Coalition Size and the 
Severity of Civil Conflict”. International Studies Querterly. 51 (2): 385-403. 
Hegre, Håvard, Tanja Ellingsen, Scott Gates and Nils Petter Gleditsch. (2001). “Toward a 
democratic civil peace? Democracy, political change, and civil war, 1816–1992.” American 
Political Science Review. 95(1): 33–48. 
Hegre, Håvard and Nicholas Sambanis. (2006). “Sensitivity Analysis of Empirical Results on 
Civil War Onset.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50 (4): 508-535. 
Henriksen, Thomas. (1983). Revolution and Counterrevolution: Mozambique's War of 
206 
 
Independence, 1964-1974. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 
Holsti, Ole R, P. Terrence Hopmann and John D. Sullivan. (1973). Unity and Disintegration 
in International Alliances: Comparative Studies. New York: John Wiley. 
Horowitz, Donald. (1985). Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley: University of California 
Press. 
Humphreys, Macartan and Jeremy M. Weinstein. (2008). “Who fights? The determinants of 
participation in civil war”. American Journal of Political Science. 52 (2): 436-455. 
Huntington, Samuel. (1968). Political Order in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Ilachinski, Andrew. (2004). Artificial War: Multi-Agent Based Simulation of Combat. 
Singapore, World Scientific. 
Johnson, Neil. (2008). “Complexity in Human Conflict.” in Managing Complexity: Insights, 
Concepts, Applications by Neil Johnson, Springer Publishers pp 303-320. 
Jones, Benjamin F. and Benjamin A. Olken. (2007). “Hit or Miss? The Effect of 
Assassinations on Institutions and War.” NBER Working Paper, 1. 
Kalyvas, Stathis. N. (2006). The Logic of Violence in Civil War. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Kalyvas, Stathis N. (2008). “Ethnic defection in civil war.” Comparative Political Studies 41 
(8): 1043-1068. 
 
Kalyvas, Stathis. N. and Laia Balcells. (2010a). Did Marxism Make a Difference? Marxist 
Rebellions and National Liberation Movements. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the 
Annual Political Science Association, Washington DC. September 2 - 5. 
Kalyvas, Stathis. N and Matthew Adam Kocher. (2007). “How Free Is ‘Free-Riding’ in Civil 
Wars? Violence, Insurgency, and the Collective Action Problem.” World Politics 59 (2): 177-
216.  
Kaplan, Morton A. (1957). System and Process in International Politics. New York: John 
Wiley.  
Kaufmann, Chaim. (1996a). “Intervention in Ethnic and Ideological Civil Wars: Why One 
Can Be Done and the Other Can’t.” Security Studies 6 (1): 62-100. 
Kaufmann, Chaim. (1996b). “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars.” 
International Security 20 (4): 136-175. 
Kaufmann, Stewart. J. (2001). Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press. 
Keller, Jared P, Kevin C. Desouza and Yuan Lin. (2010). “Dismantling terrorist networks: 
Evalusating strategic options using agent-based modeling.” Technological Forecasting & 
Social Change. 77: 1014-1036. 
Kenny, Paul D. (2010). “Structural Integrity and Cohesion in Insurgent Organizations: 
Evidence from Protracted Conflicts in Ireland and Burma”. International Studies Review 12: 
533-555.  
207 
 
Kirby, Andrew. M. and Michael. D. Ward. (1987). “The Spatial Analysis of Peace and War.” 
Comparative Political Studies 20 (3): 293-313. 
Kitschelt, Herbert, and Staf Hellemans. (1990). “The left-right semantics and the new politics 
cleavage.” Comparative Political Studies 23 (2): 210-238. 
 
Kreutz, Joakim. (2012). “Dismantling the Conflict Trap: Essays on Civil War Resolution and 
Relapse.” Report for the Department of Peace and Conflict Research pp 49. Uppsala 
University, Sweden. 
Kreysig, Herbert E. (1983). Advanced Engineering Mathematics John Wiley, New York. 
Kydd, Andrew H. (2005) Trust and Mistrust in International Relations. Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press. 
Kydd, Andrew H. and Barbara Walter. (2003). “Sabotaging the Peace: The Politics of 
Extremist Violence”. International organization. 56: 263 – 296.  
Lacina, Bethany. (2006). “Explaining the severity of civil wars.” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 50 (2): 276-289. 
Lake, David. A and Donald. S. Rothchild. (1996). “Containing Fear: The Origins and 
Management of Ethnic Conflict.” International Security 21 (2): 41-75.    
Lanchester, Frederick William. (1956). Mathematics in Warfare in Newman, J.R. The World 
of Mathematics Vol.4 (1956) 2138-2157. 
Lawrence, Adria. (2007). Imperial Rule and the Politics of Nationalism. PhD dissertation, 
University of Chicago.  
Le Billon, Philippe. (2003). Fuelling War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts. Adelphi 
Paper 357. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Leeds, Brett Ashley. (1999) “Domestic political Institutions, Credible Commitments, and 
International Cooperation.” American Journal of Political Science, 43, 979-1002. 
Lilja, Janie and Lisa Hultman. (2011). “Intra-Ethnic Dominance and Control: Violence 
against Co-Ethnics in the Early Sri Lankan Civil War.” Security Studies 20 (2): 171-197. 
Lindberg, Jo-Eystein. (2008). “Running on Faith?: A Quantitative Analysis of the Effect of 
Religious Cleavages on the Intensity and Duration of Internal Conflicts” PRIO, URL: 
https://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/ArmedConflict/Running_on_Faith.pdf. 
Liska, George. (1962). Nations in Alliance: The Limits of Interdependence. Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press.  
Loh, Wei‐Yin. (2008) “Classification and regression tree methods.” Encyclopaedia of 
statistics in quality and reliability. 
Lowri, Miriam. R. (2005). “Algeria, 1992-2002: Anatomy of a Civil War” in Paul Collier and 
Nicholas Sambanis Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis. Volume 1: Africa. The 
World Bank: Washington D.C.   
Lyall, Jason. (2009). “Does Indiscriminate Violence Insight Insurgent Attacks? Evidence 
from Chechnya.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (3): 331-362.  
208 
 
Mack, Andrew. (1975) “Why big nations lose small wars: The politics of asymmetric 
conflict." World Politics Vol.27 (2): 175-200. 
Maoz, Zeev. (2009). “The effects of strategic and economic interdependence on international 
conflict across levels of analysis.” American Journal of Political Science 53 (1): 223-240. 
Maoz, Zeev. (2010). Networks of Nations: The Evolution, Structure, and Effects of 
International Networks 1816-2001 New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Maoz, Zeev, Lesley G. Terris, Ranan D. Kuperman, and Ilan Talmund. (2006). “What is the 
enemy of my enemy? Causes and consequences of imbalanced international relations.” 
Journal of Politics 69 (1): 100-115. 
McLauchlin, Theodore and Wendy Pearlman. (2009). Out-group Conflict, In-group Unity? 
Exploring the Effect of Repression on Movement Fragmentation. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Toronto, Canada. September 3 
- 6.  
Mearsheimer, John. J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W 
Norton. 
Miguel, Edward and Mary-Kay Gugerty. (2005). “Ethnic Diversity, Social Sanctions and 
Public Goods in Kenya.” Journal of Public Economics 89 (11-12): 2325-2368. 
Milstein, Jeffery S. And William C. Mitchell. (1969). “Computer Simulation of International 
Processes: The Vietnam War and the Pre-World War I Naval Race.” Peace Research Society 
International Papers. 12: 117-136.    
Minter, William. (1994). Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola 
and Mozambique. London: Zed Books. 
Morrow, James D. (2000). “Alliances: Why Write them Down?” Annual Review of Political 
Science, 3, 63-83. 
Muller, Edward N. and Erich Weede. (1990). “Cross-national variation in political violence: 
A rational action approach”. Journal of Conflict Resolution. 34(4): 624–651. 
Nekovee, Maziar, Yamir Moreno, G. Bianconi, and M. Marsili. (2007). “Theory of rumour 
spreading in complex social networks.” Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its 
Applications. 374 (1): 457-470. 
Newman, Mark E.J. (2002). “Spread of epidemic disease on networks.” Physical review E 66 
(1): 016128. 
Newman, Mark E.J. (2010). Networks: An introduction. Oxford University Press. 
Nilsson, Desirée. (2008). “Partial Peace: Rebel Groups Inside and Outside of Civil War 
Settlements.” Journal of Peace Research 45 (4): 479-495. 
Nilsson, Desirée. (2010). “Turning Weakness into Strength: Military Capabilities, Multiple 
Rebel Groups and Negotiated Settlements.” Conflict Management and Peace Science 27 (3): 
253-271. 
O’Loughlin, John and Luc Anselin. (1991). “Bringing Geography Back to the Study of 
International Relations: Spatial Dependence and Regional Context in Africa, 1966-1978.” 
International Interactions 17 (1): 29-61. 
209 
 
O’Loughlin, John and Luc Anselin. (1992). “Geography of International Conflict and 
Cooperation: Theory and Models.” in Michael D. Ward eds. The New Geopolitics 
Philadelphia, PA: Gordon and Breach pp 11-38. 
Olson, Mancur. (1965). The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of 
Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Østby, Gudrun. (2008). “Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict.” 
Journal of Peace Research. 45(2):: 143-162. 
Ostrom, Thomas. M. (1988). “Computer Simulation: the third symbol system.” Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 24: 381-392. 
O’Sullivan, David and Mordechai Haklay. (2000). “Agent-based models and individualism: 
is the world agent-based?” Environmental Planning A. 32 (8): 1409-1425. 
Pagallo, Giulia and David Haussler. (1990). “Boolean Feature Discovery in Empirical 
Learning”. Machine Learning. Vol.5 (1): 71-99. 
Paul, Thazha Varkey. (1994). Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers. Vol. 
33. Cambridge University Press. 
Pearlman, Wendy. (2009). “Spoiling inside and Out: Internal Political Contestation and the 
Middle East Peace Process”. International Security. Vol.33: 79-109.  
Pearlman, Wendy and Kathleen G. Cunningham. (2011). “Non-State Actors, Fragmentation, 
and Conflict Processes”. Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.56 (1): 3-15. 
Petersen, Rodger. D. (2001). Resistance and Rebellion: Lessons from Eastern Europe. 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Petersen, Rodger. D. (2002). Understanding Ethnic Violence: Fear, Hatred and Resentment 
in Twentieth-Century Eastern Europe. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Platteau, Jean-Philippe. (1994). “Behind the Market Where Real Societies Exist.” Journal of 
Development Studies 30 (3): 533-578. 
Popkin, Samuel. (1979). The Rationalist Peasant: The Political Economy of Rural Society in 
Vietnam. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. 
Posen, Barry. (1993). “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict.” in Michael Brown eds., 
Ethnic Conflict and International Security. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp 103-
124.  
Powell, Robert. (2006). “War as a Commitment Problem.” International Organization 60 (1): 
169-203. 
Prunier, Gérard. (2004). “Rebel Movements and Proxy Warfare: Uganda, Sudan and the 
Congo (1986-99)”. African Affairs. 103 (412): 359-83. 
Przeworski, Adam et al. (2000). Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and 
Well-Being in the World, 1950-1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Puhani, Patrick. (2000). “The Heckman correction for sample selection and its critique.” 
Journal of economic surveys. 14 (1): 53-68. 
210 
 
Pye, Lucian. (1956). Guerrilla Communism in Malaya: Its Social and Political Meaning. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.  
Quinlan, John Ross. (1992). Programs for Machine Learning. San Mateo, CA: Morgan 
Kaufman. 
Regan, Patrick M. (2000). Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Interventions and Intrastate 
Conflict. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 
Regan, Patrick M. (2002). “Third Party Interventions and the Duration of Intrastate 
Conflicts.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 46 (1): 55-73. 
Reuters. (2014). “Al Qaeda Breaks Link with Syrian Militant Group ISIL.” URL: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/03/us-syria-crisis-qaeda-
idUSBREA120NS20140203. 
Riker, William. H. (1962). The Theory of Political Coalition. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press. 
Rokkan, Stein. (1999). State Formation, Nation Building and, Mass Politics in Europe: The 
Theory of Stein Rokkan Based on His Collect Works. Peter Flora, Stein Kuhnle, and Derick 
Urwin eds. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Ross, Michael. L. (2004). “How Do Natural Resources Influence Civil War? Evidence from 
Thirteen Cases.” International Organization 58 (1): 35-67. 
Rothstein, Robert L. (1968). Alliances and Small Powers. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
De Rouen, Karl. R. Jr and David Sobek. (2004). “The Dynamics of Civil War Duration and 
Outcome.” Journal of Peace Research. 41: 303-320.  
Ruloff, Dieter. (1975). Konfliktlsung durch Vermittlung. Basel, Switzerland: 
Birkhauserverlag.  
Salehyan, Idean, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and David E. Cunningham. (2011). “Explaining 
external support for insurgent groups.” International Organization 65 (4): 709-744. 
Salter, F.K. (2001). “A Defense and an Extension of Pierre van den Berghe’s Theory of 
Ethnic Nepotism” in P James and D Goertz. Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Conflict. 
Westport, CT and London, Praeger pp 39-70. 
Sanín, Francisco Gutiérrez and Elisabeth J. Wood. (2014). “Ideology in civil war 
Instrumental adoption and beyond.” Journal of Peace Research 51 (2): 213-226. 
 
Schaffer, Marvin. B. (1968) ‘Lanchester models of guerrilla engagements.’ Operations 
Research. 16 (3): 457-488. 
Schweller, Randall. L. (1994). “Bandwagoning for Profit: Bringing the Revisionist State 
Back In.” International Security 19 (1): 72-107. 
Scott, Andrew MacKay. (1967). The Functioning of the International System. New York: 
Macmillan.  
Selznick, Phillip. (1952). The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and 
Tactics. New York: McGraw-Hill.  
211 
 
Sherif, Muzafer. (2010). The Robbers Cave Experiment: Intergroup Conflict and 
Cooperation.[Orig. pub. as Intergroup Conflict and Group Relations]. Wesleyan University 
Press, 2010. 
Sherif, Muzafer and Caroline W. Sherif. (1953). Groups in Harmony and Tension. New 
York: Harper & Row.  
Simmel, Georg. (1955). Conflict and the web of group affiliations. New York: Free Press.  
Simon, Herbert A. (1997). Models of Bounded Rationality. Volume III: Empirically grounded 
economic reason. Cambridge, MA: MIT.  
Skrondal, Anders and Sophia Rabe-Hesketh (2004). Generalized latent variable modeling: 
Multilevel, longitudinal, and structural equation models. Crc Press. 
Smith, Eliot R and Frederica R. Conrey. (2007). “Agent-based modeling: a new approach for 
theory building in social psychology.” Personality and Social Psychology Review. 11: 87-
104. 
Staniland, Paul. (2012). “Between a Rock and a Hard Place: Insurgent Fratricide, Ethnic 
Defection and the Rise of Pro-State Paramilitaries.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 56 (1): 16-
40. 
Starr, Harvey. (1992). “Democracy and War: Choice, Learning, and Security Communities.” 
Journal of Peace Research 29 (2): 207-213.  
Stedman, Stephen J. (1997). “Spoiler Problems in Peace Processes”. International Security, 
22, 5-53. 
Stein, Arthur .A. (1976). “Conflict and cohesion: a review of the literature”. Journal of 
Conflict Resolution 20 (March): 143-172.  
Sullivan, Michael .P. (1976). International Relations: Theories and Evidence. Englewood 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
Sundberg, Ralph, Kristine Eck and Joakim Kreutz. (2012). “Introducing the UCDP Non-State 
Conflict Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research 44(2): 351-362. 
Tajfel, Henri, M.G. Bilig, R.P. Bundy and C. Flament. (1971). “Social Categorization and 
Inter-Group Behavior”. European Journal of Social Psychology 1 (2): 149-178.  
Therneau, Terry, Beth Atkinson, Brian Ripley and Maintainer Brian Ripley. (2014). “R 
Package ‘rpart’.” (2014): 3-1. 
Thompson, Grahame. (1991). Markets, hierarchies and networks: the coordination of social 
life. Sage Publishers. 
Thompson, William R. and David P. Rapkin. (1981). “Collaboration, Consensus, and Détent: 
The External Threat-Bloc Cohesion Hypothesis.” Journal of Conflict Resolution Vol.25 (4): 
615-637. 
Tiernay, Michael. (2013). ‘Killing Kony: Leadership Change and Civil War Termination’ 
Journal of Conflict Resolution Published: OnlineFirst on 21
st
 Aug 2013. 
Tilly, Charles. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
212 
 
Tucker, Robert C. (1963). The Soviet Political Mind. New York: Praeger.  
Tullock, Gordon. (1971). “The Paradox of Revolution”. Public Choice. 11(1): 88-99. 
Turner, Malcolm E, Edwin L. Bradley, Katherine A. Kirk and Kenneth M. Pruitt. (1976). “A 
Theory of Growth”. Mathematical Biosciences. 29 (3): 367-373. 
Ugarriza, Juan. E. and Matthew J. Craig. (2012). “The Relevance of Ideology to 
Contemporary Armed Conflicts: A Quantitative Analysis of Former Combatants in 
Columbia.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. Published online 5 July 2012. 
Valente, Thomas W. (1995). Network models of the diffusion of innovations. Vol. 2, No. 2. 
Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. 
Van Den Berghe, Pierre. L. (1981). The Ethnic Phenomenon. New York, Elsevier.  
Van Den Berghe, Pierre. L. (2002). “Multicultural Democracy: Can it Work?” Nations and 
Nationalism 8 (4): 433-449. 
Van Evera, Stephen. (1994). “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War.” International Security 
18 (4): 5-39. 
Van Evera, Stephen. (2001). “Primordialism Lives!” APSA-CP 12 (1): 20-22. 
Walt, Stephen. M. (1987). The Origin of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Walter, Barbara. F. (1997). “The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement.” International 
Organization 51 (3): 335-364.   
Walter, Barbara F. (2002). Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. 
Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press. 
Waltz, Kenneth. N. (1979). Theory of International Politics. New York: Random House. 
Ward, Michael. D. and Kristian Skrede Gleditsch. (2002). “Location, Location, Location: An 
MCMC Approach to Modeling the Spatial Context of War and Peace.” Political Analysis 10 
(2): 244-260. 
Warren, T. Camber and Kevin K. Troy. (2014). “Explaining Violent Intra-Ethnic Conflict: 
Group Fragmentation in the Shadow of State Power.” Journal of Conflict Resolution Online 
First 2014. 
Wasserman, Stanley. (1994). Social network analysis: Methods and applications. Vol. 8. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Weinstein, Jeremy. (2007). Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Wolfers, Arnold. (1962). Discord and Collaboration. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 
Press. 
Wood, Reed M, Jacob D. Kathman and Stephen E. Gent. (2012). “Armed intervention and 
civilian victimization in intrastate conflicts.” Journal of Peace Research. 49 (5): 647-660. 
Zartman, I. William. (1995). Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars. Washington, 
DC: Brookings Institution. 
213 
 
Zartman, I. William. (2005). “Need, Creed, and Greed in Intrastate Conflict” in Rethinking 
the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed, and Greed Cynthia J. Arnson and I. 
William Zartman eds. Washington DC: Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. 
Zipf, George Kingsley. (1965). Human Behaviour and the Principle of Least Effort. New 
York. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
214 
 
Appendix I - Predicting the number of rebel groups in civil wars 
The aim of Chapter II was to test the determinants of rebel group interactions. Several 
different types of statistical models were utilised, one of which was the two-step Heckman 
selection model. In the first stage of the Heckman selection model, the dependent variable, 
multiple groups, was coded a binary outcome variable (where 0 signified that a rebel group 
operated in a two-party conflict and 1 signified that a rebel group operated in a multi-party 
conflict). The variable, multiple groups, was coded in this way so that the multi-party conflict 
observations could be analysed in the second stage of the Heckman selection models. One 
problem with coding multiple groups as a binary variable is that it is only possible to assess 
the effect that the independent variables have on the probability of multi-party conflict. In 
other words, it is not possible to assess the effect that the independent variables have on the 
number of rebel groups in a conflict. To address this aspect linear regression analysis is 
employed in this appendix. The dependent variable is: 
Number of groups: a continuous variable signifying the number of overlapping groups that 
are listed in the dataset for each conflict-year. 
The same independent variables are used as before (in Chapter II). These are selected on the 
basis of their association with the likelihood of civil war. If an independent variable is highly 
associated with an increased likelihood of civil war, it is possible that the same independent 
variable will also be associated with larger numbers of groups. This argument is based on the 
notion that if some factor increases the opportunity for civil war, it may also increase the 
opportunity for the numbers of rebel groups. These are coded as follows: 
Military quality (expressed as the natural logarithm, ln[military quality]): a proxy for state 
strength that is widely used and recommended by Bennett and Stam (1996). Military quality 
is calculated by taking the military expenditure of a country divided by the number of 
military personnel, transformed by taking the natural log. Data are taken from Lacina (2006). 
This variable is included because state strength is associated with conflict opportunity. 
Previous research has shown that poorer states are more likely to experience civil war 
(Collier 2000, Collier and Hoeffler 2004; 2007, Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, if state 
weakness provides more opportunity for civil conflict, it could be argued that weak states 
would be more likely to have larger numbers of rebel groups.    
Democracy: a continuous variable ranging between 0 and 10, where 10 signifies that the 
country is entirely democratic and 0 signifies that the country is entirely undemocratic. Data 
are taken from Lacina (2006). This variable is included because democracy is also associated 
with conflict opportunity. Hegre et al. (2001) have shown that mixed regimes, which are 
neither fully democratic, nor extremely repressive, are most likely to experience internal 
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conflict. This argument is based on the notion that highly authoritarian states are less likely to 
experience civil war because potential rebels are less likely to mobilise when they perceive 
the cost of group formation to be high. Highly democratic states are also less likely to 
experience civil conflict because they have institutionalised channels through which 
opposition groups can be accommodated (Tilly, 1978). In the middle of the range however, 
where regimes are not repressive enough to prevent mobilisation but also not accommodative 
enough to channel opposition through institutional mechanisms, conflict is most likely 
(Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001; Fearon and Laitin 2003). Thus, if intermediate 
levels of democracy are associated with increased opportunity for conflict, it could be argued 
that these states will be prone to conflicts with higher numbers of rebel groups.   
Ethnic fractionalisation: coded as before. The association between ethnic heterogeneity 
(either polarisation or fractionalisation) and the likelihood of civil war has been an area of hot 
debate. Polarisation occurs when a society is divided into a small number of large groups, 
whereas fractionalisation occurs when a society is divided into a large number of small 
groups. Some research has shown that the likelihood of civil war is increased when states are 
highly ethnically fractionalised, but not when they are ethnically polarised (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004). Other research has shown that the relationship between ethnic 
fractionalisation and the likelihood of civil war is weak, but that civil war is most likely when 
societies are highly ethnically polarised (Garcia-Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2004; Østby 
2008). The rationale behind these arguments is that heterogeneous societies, which are 
divided along ethnic lines, are more prone to grievances arising between groups. In turn, 
these grievances increase the likelihood of war. If ethnic heterogeneity increases the 
likelihood of war, it could also be argued that it increases the numbers of rebel groups that are 
motivated to participate in war.    
Results of the linear regression analysis are shown in Table AI.1. The coefficients for all 
three independent variables are statistically significant at the <0.01 level.  Predicted values 
for these relationships are plotted in Figures AI.1 – AI.3. These were generated using the 
margins and marginsplot commands in STATA.  
The coefficient for ln[military quality] is negative, indicating that weaker states encounter 
conflicts involving larger numbers of rebel groups. This result is in-line with the expectation 
detailed above, although the causality of this effect is ambiguous (as noted in Chapter II). The 
presence of a weak state could encourage more rebel groups to engage in conflict in the first 
place, or alternatively the presence of multiple groups could mean that the state is weakened 
more than if it was fighting a single rebel group.  
The coefficient for democracy index is also negative, indicating that higher levels of 
democracy are associated with lower numbers of rebel groups. This is contrary to the 
expectation that a curvilinear relationship between number of groups and democracy index 
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might exist, with the largest numbers of groups occurring at intermediate values of 
democracy. The standard errors on this result are small, which is indicative of high precision 
regarding this statistic. In Figure AI.2, the confidence intervals are also small. These aspects 
suggest that the assumption of a linear relationship between number of groups and democracy 
index is correct. This was confirmed by inclusion of the squared term, democracy index
2
, into 
the model, which was not statistically significant. Although this result is contrary to 
expectations, the effect is extremely small, as is evident in Figure AI.2. The coefficient for 
ethnic fractionalisation is positive indicating that higher degrees of ethnic diversity in a 
population are associated with larger number of rebel groups entering into conflict against the 
state. This is in-line with expectations. 
Table AI.1 Linear regression estimates for the number of groups in a conflict 
Variable Coefficient Standard error 
ln [Military quality] -0.461**  0.043  
Democracy index -0.042**   0.016  
Ethnic fractionalisation 1.192**  0.190  
Number of obs.                 798  
F (3, 794)                        60.5  
R
2
                            0.18  
Note: ** denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.01, * denotes significance at p = ≤ 0.05 
Figure AI.1 Predicted values of number of groups for a range of assumed values of 
ln[military quality] (range = 0:12) generated from linear regression estimates 
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Figure AI.2 Predicted values of number of groups for a range of assumed values of 
democracy (range = 0:10) generated from linear regression estimates 
 
 
 
Figure AI.3 Predicted values of number of groups for a range of assumed values of 
ethnic fractionalisation (range = 0:1) generated from linear regression estimates 
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Appendix II - Flow diagrams for computer based simulations 
(a) Flow diagram of computational scheme used to generatcfe p1(t) and p2(t) values for 
equations (5.12 – 5.15) plotted in Figures 5.1 – 5.4. The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
B1 = 0.01 
B2 = 0.01 
t = 0, ∆t = 0.1 
 
killrate1 = -B2 * N2 
killrate2 = -B1 * N1 
∆N1 = killrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t  
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 
N2 = N2 + ∆N2 
 
t = t + ∆t 
END 
No Yes 
Use equation 
5.12? 
Use equation 
5.13? 
Use equation 
5.14? 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 
No 
No 
No 
Use equation 5.15 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
p1 = N1 / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = N2 / (N1 + N2) 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / N2 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / N1 
 
p1 = N1 / N2 
p2 = N2 / N1 
 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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(b) Flow diagram of computational scheme used to generate p1(t) and p2(t) values for 
guerrilla warfare plotted in Figure 5.5. The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
C1 = 0.01 
C2 = 0.01 
D1 = 0.0003 
D2 = 0.0003 
t = 0 
∆t = 0.1 
 
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = searchkillrate2 * ∆t  
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
 
t = t + ∆t 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 END 
No Yes 
searchkillrate1 = killrate1 * (D1 * N1) 
searchkillrate2 = killrate2 * (D2 * N2) 
 
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 
N2 = N2 + ∆N2 
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(c) Flow diagram for ABM used to generate p1(t) and p2(t) values for guerrilla warfare 
plotted in Figure 5.6. The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
breed = rebel = N1 = 800 
breed = government = N2 = 1000 
C1 = 0.01 
C2 = 0.01 
 
All agents move forward 1 assuming 
Brownian motion 
Eliminate government agent 
according to kill probability = C1 
END 
No Yes 
Place all agents in their environment 
at random x, y coordinates 
If  
breed = rebel   
If 
 government agent 
nearby   
 
If 
 rebel agent  
nearby   
 
Eliminate rebel agent according 
to kill probability = C2 
 
If 
government  
agent eliminated 
If 
rebel agent  
eliminated 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 
 
No No 
Yes No 
Yes Yes 
Wait Wait 
No No 
N1 = N1 – 1 
N2 = N2 – 1 
 
Yes Yes 
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(d) Flow diagram of computational scheme used to generate p1(t) and p2(t) values for 
asymmetric warfare plotted in Figure 5.7. The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
C1 = 0.01 
C2 = 0.01 
D1 = 0.0003 
t = 0 
∆t = 0.1 
 
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t  
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
 
t = t + ∆t 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 END 
No Yes 
searchkillrate1 = killrate1 * (D1 * N1) 
 
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 
N2 = N2 + ∆N2 
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(e) Flow diagram showing the stochastic element applied to the killing probability for all 
types of conflict (figures 5.9 – 5.11). The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
RND = random number [0:1] 
B1 = RND * 0.05 
C1 = RND * 0.04  
B2, C2, = 0.01 
D1 = 0.0003 
D2 = 0.0003*5 
t = 0 
∆t = 0.1 
 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 END 
No Yes 
Direct-fire 
conflict? 
Guerrilla 
warfare? 
Asymmetric 
warfare 
killrate1 = -B2 * N2 
killrate2 = -B1 * N1 
 
∆N1 = killrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t  
 
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 
N2 = N2 + ∆N2 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
 
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
searchkillrate1 = killrate1 * (D1 * N1) 
searchkillrate2 = killrate2 * (D2 * N2) 
 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = searchkillrate2 * ∆t  
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
searchkillrate1 =  
killrate1 * (D2 * N2) 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t 
Yes No Yes 
No 
RND = random 
number [0:1] 
B1 = RND * 0.05 
C1 = RND * 0.04  
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(f) Flow diagram showing the stochastic element applied to N1 for direct-fire conflict 
shown in Figure 5.12. The case where N1 = 800 is shown. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 800 
N2 = 1000 
LL = 0.0001  
UL = 1 
α = 2 
B1 = 0.01 
B2 = 0.01 
t = 0, ∆t = 0.1 
 
killrate1 = -B2 * N2 
killrate2 = -B1 * N1 
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 
N2 = N2 + ∆N2 
 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
 
t = t + ∆t 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 END 
No Yes 
∆N1 = killrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t  
 
fractionN1 = (LL
α
 * UL
α
 / (RND * LL
α
 + (1 - RND) * UL
α
)) 
(1/α)
 
 
If 
RND ≥ 0.5 
Yes No 
N1 = N1 + ∆N1 N1 = N1 - ∆N1 
stochastic ∆N1 = fractionN1 * N1 
 
Key to variables 
 
LL = power-law lower limit 
UL = power-law upper limit 
α = power law exponent 
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(g) Flow diagram showing the inclusion of terms for rebel recruitment and government 
deployment shown in Figures 5.13 – 5.20. 
 
START 
Initialise variables 
N1 = 100 
Nmax = 2000 
C1, C2 = 0.01 
D2 = 0.0003 
D2’ = 0.003 
A1 = 0.00001 
A2 = 0.05 * N1 
A2’ = (0.05/10) * N1 
t = 0, ∆t = 0.1 
 
END 
No 
Yes 
Run experiment 
with a troop ratio 
= 20:1? 
N2 = 600 
 
Yes No 
Run experiment with a  
troop ratio = 6:1 
N2 = 2000 
 
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
 
searchkillrate1 =  
killrate1 * (D2 * N2) 
Run  
experiment  
for Figure 5.13? 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t 
searchkillrate1 =  
killrate1 * (D2’ * N2) 
 
N1 = (N1 + ∆N1) + ((A1 * N1) * (Nmax – N1)) * ∆t 
N2 = (N2 + ∆N2) + A2 * ∆t 
 
Run experiment  
for Figure 5.15 
 
Yes 
No 
killrate1 = -C2 * N2 
killrate2 = -C1 * N1 
searchkillrate1 = killrate1 * (D2’ * N2) 
 
∆N1 = searchkillrate1 * ∆t 
∆N2 = killrate2 * ∆t 
Run  
experiment  
for Figure 5.17? 
 
Run experiment  
for Figure 5.19 
 
No Yes 
p1 = (N1 – N2) / (N1 + N2) 
p2 = (N2 – N1) / (N1 + N2) 
t = t + ∆t 
If 
N1 > 0 and N2 > 0 
N1 = (N1 + ∆N1) + ((A1 * N1) * (Nmax – N1)) * ∆t 
N2 = (N2 + ∆N2) + A2’ * ∆t 
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Appendix III - Modelling rebel group growth 
The growth of a rebel group can be likened to the spread of an infection through a population, 
such that existing group members (or infected individuals) recruit (or infect) others. Such a 
process is described by the logistic (or limited growth) equation (Turner et al. 1976). The rate 
of growth of recruited members (dN/dt) is described by the equation: 
NNNA
dt
dN
)( max1 −=         (AIII.1) 
where Nmax is the maximum number in the population available to be recruited and α1 is a rate 
constant. In the early stages, when N << Nmax, this equation takes the approximate form: 
NNAdtdN max1)/( ≈ , which has the solution: )(exp max10 tNANN = , where N0 is the group 
size at t = 0. This exponential growth continues until the term (Nmax – N) in equation (AIII.1) 
becomes increasingly important and the growth rate then decreases, eventually approaching 
zero as maxNN → . Note that when N = N0 the initial growth rate is (dN/dt)0 (= 0N& ), so that 
the rate constant can be expressed in the form
00max01 )( NNNNA −= &  and equation (AIII.1) 
can then be rearranged to give:  
maxmax0
max
0
0
max /1
/1
N
N
NN
NN
N
N
N
N






−
−
=
&&
       (AIII.2) 
The solution of this equation gives the time dependence of the group size as follows (Turner 
et al. 1976): 






−
−−+
=
)/1(
exp)1(1
1)(
max00
0
0
maxmax
NNN
tN
N
NN
tN
&
     (AIII.3) 
This equation represents an S-shaped growth curve and is illustrated in Figure AIII.1. The 
group size and time are plotted in the normalised forms )/()( 0max0 NNNN −− and 
)/1/()/( max000 NNNtN −&  respectively.  
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Figure AIII.1 Group size as a function of time according to equation (AIII.3). The size 
and time are expressed in the normalised forms as given in the text 
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Agent-Based Modelling of Group Growth 
Agent-based modelling (ABM) can be used as an alternative to the deterministic method 
described above. The basis of ABM was described earlier in Chapter V. Here the growth of a 
single rebel group is modelled to reproduce and therefore validate the deterministic method 
described above. At the onset (t = 0), Nmax agents were programmed to move by random 
Brownian motion over a two-dimensional surface. Of these agents, a number N0 carried the 
attribute ‘recruited’. On collision with a ‘non-recruited’ agent, that agent was allowed to be 
recruited and therefore gain the attribute ‘recruited’ according to a user-input value of the 
probability 0 ≤ P ≤ 1. The program produced an output of rebel number versus time. A set of 
growth curves obtained by this ABM are shown in Figure AIII.2 using the values Nmax = 
1000 and N0 =50. The initial rate 0N
& was determined from the average initial rate determined 
from 15 runs of the program. The value of A1 was then calculated from the expression given 
earlier, namely: 
00max01 )( NNNNA −= & . The growth curve determined from deterministic 
methods, reproduced from Figure AIII.1, is shown for comparison. The curves are in good 
agreement, thus validating the compatibility of the two methods. 
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Figure AIII.2 Comparison of rebel group growth curves obtained by ABM and those 
predicted by equation (AIII.3) 
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